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Vol. 75 JANUARY 1975 No. 1 
JUDICIAL REVIE\V OF FEDERAL ADlYIINISTRATIVE 
ACTION: QUEST FOR THE OPTilYIUM FORUM 
DAVID P. CURRIE�· AND FRANK I. GOODMAN** 
Professors Currie and Goodman present a comprehensive analysis of 
the variables that Inust be isolated and <t•eighed in determining the ophmum 
forum for judicial re·uiew of adnzi11istrati'L•e action. While the backdrop for 
this study is the caseload crisis presently confronting the federal courts of 
appeals, their discussio-n i!!z11 zinates the reqz11:sites for opt iwunn judicial review 
generally. 
Failing to percei·ve any com pelling reason to single out administrative 
cases for rez•iez( ' in separate cou rts , the authors argn e against the cr eation of 
special administrati'L'e appeals courts. Ez;en if such courts were to enjoy broad 
subject matter jurisdiction over the most deHwnding aspects of the agency 
revie·w caseload, countervailing considerations, such as the danger of im proper 
influence on the appointnzc nt process and the loss of the jll(/r;es' generalist 
perspective, outweigh the percei< :ed benefits of unifonnity , e:t·pertise and relief 
for the rc.r;iona! courts of appeals. 
As to t/ze optimal forum -ze£thin the present syste1n of district courts and 
courts of aj; pea!s, the authors divide the ir discussion into three categories of 
a[Jency action. vVith respect to fornwl agency detenninations, the authors 
genera.!ly favor direct appel!ate court rrvie·zu, except ·where diversion to the 
district courts in the first instance ·is necessary to reduce an appellate work­
load ozvhich has grown to such proportions that d threatens the collegial nature 
of circuit court decisimmzali'inq; and anwng two-tier systc1ns, the authors sug­
gest that discretionary appcl!ate review be hrnited to areas gcneraring a 
lmrdensome volume of appeals, ·im•o iving issues or interests of Telative insig­
nificance and not bearing a poten tial for biased or ·Jnisquided trial co�wt 
decisions . 
Informal rule·nw!�ing, qenerally invo lvinr; issues of legal inz.portance which 
are li/,;cly to u ltimately reach the courts of appeals in awy event, is presump­
tively appropriate for direct apjJt'llate revie-w. Despite the absence of a 
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago. A.B., 1957, University of Ch icago; 
LLB ., 1960, Harvard University. 
""'  Professor o f  Law, Univers ity oi Pennsylvania. A.B., 1954; LL.B., !959, Harvard 
University. B.A. ,  1956, Oxford University. 
2 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 :1 
trial-type record, the courts of appeals will not have to engage in extensive 
factfind1:ng, for any factual issues ·will increasingly be deterrm:ned on the basis 
of materials before the agency, and any need for new factual informat-ion will 
be rare and obtainable b;; methods short of a judicial trial. 
In the case of informal adjudication, hOLuever, the absence of a formal 
adjudicative record justifies a presump tion in favor of initial district cou.rt 
review. Informal rulemaking is distinguished, for the issues arising frmn in­
formal adj11dication are likely to invol'ue questions of spedfic fact, there is 
little guarantee of any mean1·ngful record for reviecv, and a larger proportion of 
such detenninations are relati·vely unimportant and unlikely to be taken to 
the courts of appeals. The authors recognize that direct circui t  court review 
may be appropriate if review is limited to reconstr11ction of the record before 
the agency and there is therefore no significant factfinding burden. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A. The Issue 
The aim of this Article i s  to explore the considerations that determine 
which federal administrative act ions are best reviewed by the district courts, 
which by the courts of appeals,*** and which by separate courts of admin­
istrative review. 
This study was commissioned j ointly by the Administrative Conference 
of the United States, which has a continuing interest in quest ions respecting 
judicial review of agency action, and by the Commission on Revision of the 
Federal Court Appellate System, which i s  particularly concerned with  the 
issue as it affects the circuit cour t s .  That Commission, created in  response to  
serious warnings that the courts of  appeals are  overloaded, has heard how the 
press of cases has led to heightened use of summary procedures and to  t he 
fear that the quality of deci sion may be impaired. \Vhi le  it is this concern that 
provides the immediate impetus for the present stu dy, i t  would be a mistake to 
view the matter ent irely from the standpoint of the courts of appeals .  The over­
riding goal must be to afford adequate and efficient access to the courts gen­
erally. At the :same time. the condition of all of the courts is a relevant factor 
in  assessing the optimum system of j udicial review : A review scheme that 
looks good on paper may be a disaster i f  overloaded dockets seriously impair 
the quality of adj udication. 
In fiscal 1974, 1,994 of the 16,436 cases (12 percent ) fil ed in the eleven 
circuit courts came d irectly from federal "Boards and Commissions" other 
than the Tax Court 1 !VIoreover, in the same year the Unit eel States or i ts  
officers or agencies were parties to over half (7,334 of 13,491) of the cases 
appealed to the circuit courts  from the district courts .  lVIany of these were 
ordinary criminal cases. Even so. and setting aside proprietary and tax cases, 
i t  appears that several hundred administrative cases, perhaps n early a 
-------·---- -·------ ·- - ·----
.. *** The United States Court of Appeals 11· i l l  be referred to, intercl1angeably, as c�urts of appeals." "appeals cour ts ." o r  "circu i t  courts"; the i?.tter term. though not stnctly C<?_rrect. frequently sen·es the interests of brevity, euphony, or  variety. 
b 
1. �9;4 REPO�T OF T!IF: DmECTOR OF TirE Ao:v!INISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS,  ta  le  BJ [herematter cited as  A.O. REPORT]. 
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thousand, reach the c ircuit  courts annually through the district courts . 2 The 
number of such cases not appealed beyond the district courts is presumably 
a good deal h igher. 
Dean Roger Cramton has i dentified three dimensions of any inquiry into 
what constitutes the optimum in  institutions for the resolution of controversies: 
accuracy, efficiency and acceptabi lity.3 By accuracy is meant a l l  those consider­
ations that contribute to a high quali ty of decisionmaking : the qual ifications of 
the deciders, adequate t ime for deliberation, and so forth .  Efficiency reflects 
the truism that the conditions for quality cleci sionmaking are not without cost : 
I t  i s  also des irable to avoid undue delay, expense, or  the extra  l itigation that 
may be prompted by fuzzy juri sdictional l ines or by the  uncerta inty of sub­
stantive law. Acceptab i l ity  embraces the principle that it is important that 
l it igants feel they have been fairly treated.  \Ve shall bear these dimensions 
i n  mind i n  exploring the quest ion of optimum forums for j udic ia l  review. 
The result  is no blueprint for change. If one concludes f rom this study, 
or from what we have overlooked, that changes are necessary. additional work 
wil l  be requi red to flesh out the detail s .  
B .  Patterns of Judicial Review 
At common law, rel ief against u nl awful government action was sought 
m the ordinary courts of  first instance. An inj ured c it izen equid fi le  for one 
of the prerogative writs--chiefly mandamus, certiorari and habe.c1s corpus-for 
an i njunction ( and later for declaratory judgment ) ,  or for damages in tort 
against the offending officer .  A civi l  or criminal defendant m ight assert as a 
defense the i nvalidity of the regulation or other provision upon which the 
proceeding was based, and an offending officer could  he prosecuted criminally .4 
In the federal courts, common law certiorari \vas essential ly unavai lab le,5 
and, unti l  recently, mandamus lay only i n  the District of ColumbiaG F ecleral 
government action could be revi ewed in state courts in  c riminal and damage 
2. !d., tab le  B 7. The category of "other" U.S. defendant cases-which does not 
include government property, contracts ,  torts, or tax cases-numbered 690 in  fiscal 1 974. 
Social security cases (246) were separately categorized. Related questions are also 
presented in civi l  or cr iminal district court proceedings to enforce regulatory statutes. 
Judge Leventhal has test ified that appeals from district court rul ings in revi ew oi 
administrative action "comprise almost  al l of the so-called 'U.S.  Civil '  cases component 
of the District of Columbia Circuit's workload." which in turn "is now running 32% of 
filings in  1974." He added : " [ u 1 ndoubtedly. a disproportionate number of  such fi l ings are 
in the Distr ict  oi Columbia," despite the :Mandamus and Venue Act of 1 962, 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1361, 1391 (e) (1970). Statement by Judge Leventhal Before Commission on Revision 
of the Federal Court Appellate System, 1hy 2 1 ,  1 974, at 13- 1 4  [hereinafter c i ted as 
State?ncnt of Judge Lcucnthal]. 
3. Cramton. Ad111inistrative Procedure Reform: The Ef ects of S. 1663 on the Con­
duct of Federal !?ate Proceedings, 16 Ao. L. REv. 108. 1 1 1 - 13  ( 1 964). 
4. See, e.g., L. JAFFE, JuDICIAL CoNTROL OF ADNUNISTRATI\"E AcTION 152-96 (1965): 
F. GoonKow, TIIr: PRINCIPLES OF THE Ao:-IINTSTRATI\"E LAw OF THE UxnEo STATEs 
378-411 (1905). 
5. Degge v. Hitchcock. 229 U.S. 162 (1913 ) .  Sec L. JAFFE, supra note 4, at 1 66-67. 
6. Kendall v. United States, 37 U .S. ( 1 2 Pet.) 524 (1838). and cases therein cited. 
See generally D. Ct.:tum:, 1-EDER.'\L CoGRTS 541-42 (2cl ed. 1975). 
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proceedings/ and by way of defense, but state courts lacked authority to issue 
mandamus8 or habeas corpus9 against federal officers or, general ly, to try 
federal offenses.1
0 
Judicial review reforms in  the states, exemplified by the Model State 
Administrative Proce�ure Act, often retain the common law principle that 
administrative action is to be reviewed by the ordinary trial courts_ll From 
the beginning of this century. however, Congress has frequently  deviated from 
this model to provide for review by three-judge trial courts, by the courts of 
appeals generally, by a single court of appeals,  or by a more or l ess specialized 
tribunal. The present statutory scheme is a patchwork of these various tech­
niques . 
I. Dr sTRICT CouRT OR CouRT OF APPEALS REVIEW: 
Two-TIER oR SINGLE-TIER STRUCTURES 
A. Formal Administrative Action 
The Federal Trade Commission Act of 19 14 set a pattern for many sub­
sequent federal statutes i n  prov iding for both review and enforcement of 
Commission "orders" not in the trial courts but in  the several courts of ap­
peals.12 Among other agencies whose orders bypass the district courts are the 
Power, 13 Communications, 14 Securities15 and Maritime16 Commissions, and 
the Labor17 and Civil Aeronautics18 Boards. 
The rationale for the direct-review model, and its appropriateness for 
most, if not al l ,  of the agencies to which it applies, are plain enough . The key 
point is that the district court i s  unnecessary here because the functions it 
ordinarily performs i n  the j udicial system are either performed by the admin­
istrative agency itself or are relatively unimportant . F irst and foremost, a 
court trial need not be held because the record has already been developed at 
7. United States ex rcl. D rury v. Lewis, 200 U.S. 1 (1906); Teal v. Fel ton, 53 U.S. 
( 12 How.) 284 ( 1851). Congress has increasingly al lowed the defendant to remove to the 
federal court ,  sec 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1970) and predecessor statutes. 
8. M'Ciung v. S i l l iman, 19 U. S.  (6 Wheat.) 598 (182 1) (dicta). 
9. Tarble's Case, 80 U.S.  ( 13 Wall .)  397 ( 1872). 
10. See Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 HARV. L. REv. 545 
(1924); H .  FRIENDLY, FEDERAL ]URISDICTIO": A GENERAL VIEW 8 & n .28 (1973). State 
court j urisdiction to enjoin federal officers surprisi ngly r emains unsettled even today 
despite the absence of federal jur isdiction in cases of low dol lar value. Sec Arnold, Tlic 
Po'''cr of State Courts to Enjoin Federal Officers, 73 YALE L.J. 1385 (1964): 28 U.S.( 
§ 1331 (1970). 
11. 9C UNIFORM L\\VS ANNOT. 174, 183 (1957), 134, 136, 158 (Supp. 1967). The 
Model Act i n  earl ier or l a ter form has been adopted in a t  l east ten states. Sec also In. 
REV. STAT . ch. 1 10, § 268 (1968). 
12. 38 Stat. 7 17, 719, § 5. The present statute is 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) ( 1970). 
13. 15 u . s .c. § 7 1 7r(b) ( 1970). 
14. 28 u.s.c. § 2342(1) ( 1970); 47 u.s.c. § 402 ( 1970). 
15. 15 u.s. c. § 78y ( 1970) .. 
16. 28 u.s.c. § 2342(3) (1970): 46 u.s.c. § 830 (1970) . 
17. 29 U. S .C. § 160( e), (f) (1970). 
18. 49 U.S .  C. § 1486 ( 1970), which also makes similar  provision for orders of the 
federal Aeronautics A dm inistrat ion ( FA A ) .  
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the admin istrat ive level i n  trial-type hearings conducted by administrative 
law j udges in accordance with the Administrative P rocedure Act ( APA) .19 
Second, a district court opinion defining and focusing the i ssues, f requently 
useful to the appellate court in  other types of lit igation, i s  superfluous because 
opinions by the admin istrative l aw judge or by the agency itself wi l l  already 
have served that purpose. Third, the  avai l ab i l ity of a convenient and relatively 
local point of entry i nto the j udicial  system, valuable  to l it igants of modest 
means i n  other civi l  cases, i s  of much l ess importance i n  many areas of admin­
i strative review where the economic stakes are typical ly h igh and the l it igants 
well abl e  to bear the costs. Finally, the v ital screening rol e  which courts of first 
instance play i n  holding down the volume of appellate l it igation is, once again ,  
played here by  the administrative process .  Only a small fraction of  the  cases 
processed by most agencies wind up in court ,  and a h igh proportion of those 
that do could be expected to reach courts of appeals even if required to  pass en 
route through d istrict courts. The efficiency argument is obvious: Assuming 
appeal as of right from district to appellate court,20 bypassing the trial court 
s ignificantly expedites ultimate clecision,21 lessening the burden on both courts 
and l it igants . 
N evertheless, Congress has not invariably placed j urisdiction to review 
record agency adj udication i n  the c ircuit courts. Record review of  applications 
for old age, survivors' or d isab il i ty benefits under the soc ial security law,  for 
example, i s  channeled to  the district courts by statute.22 Unti l  recently, the 
same was true of administrative workmen's compensation determinations 
under the Longshoremen's and Harborworkers' Compensat ion Act .23 Simi­
l arly, in  the absence of specific j u dic ial rev i ew provisions, assorted other formal 
agency adjud icat ions are afforded review in the distr ict courts. The AP A 
makes numerous agency actions reviewable in  "a court of competent juri s­
diction,"24 and only the district courts enj oy grants of general j ur isdiction in  
the first i nstance over mandamus act ions25 or  actions arising under federal 
law.26 Examples of district court record review under general j ur i sdictional 
provisions inc lude dispositions of m ining cbms by the Department of the 
19 .  5 u.s.c. § 556 (1970). 
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 ( 1970). 
21. Si'c, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914) (conference decision 
to substitute direct review of Federal Trade Commission (FTC) orders for the three­
judge-district-court procedure passed by the Senate) ; H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 
lst Sess. (1961) (expedition was the express reason for extending the direct reviev.­
procedure to deportation orders of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) ) . 
22. 42 u.s .c. §§ 405(g), 42l(d) (1970). 
23. 44 Stat. 1424, 1436 (1927). A 1972 amendment, 86 Stat. 1251, 1261, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 921 (c) ( Supp. III 1973), provides for review by an administrative board and then 
by the circuit courts. The House Report gives no reason for the change. Sri' notes 
128-35 and accompanying text infra. 
24. 5 u.s .c. § 703 (1970). 
25. 28 u.s.c. § 1361 (1970). 
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Interior and of federal employee discharge cases by the Civil Service Com­
mission ; both have come under recent attack as t ime-consuming and out of 
line with the proper Trade Commission model . District court review, it i s  
argued, "serves . . .  no viable purpose."27 The two-tier model assumes that, 
in some classes of federal agency l itigation, district court review does perform 
a function important enough to j ustify the obvious cost and delay of an addi­
tional stage of l itigation. 
In the following analysis we shall examine the two models rather more 
closely, identifying and evaluating the comparative advantages of district and 
appellate courts as forums for record review of administrative action. 'vVe begin 
by asking, first , what would be gained and lost by district court review if 
there were no subsequent recourse other than to the Supreme Court on 
certiorari .  \Ve frame the discussion in  this way not because we believe single­
tier district court review a viable option, but because we  can more easily iso­
late the relevant features of the two forums by vi ewing them independently 
rather than in coordination. Second, we compare the two-t ier model to the 
single-tier alternatives, assuming a right of appeal to the circuit courts .  Third, 
we add to the comparison a two-tier scheme in which appeals court review is 
available only on a discretionary basis .  Finally, the general considerations 
which have been set forth are appl ied to specific agencies that might be thought 
borderline cases. 
1 .  Single-Tier District Court Re7Iie7u. ( a )  A ppraisal of Advantages. 
In a single-tier scheme, the district court would have three maj or advantages 
over the court of appeals as a forum for review of administ rative action .  The 
first is i ts greater proximity, convenience and, therefore, economy to the pri­
vate l it igant .  Appel late courts s it in one or two c ities in each circuit ,  district 
courts in many more; l itigating close to home i s  presumably less costly. This 
advantage may be of little importance, as we have said, in  big cases, especially 
when the agencies themselves are highly centralized. But for the social security 
claimant ,  the injured longshoreman, the discharged federal worker, access to 
27. Po !cover v .  Secretary of  the Treasury, 477 F.2ct 1223, 1225-28 (D. C. Cir .  1973), 
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1001 (1974) ( employee d ischarge ) ,  and cases therein cited. Sec also 
Johnson & Stol l .  Jzulicial Rc<.:icw of Federal Emplo:yee Dismissals and Other .4dc•ersc 
Actions, 57 CoRXELL L. REv. 178 ( 1972); Strauss, Procedures of tlzc Departwcnt of tlzc 
Interior ,,.itlz Respect to lvfining Claims on Public Lands 170-71 ( 1973) ( Report pre­
pared for Administrative Conference of the United States, published in 1974 UTAH 
L. REV. 185, 266) : 
Given a formal hearing process within the agency, the results o f  that process  
should have the  consequences normal ly  accorded agency hearings on-the-record: 
a review proceeding brought direct ly to the United States Court  of Appeal s  i n  
wh ich the standard appl ied for review of  factual issues i s  substantial evidence 
upon the record as a whole.  Dis t rict courts have no specia l expertise or funct ion 
to warrant continuation of the present two-tiered structure for review; r ather, 
they have seemed somewhat at sea, and far from uniform in their approach 
to review . . . .  
I n  Po!coc'Cr, for example,  the t ime spent in the district court was twenty-seven months . 
477 F.2d at 1227. 
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a convenient forum may be thought essential if the expense of litigation is 
not to swallow the recovery or price it beyond pursuit. "The obvious theory of 
a district court venue," wrote Professor Jaffe, "is that the typical plaintiff is 
a person of modest means."28 
Yet the difference in litigation costs between district court and circuit 
court review should not be exaggerated. More than a third of all civil litigation 
in federal district courts is brought in cities where circuit courts also sit.29 
For this large category of litigants. the court of appeals is no more costly or in­
convenient than the district court. Furthermore, many of those who must travel 
to a court of appeals must also travel, though less far, to a district court. The 
ninety-four federal judicial districts (including the Virgin Islands, Puerto 
Rico, Guam, and Canal Zone)-on the average, less than two per state-are 
not "local" in the way the county courthouse is. Finally, in the record review of 
agency action, a court of a
_
ppeals, even when significantly more distant, is not a 
great deal more costly. A trial is not needed; witnesses need not be trans­
ported; added costs may be limited to a small difference in filing fees30 and 
to the attorney's transportation, food and, perhaps, lodging costs plus travel­
time compensation for the single clay of oral argument,31 if indeed there is one. 
The increasing use of summary procedures by courts of appeals32 reduces the 
cost advantage of the district court, as it reduces the quality advantage of the 
appellate court. Thus, vvhile it is incorrect to say that litigating in the circuit 
court "should cost no more,"33 the saving is not on a grand scale; we guess it 
to be anywhere from zero to $600.3� 
28. L. ]AFFE, supra note 4, a t  158. It was on thi s  ground that the Motor Carrier 
Lawyers Association, speaking for the small trucker. opposed (almost uniquel y )  the 
transfer of  Interstate Commerce Commission review to the c ircuit courts. Sec H carino 
an !-! .R. 13927 Before Hause Com 111. on Inter state & Foreign C mnnzcrcc, 90th Cong·:. 
2d Sess. 32 (1 968). In the .•\gricu l tu ra l  Adj ustment A ct, 7 U.S.C. § 1365 (1 970), 
Congress carr ied th is  pol i cy one step further, p roviding the fanner aggrieved by h i s  
assigned product ion quota \v·i th t h e  addit ional option of a state court forum. Sec De7Jelop­
mcnts in the Lww: Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 HARV. L. 
REv. 827, 906 (1957 ) .  The same pol i cy h elped induce Congress in 1958 to  forbid removal 
of state court workmen's compensation cases, 28 U.S. C. § 1 445 ( 1 970 ) .  and in 1 962 to 
allow mandamus actions to be brought outside the D i strict of  Columbia,  28 U.S.C .  
§ §  1361  1391(e) (1970). See S.  REP. No. 1 830, 85th Cong., 2d  Sess. 6-1 0 (1 958 ) :  
S. REP. No. 1 992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 ( 1 962). 
29. The data upon which thi s  stat ement i s  based are found in 1974 A.O. REPORT, 
snpra note 1. table  C3.  
30. Fi ling fees are $15 i n  the distri ct  court, $50 in the c ircu it courts, see 28 U. S.C. 
§ 1 914 ( 1970) : note following id. § 1 91 3  (Supp.  III 1 973) . This difference i s  not only 
small; i t  i s  a lso not immutabl e. Since the provision of the federal appel late rules that 
briefs may b e  produced "by any duplicat ing or copying process which produces a c lear 
bl ack image on white paper," FED. R. APP. P. 3 2, has been read, a t  least i n  the Seventh 
C ircuit, to a llow xerox copies of typed br iefs, there seems no reason to expect a 
d ifference i n  printing costs. In any case, such a difference would argue for modifying 
the print ing rules. not for dispensing with c i rcu i t  court review i f  that appeared other­
wise desirable. 
31. See gencraily Carri ngton, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The 
Threat to the Function of Revicu· and the National La<.u, 82 HAR\·. L. RD·. 542, 606, 
608 ( 1969). 
32. See note 52 infra. 
33 .  Johnson &: Stol l ,  suj1ra note 27, at 1 94 n.89 (1972) . 
34. Round-trip coach br e on the l ess expensive clays between Honolulu and Los 
J ! 
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vVe must note, too, the possibi l ity that district court rev1ew may be 
costlier and less convenient to the Government . Where an agency's cases are 
managed by United States Attorneys in the field, those stationed in cities 
where courts of appeals are located frequently acquire a special competence in  
handling l itigation from a particular agency ; to d istribute that l it igation 
among the district courts would force the Government either to assign cases 
to local federal attorneys who lack that expertise or to pay for c ircuit-riding 
by those who have it . l\I uch the same applies to agencies that organize their 
attorneys on a regional basis more or less parallel ing j udicial c ircuits.3 5 E x­
pense to the Government, however, cannot alone just i fy denying private l it i­
gants a convenient forum within their means .  I f  the district court were cost l ier 
to the Government than the c ircuit court to the private l it igants ,  efficiency 
might dictate the latter as the forum, but fairness would require that the 
private parties be  compensated for their travel time and expense.36 
The second and more significant advantage of s ingle-tier district court 
review is the conservation of j u dicial resources : t he reduction, by two-thirds, 
of the number of j udges required to decide each case. This does not mean a 
commensurate reduction i n  the number of judge-hours per case. A single dis­
trict judge cannot handle as many cases i n  a given t ime as a t hree-judge 
appellate panel . A lt hough the panel may perform some j udicial tasks in tripli­
cate, opinion-writ ing, the most onerous task of al l ,  fal ls to only one judge per 
case. A recent t ime survey by the Third C ircuit indicates that a judge spends 
roughly half ( 48 percent ) of his case time writing opinions.:37 Half of the 
overall appellate effort would not  be reduced at a l l  by substituting s ingle­
judge review : the other hal f would be reduced by two-thirds ; the overall 
saving of j udge-hours would be one-third.38 
A third advantage of the district court over the c ircuit court, going both 
to efficiency and to qual ity .  i s  the greater flexibility with which it can be  ex­
panded to meet rising caseloacl demands. This flexibil ity flows from the fact 
Angeles is $253.33 (per Uni ted Air Lines information office, S ept. 20, 1974) ; fl ight  t ime 
is long enough so that the attorney can probably expect to  spend a full working day and 
a night in  the process. If he charges for eight hours' t ravel t ime a t  S35 per hour, l ives 
on the federal $40 per diem,  and spends $20 for taxis, \Ve add $340. V.fe have disre­
garded the cost of traveling to Honolulu from a remote island to make connections. 
s ince that must  be borne to reach the district court  too. 
35 .  Those agencies which handle or supervise their o\vn l it igation from vVashington. 
or which rely on the Civil D ivi s ion of the D epartment of Justice, m ight have no s trong 
preference in terms of  cost, but coul d  find it more difficult to maintain central i zed super­
vision if forced to meet the distr ict  courts' shorter time periods for response. 
36. Sec Carrington, .mpra note 3 1, at 606. 608 n .277. 
37. FEDERAL J U DICIAL CExTER, 3D CIRCUIT T D!E STUDY (November 16, 1972) .  
38. An example may clarify : I f  a circu i t  court  panel r equires a total of 30  j udge­
hours to decide one ease- l S  for opinion-writ ing and 15 (as  per the Third Circuit  t ime 
study ) for everything el se-a s ingle di str ict  j udge would need only 20 hours- 15 for 
opinion-writing and five for everything else. This  reckoning ignores the t im e  spent by 
appel late j udges in conferring and in writ ing dissenting or concurring opinions ; to  that 
extent, it s l ightly understates the savings accomplished by dis tr ict  court review. Accord­
Ing to the Third C ircuit t ime  s tudy, id., the latter functions consume 5.7 percent of the 
appel late j u dge's case t ime. 
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that district courts are not expected t o  maintain consistency among their own 
decisions .  The appellate courts, on the other hand, strive not only to  resolve 
conflicts of decision within and between districts but also to  maintain harmony 
among their own decisions through en bane procedures that become both 
costly and awkward when too many judges are involved. The essential differ­
ence, as Judge Friendly has explained. is that the appellate court s are intended 
to be far more collegia1 .39 I n  t estimony before the Commission on Revision of 
the Federal Court Appell ate System. j udges have vigorously argued for 
limiting the courts of appeals to n ine members. a number already equalled or 
exceeded in  several circuits .40 I f  we assume that these courts cannot be 
further enlarged, it becomes c lea r  that, even if  the basic cost of judge-time 
were the same at both l evels ,  a given volume of cases could more seriously 
impair the quality of adjudication in  the  courts of appeals than in the district 
courts. This is not to say that enlargement of the district courts through the 
appointment of additional judges i s  altogether painless. The larger the court 
the more difficult it becomes to administer it efficiently and to  preserve a 
semblance of uniformity i n  its rulings. But once a sufficient diversity of v iew­
point and attitude is represented, additional judges are not likely to  increase 
very much the risk of disuniformity or unequal justice. The fourth advantage 
of the district court is its superiority on occasions when, despite the existence 
of an administrative record, evidence must be taken . Sanctions for the viola­
tion of National Labor Relations Board ( NLRB ) orders, for example,4 1 
depend not only upon the  validity of the order, which can be determined from 
the agency record, but also upon proof of its later violation, which vvas not in 
issue before the  Board. Similarly, the propriety of interim relief against either 
an order or its violation pending judicial review42 may depend upon facts 
respecting the balance of hardships that are outside the agency record.43 
39. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 10 ,  a t  29-31, 40-46 (1973 ) .  
40. S ce Digest of T esti11 1ony R eceived by the Commission 0 1 1  Revision of the Federal 
Court A ppclla tc System in Con nee lion zvith Hearings A ug.-S c p t. 1 97 3 (Statements o f  
Chief Judge Seitz on  behalf of the T h i r d  Circuit  judges ;  Statement o f  J uclges Gewin. 
Morgan , Clark, Col eman, Godbold, Dyer , S impson and Be l l ) .  
41. 29 U. S.C. § 160(e) ( 1 970) . 
42. Sec, e.g. ,  29 U.S.C. § 1 60 ( e ) , (f) ( 1970 ) ,  authorizing temporary rel ief  11·hen 
review or enforcement i s  sought of  an NLRB order. General authority of  the same nature 
i s  conferred by the All ·writs Act ,  28 U.S.C. § 1 651 ( 1 970 ) ( "all  writs necessary or 
appropriate in aid of their respective j ur isdictions" ) . 
43. vVe do not view the erstwhi l e  const itut ional  requirement of a j udic ia l  "tr ial  de 
novo" of  certain "j ur isdictional" or "const i tu tional" facts found on the record by ad­
min istrative agencies, sec, e.g., Cro11·ell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 ( 1932) , as presenting 
additional occasions for evidence-taking in the circuit  courts. This  doctrine has been i n  
serious dec l ine in  the last several decades, sec 4 K .  DAVIS, AD�IINISTRATI\'E L A w  TRLI TISE 
1 56-6 1 ( 1958)  ; Jaffe, J udicial R e<-·iew : Co llstitu tional and Jurisdic tional Fac I .  70 H ,\RI . 
L. REI'. 953. 973 ( 1957) .  Moreover, i f  the requirement has any vi ta l i ty at a l l ,  i t  seems 
l ikely i t  wi l l  be satisfied by a j udici a l  redetermination of  the facts  on the basis of the 
agency record ; Crowell i tself spoke repeatedly of the need for an  independent j udicial 
"deterrninatiun. ' '  The power to remand to permit addit ional evidence and the authority tu 
ignore administrative findings seem fully to assure complete judicial control of  any 
administrative proceeding. Congress seems to share our conclusion t hat no judicial tr ia l  
i s  necessary under Crowell, for i t  recently transferred revie11· of longshoremen's inj ury 
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Taking oral testimony in open court is  a highly inefficient procedure for three 
judges ;44 if the incidental functions of enforcement and interim relief imposed 
the burden of conducting extensive trials in  any substantial percentage of cases, 
the desirability of direct review would be questionable. 
There may be no wholly satisfactory solution to the problem of incidental 
factfinding in contempt or interim-relief proceedings in courts of appeals. 
Sending these issues back to the agency45 or to a master46 can cause delay,47 
and the former gives rise to obj ections that the agency is  made judge in its 
own cause.48 Sending parties to the district court for interim rel ief40 or  to 
enforce orders reviewable in the court of appeals50 splits what might be thought 
a single case between two forums, with varying risks of duplication ,  conflict, 
expense and delay. 
cases such as Crozt•c/1 i tsel f from the distr ict  courts to the courts of appea ls .  See note 
23 snp·ra. 
44. Sec. e.g. , NLRB v. Del l, 309 F.2d 867, 869 ( 5th  Cir. 1 962) . On occasion the 
courts of appeals have themselves heard oral testimony. E.g., N LRB v. Lambert, 250 
F.2d 80 1 ( 5th Cir .  1 958 ) . Sec a lso NLRB v .  I nt ' l  Ladies Garment �Workers Union, 36 
CCH LAB.  CAs. IT 65,365 (3d Cir.  1 959 ) ( granting temporary relief agai nst a refusal  
to bargain upon finding ir reparabl e  harm on the basis of oral testimony, affidavits and 
argument ) .  
45. Sec, e .g. ,  NLRB v.  Reta i l  Clerks Int ' l  Ass 'n, 203 F.2d 1 65 ( 9th  Cir .  1 953 ) .  Cf, 
ILL. A ?\ N .  STAT. ch. 1 10A, § 335 ( g )  ( Sm ith-Hurd Supp. 1 974) ( requiring prior applica­
tion to the Pol lution Control B oa rd to stay its  own orders ) ; FED. R .  APP. P .  8 ( requir ing 
prior appl ication to a d istrict court  to stay its j udgment or for interlocutory inj unction ) .  
46. See, e.g., N LRB v. Giannasca, 1 1 9 F.2d 756 ( 2d Cir .  1 941 ) ; NLRB v. Litt le  
Rock Furni ture Mfg. Co. ,  1 23 F.2d 868, 87 1 ( 8th Cir .  1 94 1 ) ;  N LRB v .  Red A rrow 
Freight Li nes.  Inc. ,  193 F.2d 979 ( 5th Cir.  1 952) . 
47. Sec N LRB v. Giannasca, 1 19 F.2cl 756, 759 ( 2d Cir .  1 94 1 ) ( Clark, ] . ,  concurr ing)  
( reference to master caused year 's  delay ) ; N ote,  Tlzc Role of Contc1 1 1pt  Proceedings in 
Enforcing Orders of the NLRB , 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 603, 6 1 5  ( 1954) ( two years for re­
mand to Board in  NLRB v. Retail Clerks Int ' l  Ass'n, 203 F.2d 1 65 ( 9th Cir. 1 953 ) ; 
six years for master in N LRB v. Weirton Steel Co. ,  1 46 F.2d 1 44 ( 3d Cir .  1 944 ) ) .  Some 
time can be saved by directing the agency or master s imply to take evidence and not find 
the facts ; this  procedure a lso helps to preserve the u ltimate authority of the court by 
avoiding deference to a subordinate trier of fact. 
48. See Wallace Corp. v. NLRB,  159 F.2d 952 ( 4th Cir. 1 947 ) ; id. at 957 ( Soper, 
]., dissenting) .  It is not c lear that the argument has  more force here than when the 
agency enters the original order. Su L .  JAFFE, supra note 4, a t  305-06 ( 1 965 ) .  Having 
the facts as to v iolation determined by the expert agency reduces the risk of error or of 
conflict bet\\·een agency and court as to the l egality of the same conduct. See NLRB v .  
Giannasca, 1 1 9 F.2d 756,  759 ( 2d Cir. 1 94 1 )  ( Clark, J .. concurr i ng ) ; Bartosic & Lanoff, 
Escalatiny the Struggle Against Taft-Hartley Conte11mors, 39  U. CHI. L .  REv. 255,  289 
( 1972 ) ; L. ] .\FFE, supra note 4. at 307-08. 
49. I t  is perhaps because of the awkwardness of  appel late trials that, despite c i rcuit  
review of final  � LRB orders ,  the statute authorizes only the d istrict courts to grant 
temporary injunctions against al leged unfair labor practices while the Board considers 
the merits ,  29 U.S. C. § 1 60 ( j ) ,  ( I )  ( 1970 ) .  In the absence of a specific  prm·ision for 
district court rel ief before entry of a Board order, the Supreme Court has upheld in­
terim relief by the circuit court under 28 U . S . C. § 1 6 5 1 ( 1970 ) ,  in order to protect i ts 
future j urisdict ion.  This  procedure requires the circuit  courts to find the facts for them­
selves al though, i n  contrast to requests for interim rel ief after entry of a final order, the 
matter is not pendent to a review proceeding al ready properly in  the appellate court. 
50. E.g., I LL. A X )! .  STAT. ch.  1 1 1 ;/,, § §  1 04 1 -42 ( Sm i th-Hurd Supp. 1 974 ) ( Environ­
mental Protec tion Act ) . FTC orders may be enforced either by district court action or, 
if they have been reviewed and ordered enforced, by a contempt proceeding in the 
circuit cour t .  I S  U.S.C .  § 45 ( c )  ( 1970 ) ; id. § 45 ( ! )  ( Supp. I I I ,  1 974) ; sec United 
States v. Bostic,  335 F .  Supp. 1 3 1 2  ( D.S .C .  197 1 )  ( district court ) ; In re Holland 
Furnace Co. ,  3 4 1  f.2d 548 ( 7th Cir. 1 965 ) ( circuit court ) .  
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But one should  keep the seriousness of the problem m perspective. The  
reported cases do  not  suggest that the  courts o f  appeals are  suffering greatly 
from the need to find facts in such proceedings. Given the time pressures sur­
rounding applications for interim relief, we suspect the facts are normally pre­
sented by affidavits ,  which are no special problem for three judges to handle, 
or in  a very brief and thus not terribly burdensome hearing. N LRB contempt 
cases, those in which the fact problem has been most prominently discussed, 
have been quite infrequent .51 If  the countervailing advantages of cou rt of 
appeals review are considerable, the delays of an occasional remand or the 
dangers of bifurcated review may be an acceptable price to pay. 
( b )  The Superior Characteristics of Courts of Appeals. Against the 
greater economy and convenience of the district court forum must  be weighed 
the great advantages of review in the courts of appeals : its capacity, or per­
ceived capacity, for superior decisionmaking and its abil ity to develop and 
maintain a uniform and coherent case law for a large geographical area . The 
quali tative superiority, i f  i t  exi sts, can be attributed to three principal consid­
erations. First, and by far the most important, is  the multi-member composition 
of the appellate court. The process of coll egial clec isionmaking tends to coun­
teract bias, subj ectivity and incompetence. The need to persuade colleagues , 
and the opportunity to be persuaded by them, bring reason to the fore and 
subordinate considerations that cannot be defended in argument. Moreover, i f  
one in three members of a district bench is  inept, one in three cases wil l  be 
decided ineptly ; in a court of appeals ,  ineptitude would more often be outvoted. 
Besides. multi-j udge review helps to minimize the extent to which l itigative 
outcomes are determined by "the luck of the draw, " the fortuities of j udicial 
assignment .  The decision of a panel of three j udges chosen from a bench of 
nine is far l ikelier to be representat ive of the views of the whole court than 
a decision by one of hventy district judges. Nowhere i s  this value more im­
portant than in the review of certain types of administrative action, where 
outcomes so frequently reflect, in subtle ways, the philosophy and public policy 
preferences of the j udge. 
A second element of superiority is the supposed overal l h igher caliber 
of the appellate bench . B ecause of its greater rarity, superior authority, wider 
territorial j urisdiction, and consequent prestige, a seat on the appel late bench 
attracts men who would not accept a district j udgeship. Furthermore, district 
j udges are recruited almost exclusively from the ranks of the tr ial bar, whereas 
appellate judges are drawn from the profession as a whole and,  at l east i n  
theory and t o  a considerable extent in practice, from the best o f  t h e  district 
j udges. 
-- -· -- · ---- ---------··---- --- -
5 1 .  S ce Bartosic & Lanoff, mpra note 48, at 256-58. Only 1 64 contempt cases hac! 
been brough t as of 1971 for an average of five cases per year, \\·ith a high of 23 in a l l  
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Third ,  apart from the  qualifications he brings to  the  bench, the  appellate 
judge is  better equipped by his j udicial experience as a whole for the task of 
reviewing administ rative action. Evaluating the decisions of other j udges i s  
his daily business. Trial j udges, on the  other hand, are more accustomed to  
exercising discretion , .  l ess accustomed to reviewing i t s  exercise, l ess practiced 
in applying a standard of adj udication that requires them to defer and, there­
fore, more prone to substitute their j udgment for that of the responsible ad­
ministrative official .  This contrast, we suspect, is  somewhat overdrawn. 
District judges, though unaccustomed to passing upon prior judicial action, 
are regularly  called upon to decide whether evidence is or  would be sufficient 
to support a j ury verdict, and the thought process requi red for that determina­
t ion is not very different from that required in reviewing the findings of a 
lower court or an administrative agency. A more important difference, we 
think. is  that a circuit court j udge has greater opportunity than a district 
judge to familiarize himself with the substantive law of taxation, labor rela­
tions. securities regulations, and so on. One of thirty district j udges i n  a 
Circuit can expect to hear no more than 3 percent of the total caseload in  any 
field : one of nine appel late j udges wi l l  hear 33 percent of that caseload. It i s  
no  wonder that pract it ioners so  frequently complain o f  the  difficulty of making 
district judges understand the complexities of their particular specialty .  A re­
lated difference is that appellate j udges are more accustomed to deciding, and 
writing opinions on, question s of substantive l aw than district judges, who 
spend the greater part of their time conducting trials and ruling on procedural 
questions and who rarely write opinions of any great l ength. 
A reservat ion must he entered, however. The quality advantage of the 
court of appeals ,  l ike the efficiency advantage of the district court , is weakened 
by the increasing practice of the former of deciding cases without oral argu­
ment or written opinion .52 Indeed, where such summary procedures are used, 
it might well be argued that the advantage is  reversed. A litigant, given 
a choice, m ight reasonably prefer to have his case decided by a single district 
judge who offered him an opportunity to be heard in  person in support of or 
in opposition to a motion for summary judgment rather than by an appel late 
panel  that denied that opportunity. 
vVhether or not the circuit court is in fact the superior forum, it is clear 
that most l it igants, both private ancl governmental , bel ieve it to be and would 





For a comprehensive descript ion and analys i s  of the pract ice, sec H aworth,  -'lr;rccnl ! l.<J and Sunl ll l ory Pro ccdur,·s in the United Sta ll's Courts of A ppeals, 1 973 \VA S I-l .  
U . L . Q .  257 .  Sec also B ernard G.  Segal,  T h e  Case for P reserving Oral  A r<Yum ent i n  the 
United States Courts  of A ppeals .  speech to the American C o l l ege o f  T�ia l  La\\·yers,  
:VIarch 1 9 . 1974. I n  fi scal year 1 972, of 12.455 cases decided ( l e s s  consol idation ) ,  3,918 
( � 1 .5 percen t )  were disposed of withou t  oral argument or sub m i ssion on br i efs,  8,987 
( 12.2 percent ) \\ i thout s igned opinion,  and 4.995  ( 40.1 percen t )  wi thout any \\T itten 
opmlon. 1 972 A . O .  1\.EPORT. supra note 1 ,  table 1 2, at 1 04. 
14  COLUMBIA LA W REVIE W [Vol. 75 : 1  
that j udicial review by a federal court of more than one j udge has come t o  be 
looked upon as a matter of basic right in al l  cases, civi l  and criminal,  adminis­
t rative and nonadmin istrative. I f  the l it igant who loses in  a district court 
t rial is  entit led to review by a circuit court, woul d  the loser before a mere ad­
ministrative body sett le for less ? This sense of entitl ement. whether or not 
justified, reinforces the obj ective considerations favoring appellate review.53 
Another argument often made in  favor of appellate review of administra­
tive action is that it would be unseemly and demeaning for a single district 
j udge to set aside the decisions of an expert administrative agency, especial ly 
one that i tself i s  multi-membered . l\or i s  the point solely one of protocol : The 
risk of error is  especial ly high when the j u dgment of one prevails over that of 
many. The argument from seemliness, however, applies  l es s  strongly to  some 
agencies than to others. I t  applies ful l  force to  the great independent regulatory 
commissions whose members are appointed by the President with congressional 
approval and enj oy a secure, if l imited, tenure. The el ement of indignity 
dwindles, however, when the agency is  of l esser stature-for example, the  
Board of Immigration Appeals in the  Department of  J ustice or the  Appeals 
Council within the Department of Heal th ,  Education and vVelfare ( HEvV ) , 
both quasi-j udicial tribunals created and terminable by departmental regula­
tions, and staffed by members appointed and removable at  wi l l  by the respective 
heads of their departments :  or even the Benefits Review Board  in the D epart­
ment of Labor, a statutory body, to be sure, but otherwise not very d ifferent 
from the other two. 
vVhether the superior decisionmaking ability of a three- judge tribunal 
would  alone j ustify its added cost-and, in  the case of the court of appeals .  
the reduction of col l egiality brought about by the need for increased member­
ship-is a complicated question . At the outset, it shou ld  be  emphasized that 
the greater l ikel ihood that an issue or controversy will be decided correctly  by 
three heads than by one is  not generally deemed a sufficient reason for com­
mitting it to  three j udges . Decision in the first instance is  nearly always en­
t rusted to a single j udge, most of whose determinations ( not only on questions 
of specific facts, but also on questions of inference, interpretation, di scretion, 
remedy, and so on, are subj ect to narrovvly l imited review, assuring that the 
one j udge wil l  not be second-guessed by the three unless he goes egregiously 
wrong. lVIoreover, the use of mult i-j udge panels for the review of district 
court decisions in  ordinary civil and criminal l it igation does not necessarily 
imply a societal j udgment that correction of egregious error  is a more Im­
portant or demanding function than init ial  decision, or so important or de-
-------- -- --- --
53 .  T h e  l i t igan ts'  preference for a nml t i- j udge forum, ho\Yever, cannot be decisive 
so long as the added costs of such first-class j ust ice are not borne by the l i t igants them­
sel ves through fully compensatory user fees .  Of course, a party p r e fers a better  tr ibunal  
i f  he can get i t  for nothing.  I f  they had to pay their  \vay, many consumers of  j udic ial  
services,  at  least i n  some types of l i t igation. m i ght \\·e l l  opt for the smal l  economy s1ze .  
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manding as to justify the additional costs of multiple j udges. The plurality 
of appellate j udges can be sufficiently explained by two other factors : the 
unseeml iness of l etting a single j udge undo the work of another ; and their 
responsibi l ity not only to correct error in  the part icular case, but, more im­
portant ly, to maintain a coherent body of la\v over a broad geographic  area-a 
duty which does j ustify, and perhaps demand .  a premium brand of adju di ca-
tion. 
·whether the correction of egregious error wou ld  alone j ustify the costs 
of multi-judge review may wel l vary according to the nature of the case. 
First, the g reater the significance of the matter to be decided, the more re­
sources society may be j ust ified in spending in an effort to decide i t  correctly. 
An investment of j u dicial t ime that might seem indispensable  i n  passi ng upon 
Power Commission rates for a whole new gas field, for example, m ight appear 
an inexcusable luxury in determi ning the ownership  of a b icycle .  Simi lar ly, 
the difficulty of the case may be relevant to  the appropriate investment of 
judicial resources. The advantages of a highly qualified,  multiple-j udge panel 
may be especially important i n  cases where the technical difficulty of  the  ques­
tions enhances the risk of error. 
The importance one attaches to the advantages of a multi-j udge  court 
for the correction of error \Vi i i  take on significance when we evaluate two-t ier 
review. But for purposes of comparing systems of single-tier review, the  
decisive advantage o f  the  court of appeals i s  its capaci ty to  develop and  main­
tain a coherent ,  reliable and uniform case law for a fai rly large geographical 
region. As suggested earlier, the importance of correctly dec iding l egal issues 
that transcend the particular case argues strongly in favor of providing a first­
class forum . l\!Ioreover , apart from the quality of decision, the very freedom 
from cumbersome en bane procedures that gives the district courts significant 
advantages in  t erms of abi lity to accept additional workloads disables them, 
whether their j udges sit singly or in threes, from performing the lawmaking 
funct ion. As courts of first instance, those in  heavi ly populated areas i nevitably 
have large caseloads which necessitate too many judges to be able to  achieve 
even d istrict-wide, l et alone circuit-wide, uniformity .  At best, single-ti er dis­
trict court review would sett le l egal issues one district at a time, l eavi ng the 
law uncertain elsewhere i n  the ci rcuit and promot ing l it igation . At  worst, i t  
woul d  generate a host o f  inconsistent decisions within and between distri cts, 
unresolvable short of the Supreme Cour t .  which has difficulty fi nding t ime 
even to  iron out conflicts among eleven c ircuit courts. I t  woul d  be bad enough 
that interclistrict conflicts woul d  result in u nequal treatment of part i es simi­
larly situated. It would be intolerable that conflicts within a single district 
woul d  make i t  impossible to determine the legality of conduct at the all­
important p lanning stage . Single-tier district court review is, t herefore, 
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simply unthinkable : only the court of appeals, with its broad territorial j uris­
diction and with j udges few enough to keep in step with one another, can 
maintain a tolerable degree of uniformity. 
The advantages of the d istrict court-convenience, j u dicial economy and 
fl exible membership-are all possible only because we do not look to it for 
uniformity. It is  the need for uni formity of decision over a wide geographic 
area that prevents the circuit courts from becoming conveniently " local" 
forums and, by placing a ceiling upon their membership, makes them vulner­
able to caseload pressures that threaten the quality of adj u dication. And it is 
also the need for uniformity ( along with desire for qual ity and fear of unseem­
l iness ) that accounts for the use of expensive multi-member panels ; deciding 
singly, appellate j udges would generate too many conflicts for feasible resolu­
tion en bane. In  sum, the achi evement of uniformity carries a price tag, but 
c learly an acceptable one. 
2 .  Mandatory Two-Tier R ez: iew: Appeal as of Right. Having assessed 
the relative advantages of c ircuit court and d istrict court review on the assump­
tion that each were to be  terminal , subj ect to Supreme Court certiorari ,  we 
can now move to the more practical comparison between d ir ect court of appeals 
review and a two-ti er system in which dist rict court orders are appealable, 
either as of right or w ith l eave. to the circuit courts. First, we shall examine 
"mandatory two-tier review" ( appeal as of righ t )  ; in the following section, 
we shall add "discretionary two-ti er review" ( leave to . appeal ) to the com­
panson. 
( a )  Two-T1:er or D irect Court of A ppeals Review. The critical advantage 
of mandatory two-tier review over single-tier district court review is that it  
provides a mechanism for the resolution of inconsistenc ies within and between 
districts and for the ach ievement of circuit-wide uniformitv. This  benefit is not 
without considerable cost in those cases where appeal s are taken . but the 
price is  u ndoubtedly worth paying in  order to  a\·oid the intolerable di scordance 
and uncertainty that would result, in nearly all areas of administrat ive review, 
if there were no recourse beyond the district cm:rt . 
The more difficult problem is to j ustify mandatory two-t ier review as 
against direct c ircuit court review. In every case eventually appeal ed to  the 
c ircuit courts . interposition of  the d istrict court substantial ly increases the 
cost of  l it igation and delays the resolution of the controversy. These costs 
are difficult to quantify with any confidence . The litigant must pay double filing 
fees and brief reproduction costs, and must transport his attorney to  two 
courts instead of to one. He must also pay for extra work by his lawyers 
( though presumably much less effort is  requi red to prepare  for a second appeal 
on essent ial ly the same quest ions ) .  The indirect costs of the  aclclecl delay, both 
to  the part icular part ies and to the system . are more elusi\·e .  Delay may induce 
parties to sett le  on terms less just than would  be  imposed by a court decision ; 
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i t  may cause deterioration o f  evidence t hat must b e  used i f  there i s  a retrial ; 
similar cases may have to be l it igated unti l  the disputed point of law is 
settled ; it also increases the harm done by a challenged practice o r  by its 
temporary restraint during the period of l it igation.54 
Nor are the disadvantages of t wo-tier review l imited to those cases i n  
which appeals are taken. Perhaps t h e  most u n fortunate consequence of adding 
the district court stage is t hat it prices the appeals court beyond the reach of 
many litigants.  The party who loses in the district court may stop at t hat point, 
not because he is  sat isfied or even resigned, but because he is  exhaust ed.  
When that occurs,  the  obj ect ion is  not only that the exhausted litiga nt has 
been deni ed access to a superior forum . as under a single-tier district court 
system. but that he has effectively been excluded from a superior forum that 
is avai lable  to more affluent l it igants .  Further, if the cost of another appeal 
is sufficiently great in  comparison to the stakes in an entire class of cases, in­
terposing the district court cou l d  create substantial disuniformity. 
Four countervail ing advantages might be ciaimed for two-tier review, 
three of them carrying litt le  vveigh t .  First . whereas in other areas of l i tiga­
tion an appel late court can profit greatly from a lower court opinion focusing 
the issues, weighing the opposing arguments and pinpointing relevant port ions 
of the record. that advantage is  min imal in the review of  on-the-record admin­
istrat ive action, where even without a dist rict court op in ion , the court of ap­
peals has the benefit of at least one, and often two, formal opinions below-by 
an administrative law j u dge and by the agency head ( o r  heads ) .  The district 
court, we m ight add, is  i n  no better po s ition than the appeals court to evaluate 
the administrat ive record and findings : it app l ies exactly the same standard 
of review, and performs an essent ia l ly duplicat i ve function .55  Second ,  the dis­
trict court,  as we have already obser�vecl . i s  closer and cheaper : sometimes 
that may matter .  If there are some for whom two-t ier rev i ew prices the appeals 
court beyond reach . t here may be others for whom the alternati�ve approach 
prices j udicial review itself beyon d  reach . Others. though able to affor d  the 
appeals court, might n evertheless prefer the cheaper forum . and doubtless many 
more would if required t o  bear the ful l  cost of mult i- j u dge aclj udication . 5G But 
since. as  suggested aboYe, the  added costs of  court of appeals r eview are apt 
to he sl ight and . in any event ,  the l i t igant \v i l l  find his district court triumph 
cheaper only i f  the Government chooses not to appeal i t .  we do not t h ink dis­
trict court convenience a weighty argument.  Third.  wh i le init ial district court 
review of record agency dec is ions would ::tclmittcclly el iminate factfi ncl ing diffi­
culties i ncident to circuit cm1rt enforcement or interim rel ief, we cannot be-
- - - - - -- ---- -·-------- - - � -- -- - ---
54. On the evi l s  of delay, sa H .  ZEISEL, H .  K .·\LH::-; & B .  B L:CJ-J H OL Z, DEL.\ Y I i\" T H E  
COL'RTS ( 1 95 9 ) . Sec also Carrin gton. su ('ra note 3 1 .  a t  .'1 5 -+.  
:;_; Polcover v .  Secretary of Treasury. 477 F.2cl 1 22.3, 1 226-27 ( D .C. C i r .  1 973 ) .  ccrt .  
denied. 4 1 -1 U.S.  1 00 1  ( 1 974 ) .  But sec N ickol v. United S tat es .  501  F.2d 1 389, 1 39 1 ( l Oth 
Cir .  1 974) 
56. Sec note 53 and accompanying text .s11pra. 
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l i eve, for reasons indicated above,57 that these occasional difficulties are serious 
enough to justify the resulting waste of resources and the impaired quality of 
adjudication. 
The only real ly important j ustification for two-t ier review is  the possibil­
ity that a great many cases wil l  not be appealed beyond the  district court and 
the  appellate courts wi l l  be rel ieved of a significant part of their workload . 
J ust how low the appeal rate ( the percentage of district court decisions ap­
pealed to the circuit court s )  must be in order to make two-tier review worth­
while is difficult to sav. l\Iore coul d  be said if the sol e  obj ective were to m in i­
mize the amount of j udge-time required for the review of formal administrative 
action. Earli er vile estimated that a court of appeals decision might require 
about three judge-hours for every two requi red by a district court decision. 
On that assumption, a 10 percent appeal rate wou ld  yield a reduction of more 
than 20 percent in overall expenditure of j udge time. and a rate of about 30 
percent would  be the "break-even ' '  l evel at which the amoun t  of d istrict-j udge­
t ime exactly equalled the reduction in appell ate-judge-time.58 
The number of j udge-hours required for the review of an administrative 
action is not, however, the only appropriate measure of j udicial efficiency for 
our purposes ; accordingly, a favorable appeal rate may not be  a necessary 
condition for the adoption of two-tier review. vVe have already seen t hat the  
courts of  appeals are  a scarce resource, less easily expanded than the district 
courts ; hence. a measure that reduces the pressure on them might be j ustified.  
even though the overall demands upon the j ud icial system as a whole were 
thereby increased, if the alternative seriously impaired the coll egial nature 
of the appeals courts. Thus, even if  the appeal rate were much higher than 
the break-even l evel . the absolute number of cases filtered out of the circui t  
courts might st i l l  be great enough to j ustify a more-than-equal increase in 
j udge-time at the district court l evel . 
vV e need hardly add that a low appeal rate, if not a necessary condition 
for two-tier review, is also not a sufficient condition. The very considerable 
disadvantages in terms of cost and d elay to some l it igants, and effective denial 
of court of appeals review to others, must be careful ly weighed against any 
savings to the j udicial system, and these savings must be substantial. An anal­
ogy may help to put the issue in perspective. Routing review of record admin­
istrative action in itially to the district court has much the same advantages and 
5 7. See notes 4 1 -5 1 and accompanying text  supra. 
58. Using the estimated ratio between distr ict  j uclge and c ircuit  court  time ( 2 : 3 )  
developed a t  note 38 and accompanying text supra, a single distr ict  j udge would invest 
10 units of j udge time in deciding 10 cases : i f  there were direct review three circu i t  
j udges \\·ould inves t  1 5 .  A ppeal in one  case  in 1 0  would add  one  and a ha l f  more units  
( diminished to the extent that the appel late court rel ies upon the opinion below ) ; appeal 
in  three in  10 \\·ould add four and a half. These crude estimates are m eant merely to be 
suggestive ; any proposal for l egis lat ive action or inaction should be supported bv 
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disadvantages as  the  i nsertion o f  a new single- judge court between d istrict 
court and circuit court in  ordinary civil  and criminal cases, which we doubt 
many would  find desirable.59 The comparison may suggest that two-t ier admin­
i strative review, even in the less important cases. ought to be viewed not as 
an ideal but as a possibly unavoidable e\·i l .  
The relevant search, then, i s  to ident ify readily definable categories o f  
administrative cases whose diversion to  the  district courts i n  the first instance 
would spare courts of appeals a burden of decision that threatens their abil ity 
to function as collegial bodies, or, less compel l ingly, that i s  not worth their 
time. In any event ,  i n  order to minimize the countervail ing costs, two-t ier 
review should be appl ied first to those categories of  cases generally simple or 
trivial enough to be least deserving of the effort of three judges .60 
3 . D iscretio nary Two-Tier Review : A ppeal by L eave. vVe have thus far 
assumed that appellate court review, whether d irect or indirect, would be 
available as a matter of right .  The alternative, a two-tier system in which 
leave to appeal from district court decisions would be gPntecl or denied by 
the court of appeals on a di scretionary basis ,  deserves i nvestigation. 
A proposal to this effect was made by J uclge Friendly in his Carpent ier 
lectures : 
[ \V ]  here review of  administrative act ion l ies in  the district court and 
that court has affirmed, appeal should be only by l eave of the court of 
appeals .  The argument would be that it is enough to grant an ag­
grieved cit izen one judicial look at the action of a dis interested gov­
ernmental agency, unless a superior j udicial body bel ieves the case 
presents a problem going beyond a part icular insta.nce n1 
Under Judge Friendly's proposal , dist rict court decis ions adverse to t he ad­
ministrat ive agency would continue to be rev iewable as of right ; only for the 
private l it igant wou ld  revi ew be conditional . Arguably ,  such a. scheme would 
meet t he crux of the obj ection that it i s  unseemly for a single j udge to  reverse 
with finality the decision of a high-status multi -meiilber board. The unseemli­
ness, perhaps, l ies not in  district court review per se but merely in  giving a 
district court final say when it reverses an agency. The very considerations-
59. On this  poss ibi l i ty, sec H .  FRIENDLY, supra note 1 0 ,  at 430 : ' " One regards with 
horror what  might be considered sti l l  another t i e r  of cou r ts, with the attendant delay 
and expense." 
60. Case-by-case determination of the appropriate forum would make for maximum 
precisi.on at the cost of a considerable sift ing burden and delay ; we woul d  not recommend 
I t .  0 J u �i sdictional -amount r equirement for direct  review woul d  he lp  to  strain  out cases  
of  I I.t t le  Immediate s ignifi cance, but  woul d inhibit  ul t imate court  of appeal s  resolution o f  
t h e  Imp?rtant legal questions t hat m a y  often arise in the smal le s t  cases. lvioreover,  despite 
years ot precedents,  such a requirement m ight resu l t  in  11·as teful j urisdi ctional l i t i o·ation. 
and adm inistrat ive  decisions concerning such matters a s  deportation or union election do 
not l end themselves to ready transl ation into money equivalents.  Sc,· ycncrallv D. CurwrE,  
supra n?te 6. a t  504-43. Thus.  even though the  pr esent statutory pract ice o
'
f prescribing 
the reviC\1 ing forum according to easi ly adminis trable categories  bears only a rough 
correspondence to the rel evant pol icies, we think it t h e  most promising anproach. 
6 1 .  H .  FRIENDLY, supra note 10, at  1 76. 
· 
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the expertise, stature and multiple membership o f  the agency-that weigh 
against finality for the district court when court and agency d isagree, arguably 
weigh i n  favor of fi nality \vhen court and agency concur .  Equality of access 
between litigants, needless to say , cuts against any such distinction and 
would argue for putting both part ies to the hazard of discretionary review. 
Another important variab le  is  the standard to b e  used in  accepting or 
rej ecting cases . At one extreme. l eave to appeal m ight be  granted only in 
cases involving important issues of law. or intracircuit conflicts, or. possibly, 
large immediate stakes . At the other pole, al l but patently frivolous appeals 
might be accepted. A n  intermediate  approach would  grant review not only 
in the i mportant cases but also in cases of patent error beiow. 
( a )  A ppraisal of A chmlfac;es .  The advantages of mandatory two-tier re­
view over direct review in the courts of appeals, it wil l  he remembered, depend 
upon the expectation that losing parties in the district court will often decide 
not to take a further appeal .  Discretionary two-tier review allows us  to  in­
crease those advantages by artificially depressing the rate of  appeal . Thus, in 
a field where the high frequency of expected appeals wou l d  obviate any sub­
stantial economies from mandatory two-tier review, making appeals d iscre­
tionary might make interposition of the district court \vorthwhi le .  Similarly, 
in  fields where mandatory two-tier review does produce significant economies, 
there may stil l be a substantial burden on the courts of  appeals that discre­
tionary review could  further lessen. 
Discretionary review, however, \vmll d  require in every appealed case a 
determination now requ ired in  none : whether to grant o r  deny l eave to appeal . 
The added burden of  this prel iminary sc reening must be  weighed against 
whatever savings might be gained through obviating a decision on the merits 
in those cases where l ea>.·e to appea l is  either not requested or  is denied . Those 
savings are, in turn, suspect in view of the increasing tendency of appellate 
courts to decide "easy" cases by summary procedures that dispense with 
formal opin ion and oral argument . If leave to appeal were denied only in 
patently unmeritorious cases, the number of applications for review '>vould not 
be greatly reduced ; a high proportion of them woul cl be granted ; and nothing 
would  be gained even i n  leaYe-cleniecl cases, since nearly every such case would  
be  one  vvhich, on  t h e  meri ts .  would be clec iclecl summari ly ,  and  since the  decision 
whether to grant or deny leave would  involve virtual ly the same judicial 
thought process as the deci sion on the merits . I f. on the other hand. lea\'e vvere 
granted only in cases presenting an important issue of law, and were rigor­
ously denied even in pot ential ly meritorious cases not present ing such an 
issue, the  savings could  be more substantial . Fewer appl ications for leave would 
he fi led : fewer of them would  be granted : fewer of those denied woul d, if  
decided on the merits ,  be  dealt with by 5ummary procedures : and the thought 
process in deciding ·.vheth er t o  gram o r  deny l eave 1.vou lcl  he more abbreviated 
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than that required for decision, even summary decision, of the merits .  Fishing 
through 4,000 annual certiorari petitions may be a whale of a j ob for the  
Supreme Court, but  it  is  surely paltry in comparison to  deciding al l  those 
cases on the m erits .  
There are some who would prefer discretionary review to wholesa le  use  
of summary decision 'procedures, even if it  were not more efficient. Their posi­
tion is that oral argument is often an essential input, even in cases that at 
first may appear open-and-shut : that an opinion setting forth reasons is  an 
obligat ion of the j udicial office : and that a decision dispensing with both is  
no proper decision at all .  Rather than pretending to decide the merits  and,  in  
the process, elevating an  unr evievved district court decision to the  status  of a 
circuit  precedent binding on other dist rict j udges, the court of appeal s shou ld .  
like the  Supreme Court. simply decline to  review-an action supposedly hav­
ing no precedential importance.  I f  the courts of appeals behaved as if appeals 
were di scretionary, surely it would be preferable to l egal ize and properly lahel 
what they are doing. But it is not wholly true that the appeals courts are t reat­
ing re\'iew as discret ionary : a cursory review of the merits is better  for the  
parties than no review at  al l .  The significant argument for discretionary re­
view, for our purposes, is  j udicial economy. 
( b )  Appraisal of Disad�·antages. The disadvantages of discretionary re­
view are immediately obvious and weighty. To a greater degree than with 
mandatory two-tier review, the appeals court would be removed as a forum 
for the correction of error and bias. In every run-of-the-mill case, a lone dis­
trict judge would have final say. I t  is  serious enough to  exclude l i t igants from 
the superior forum by raising the price of admission ; i t  is more so.  especial ly 
in the important sense of appearances, to refuse admission at any price.  The 
agencies themselves, assuming they, too, had no automatic right to review, 
might be persuaded to live with such an arrangement if satisfied that the 
circuit courts would  be open to them in the cases that really mattered . For 
the ordinary private l it igant, however, to whom the "rout ine' ' case is  anything 
but routine, denial of recourse beyond the district court might be harder to 
swallow, especially if it were denied ( as it would have to be ) only to a very 
few c lasses of l itigants .  
Discretionary two-t ier review also has the further di sadvantage of added 
cost and delay for l it igants. However much or l it t le  it  may conserve the re­
sources of the j udicial system, discretionary review would do nothing to 
consen·e the resources of the parties. If the screening procedure used by the  
courts of  appeals were modeled on the  Supreme Court's certiorari procedure, 
the appellant would have to file not one but two briefs-first . a pet it ion for re­
view arguing the "certworthiness" of the case, and . if that were successful ,  a 
full brief on the merits .  The price of admission to the court of appeals woul d  
thus be significantly increased . I t  i s  pbssilJ le that the appeals courts would not 
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choose to pattern their screen on Supreme Court certiorar i ; instead, they might 
simply require a singl e  brief presenting both reasons for grant ing l eave and 
the merits . I f  so, l egal fees would not be appreciably different than under man­
datory revi ew, but petitioners denied l eaYe would get much l ess for their 
money. 
The cost factor, however, is  probably less important than the factor of 
delay. The discretionary approach .  by sandwiching an additional stage of de­
c ision between district court and plenary appellate r ev iew, woul d  inevitably 
prolong the process of j udicial rev iew of the particular agency action in­
volved . To be sure,  the delay would be mitigated i n  part  by the t ime saved 
through reduction of the appel late courts' on-the-meri ts  caseload. And for 
l itigants general ly .  the process of j udicial review would  be shortened. not pro­
longed : that follows from our assumption that discret ionary revi ew woul d  
result in  an overal l  net saving o f  time for the courts of appeal s .  But whi le the 
benefits thus obtained would be shared by al l  circuit court l i t igants, the burden 
of delay woul d  be  borne exclusively by l it igants in  the part icular categories to 
which the l eave-to-appeal procedure was applied.  IVIembers of that class would 
be worse off, and could fair ly claim discriminat ion, whether denied appellate 
court review or merely forced to wait longer and pay more for it than others. 
In short . for the appellant who i s  denied l eave or discouraged from seeking 
it , discretionary two-tier review has nearly the same d isadvantages as single­
tier district court r eview. From the standpoint of the system as a whole, 
however .  the overriding flaw of single-tier district court review i s  absent, for 
discretionary access to a court of appeals may be sufficient to settle questions of 
law and to resolve int racircuit conflicts. 
On the strength of this analys is .  we conclude that agency action i s  un­
suitab le  for discretionary two-tier review unless two conditions are met. First, 
the volume of appeals must be large and burdensome, even after filtration 
through the district courts : otherwise, curtai lment of the right to appellate 
review woul d  not be worth the canc11 e . 62 Second. the proportion of those 
appeals involving legal i ssues or important interests must be  very small ; other­
wise. l eave to appeal would be granted too often to achine real savings . More­
over, even i f  both conditions are satisfied. the need must be very great indeed 
to j ustify outright denial of appel late court re\· iew. i f  there is any reason to 
believe that the decisions of district courts ·would svstemat icallv differ  from " " 
those that would be  reached by c ircuit courts : that i s .  that denial of automatic 
review woui cl be outcome-determinat ive in  any substantial number of cases. 
A high reversal figure i ndicates that district courts in this field are more than 
�-- ���--- ·- . 
62. The discret ionary approach \\·ou ld be appropriate, hO\\·ever. where two or more 
agenci e s .  each generating a relat ively smal l  case!oad. are combined for revie\\' purposes . 
p roduc 1 11g a large aggregate caseload . I ndeed, the more agencies subj ected to this ap­
proach. the l ess  basis there is for the obj ect ion that a par t i cu lar  class o f  l i t igants  has 
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ordinarily prone to e rror or bias and,  therefore, t hat circuit court review s erves 
an especial ly  sign ificant error-correcting function.  In particular,  i t  would b e  
unfortunate to  deny private l i t igant s  chal lenging governmental act ion access 
to appellate courts in categories  of  cases in which t l1 e  district courts  are,  in 
general .  l ess  sympathetic foru m s .  
4. Specific Agencies. ( a )  Soc ial Security Administra tion. (1)  Cur­
ren t Pract ice : ill! and a tory Two- Tier Revie1v. A natural t esting groun d  for 
these general izat ions is the Social  Security A dministration ( S SA ) , a sub­
division o f  HEW, which appears at the present to  be the most significant  
instance of a federal agency whose adj u dicat ions on a formal admi n istrative 
record are reviewable i n  the d istrict courts i n  the first instance .63 In fiscal  
year 1 974, 3, 585 social security cases were filed i n  the district courts ,64 yet  
only 246 district court decisions were appealed to  the c ircuit  courts . 65  I f  one 
looks at a s lightly longer period, and assumes a one-year l ag66 b etween the  
two stages of review, the appeals rate  seems to  b e  about 1 0  percent ,67 roughly 
the same as that for district court cases general ly .68 About 80 percent of the  
social security cases i nvolve claims for  d i sability benefits :  the balance involve 
claims for health insurance, retirement and survivors' benefits.  
That the appeal rate i s  not higher is clue in part to  the Government's  own 
pol icy of  restraint in  challenging adverse decis ions .  From the inception o f  the  
disabil ity i nsurance p rogram i n  1955 .  through 1 973,  the Government appealed 
only 102 district court reversals, barely 5 percent o f  the total .u9 I ts  pol icy i s  to  
appeal only if  the case appears to  have serious administr<1t i \·e  implications­
that is ,  is contrary to statute, regulations ,  or admin i strat ive practices and 
might have a precedential eflect on futur e  cases : mere error i n  the appl icat ion 
of the " substantial evi dence" standard of review wil l  not be chal l engecl.7° 
Disabi l i ty claimants ,  too. have tended to settl e  for a s ingl e  round of r e­
view, appealing only 12 p ercent of al l  d istr ict court defeats s ince the  p rogram 
63. 42 u. s . c. § 405 ( g )  ( 1970 ) .  
64. 1 974 A . O .  REPORT, supra note 1 ,  tab le  C2. 
6i ld., tabl e B 7. 
66. The m edian t ime  interval from fi l ing t o  d isposition i n  d i s tr ic t  court social  security 
cases is 10 months. 1 973 A . O.  R EPORT. supra note 1 ,  tab l e  CSA. 
67. Social  S ecurity Administration Cases , 1 970-74 
Fiscal war district co urt court  of aPP<'als 
1 970 1 ,735 
1 97 1  1 , 792 
1 972 2,288 2 1 0  
1973 2,497 193 
1 974 3 ,585 246 
1 972-74 A . O .  REPOET. su pra note 1 ,  tab les  B7 and C2.  A ssuming a one-year lag bet11 een 
dis tr ict  and circuit  fi l ings in  the case, the 649 appeals in the l a s t  three years are ten 
percent o i  the distr ict  court cases fi led in 197 1 -73. 
68. Sc,' 1 973-74 �'1. . 0 .  l�EPORT, supra note 1 ,  tables B3 and C2. 
69. ST.\ F F  O F  H o u s E  \VA Y S  A N D  :M t-::1 x s  CoM M . ,  93o CoNe . .  2D  S E s s . ,  REPORT o :-:: TH E 
D I S .\D! LITY I N S liRAXCE PEOGRAM 262 ( Comrn. Pr int  1 974 ) [hereinafter c i ted as (O',!­
"-llTTEE STAFF REPORT] . 
70. ld. a t  266. 
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began.71 The explanation probably l i es in  a combination o f  factors-the ex­
haustion of the l it igant's resources . a recognition that the  stakes do not j ustify 
a second round of l it igation costs, and a realistic appreciation of the odds 
aga inst success.72 Attorneys. many of \vhom take disabi l ity cases on a con­
tingency basis in the hope of earning the "reasonable fee" provided for by 
statute,':> may be wil l ing to gamble on a single appearance before a famil iar 
district j udge but not to risk further t ime and money on a long-shot try i n  a 
more distant forum.  
(2)  A ppraisal of D irect Co u rt of A pp eals Revirw. Even on the basis of 1 
present figures. cited above. one can see that direct review of social security 
cases woul d  bring a rna j or increase in  the appellate caseload . I f  every case now 
brought to district court were brought to a court of appeal s-and presumably 
most would be, since the aclclecl costs of the latter are l ikely to be triviaF4-the 
increase would be on the order of 20 percent of the total present caseloacl of 
all c ircuit courts. nearly tripl ing the present number of d irect administrative 
review cases.'5 B ut the present figures clo not begin to suggest the expected 
magnitude of the social security caseload problem in the very near future. In 
the seven-year fiscal period 1 967-73 . social security fi l ings in the district courts 
more than doubled.'6 I n  fiscal 1 97 4, they rose by another 48 percent as the first 
black lung benefit cases came to the courts uncler the Coal 1\I ines Health and 
Safety Act of 1 969.77 Black lung l i t igation is expected to increase dramatically 
in the next two years ,  and then. so far as SSA is  concerned. to drop off as that 
agency ceases to be responsible for the program.'8  I n  the long run.  a much 
more prolific source of l it igation will he the Supplemental Security Income 
Program,79 which as of January 1 .  1 974. provides for a federal ly guaranteed 
monthly income to replace the former state programs of a id to the aged, 
blind and disabled. Claims under th is  statute are al ready moving through 
the multi-tiered processes of the S S A  in about half the  volume of the regular 
disability claims80 and are expected to equal that volume. The first wave of 
these cases has not yet broken upon the district courts.  but it has been esti­
mated that by 1 976 district court filings in the combined d isability programs 
7 1 .  !d. at  269-70. 
72. �fore than 80 percent of  a l l  d isabi l i ty  appeals have been cl eci ded in  the Govern-
ment's favor by the courts of appea ls .  !d. at 270. 
73. 42 U .S .  C. § 406 ( b )  ( 1970 ) ( not  to exceed 25 percent of  past -clue benefits ) .  
74. See notes 29-36 and accompanying text wpra. 
75.  See notes 1 -2 and accompanying text supra. 
76. 1 967-73 A . O .  REPORT, supra note 1 ,  table C2. 
77. 30 U . S .C.  § 80 1 ( Supp. IT ,  1 972 ) .  
78. Uncler the Coal Mines Health and Safety Act .  black lung claims fi led prior to 
Janua ry 1 . 1 974 are administered by H E\V : c la ims subsequent  to that elate are fi led 
purstnnt to appl icable state \\·orkmen's compensation la\\·s certified by the Secret ary of 
H E \\r as having adequate coverage, or absent such cert ification, are aclmini sterecl by the 
Department o f  Labor under the prcwisions of the Longshoremen 's  and Harbor \Yorkers' 
Compei iSation .'\ct .  30 U . S .  C.  §§ 924. 93 1 -32 ( Supp. I I I .  1973 ) .  
79. 42 U .S .  C. § 1 38 1  ( Supp. I I , 1972 ) . 
80. Co;,r MITTEE STAFF REPORT, supra note 69, at 1 64. 
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will haH reached the staggering total of 1 0 ,000 per year, nearly ten percent of 
total ci\·i l  fi l ings in fiscal ye.c1r 1 97 4. 81 Nor is the burden of this caseload 
eyenly d istributed throughout the j udicial system. I n  fiscal 1 97 4, about 20 
percent of all social security cases were fi led in three j udicial districts ( Eastern 
Kentuck_v, South Carolina and Puerto Rico ) . and nearly 40 percent in eight 
districts. mostly in  the Fourth, Fift h  and Sixth Circuits and specifically in  the 
Appalachian region.82 
The impact of these new programs has not yet been felt by the  c i rcuit 
courts-yet even without them social security appeals have doubled since 
1 970 s:> I f  the 1 0,000-case proj ection for the district courts comes true, and if 
the historic 10 percent appeal rate holds, the courts of appeals will be  receiving 
upwards of 1 .000 social security appeals within four years, nearly 70 percent of 
them in the Fourth, Fifth  and Sixth Circuits . 84 
In  view of these developments, it would be manifest folly to i nstitute 
direct circuit court review. Indeed, this would be  true even i f  the appeal rate 
were many times greater than i t  is. Two-tier review means greater expense 
and delay for those litigants \Vho persenre to the appellate stage but l esser 
expense to the 90 percent who do not. And while many of those who accept 
the verdict of the di strict court do so because they cannot afford to go further, 
this consideration seems decisively outweighed by the saving-one is t empted 
to say salvation-to the judicial system through avoidance of what might 
conceivably be a 30 percent increase in the appellate court caseloacl . 8 5  
( 3 )  A ppraisal of D iscretionary T'"wo- Tier R eview. The more difficult 
question is whether court of appeals review ought not be made d iscretionary in 
social securit_v cases . The conditions outl ined earl i er seem fairly wel l sat i sfied .  
Although the present volume of appeals would not justify such a departure 
from the tradition of appel late review as of right , the proj ected volume, 
especially if concentrated in three circuits ,  could well have a discernible effect 
on the qual ity of adjuclicat ion .86 
------ - ------ ------ - --------- - --- - - - --------- -------
8 1 .  !d. at 4. 
82. 1 974 A.O.  1\.EPORT, supra note 1 ,  tab l e  C3 . 
83. Sec note 67 supra. 
84. Sec Coc.IM ITTEE STAFF 1\.EPORT, sup ra note 69, at 270. 
85 .  Ser: notes 1 -2 and accom panying  text supra.  
86. A n  a l ternative poss ib i l i ty would be to expand the number of c i rcui ts  so as to 
provide aclcl i t ional manpower \\· i thout impair ing the abi l i tv of individual courts  to  main­
ta in a uniform I a\\ of the  c i rcuit .  Every such m itos is ,  i t  · may be obj ected, reduces geo­
graph ical d ivers i ty, enhances the power of  ind ividual S enators over the appointment 
process .  ami increases the risk of interc i rcuit conflicts  that  the Supreme Cour t  may be 
too busy to resolve.  Sec. e .g. ,  H. FRIE!\ DLY, su pra note 10,  at  39-4 1 : Carr ingtor1, supra 
note 3 1 .  a t  380-87. \Ve share Judge Fr iend ly 's  reservations as to the extent to  which 
addit ional  c i rcui ts  \\·ould mean addit ional conflicts .  I f  ele\'en courts agree on an issue .  the  
chance that a t \n' l fth or  even a t\\·ent ieth w i l l  d i sagree seems remote indeed. The p rob­
lem of s i ngle- Senator dominance of a one-state  c i rcuit  could be m et in the ::\ e\\. York 
City Z� r ca.  for example, by drawing c i rcui ts  that \\ Ould i nc lude portions o f  f\e w  J ersey 
and/or Connect icut as \\· e l l  as of ?\ ew York. Spl i t t ing a state between c i rcu i t s  h a s  i ts  
prob lems.  but i t  has al ready been formal ly proposed for  Cal i fomia by the Commission 
un I\.c\· is i"n o f  the Federal  Court Appel late System . and an  extens i ve argument  has been 
26 COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW [Vol .  75 : 1  
The second condition-that relatively few appeals would b e  al lowed under 
a discretionary procedure-is also probably met . It is plain  that a high pro­
portion of al l  social secur ity cases involve purely evi dentiary issues. More 
pert inent. and less c lear, is whether the same can be said about the much 
smaller subclass of cases in which appeals are now taken .  Since the Govern­
ment appeals only 5 percent of its district court reversals and selects those on 
the same criteria that circuit courts vvould use in granting l eave, discretionary 
review woul d  not substantially weed out this  class of appeals .  Pri\·ate l itigants. 
however, who appeal more than twice as often . use less stringent criteria : one 
assumes that their contribution to the circuit  court caseloacl woul d  probably 
be materially reduced by a discretionary filter.  
T he third consideration-that the substitution of d i scret ionary for man­
datory review should haYe no systematic  effect on the outcome of litigation­
presents a more difficult question .  The Government's petit ions for review 
will .  in  the main. be granted : those we can ignore. The question is whether 
discretionary review woul d  deprive social security claimants of a forum gen­
erally more favorable  to them than the district courts. The answer is  probably 
not but depends to some extent on how one evaluates certain figures. If one 
ignores remands and technical dismissals, more than four out of five disability 
appeals are decided in the Government 's  favor in the circuit courts .  But count­
ing remands as losses-not unreasonable since seven of every eight appeals 
are by the claimant-the Government's batting average fal l s  to a l ess reassuring 
67 percent. 87 I n  any case, there is  sol id evidence that di strict court review is 
no mere rubber stamp. Prior to 1 968, the SSA's record in  the district courts 
was notably unimpressive, a maj ority of cases ending either in  reversals or 
remancls.88 Since that t ime,  it has fared somewhat better. partly because of a 
1 968 statutory amendment tightening the definition of disability89 and partly 
made that the problems of a spl i t  state are  not very serious. Sec H el l m an,  L egal Pro/Jic! l ls  
of D i<.•idin r; a Stutc B e tween Federal Judicial Circuits, 1 22 U .  p ,, ,  L. REv. 1 1 88 ( 1 974 ) . 
To develop ful ly the disadvantages of dividing the circuits and to compare them ll' i th 
those o i  the present social securi ty pattern is  beyond the scope o f  this study. 
87. Co:--nriTTEE S T A FF REPORT, sup·ra note 69, at 270. 
88. In  1 965,  t\1 0 distr ict  j udges observed that in a severa l -month period in 1 965,  
the SSA hac! been either reversed or remanded in  63 ( according to  one) or  75 percent 
( according to the other ) of the cases. Scott v. Celebrezze, 2 4 1  F.  Supp. 733, 736 
( S D :\' \' 1965 ) : S eldom ridge v. Cel ebrezze, 238 F. Supp. 6 1 0 -20 ( E.D. Pa. 1 965 ) .  
Unpub l i shed fi gures compi led by S S A  show that in the fiscal year period 1 965-67. the 
Secretary 11·as affi rmed in 48 percent of  a l l  social security cases,  reversed i n  26 percent. 
and remancl ecl i n  26 percent. SociAL SEClJRITY ADill i X ISTRATIO " ,  D E P'T OF HEALT H .  Erll· ­
C\T!OX, .·\ X D  vVELFARE, 0PERATIOX,\L ANALYSIS OF T H E  B u R E.\ C O F  H EARIXGS ,\X ll 
!\PPL\LS 3 1  ( June 30. 1 973 ) [ hereinafter c i ted as H EvV. 0 PER.\TIO N,\ L  A ::-.rALY s r s ] .  Pub­
l ished figures. unfortunately ,  do not record the number of remands. They show that in 
disabi l i ty cases in  which the Secretary's decision \\'as ei ther affirmed or reversed, the 
aff-Irmance rate in the period 195.'i-67 ,,·as 66 percent : and that if total disposi t ions are  
deemed to include affirmances, re,·ersa ls  and cases in  11·hich benefits 11· ere a l lo ll· ec! after 
c ourt remands,  the aff1 rmance rate was 48 percent. Co:-r iiiiTTEE SL\ FF R EPORT, .l l tf'ra not e 
69. at 269, 27 1 .  
89. A ct o f  January 2 .  1 968, Pub. L .  No. 90-248, § §  1 04 ( d )  ( 5 ) - 1 06.  1 5 6 ( e ) - 1 59 ( b ) ,  
81 Stat .  833, 867-69, codified i n  scattered sec t ions of 42 U . S . C .  ( 1 9 70 ) .  
1975] J UDICIAL REVIEW OF A GENCY ACTION 27 
because of increasingly rigorous review of benefit-denial s within the  admin­
istrative processY0 I n  the fiscal period 1968-73 ,  the SSA was affirmed in  58 
percent of al l  soc ial security cases, reversed in 1 4  percent and remanded in 
28 percent.!ll These figures suggest that district court review, on the whole, 
is searching and sympathetic, and that placing appellate rev-iew on a di scre­
tionary basis would not leave claimants' r ights inadequately protected. 
\Ve conclude that while denial of access to a court of appeals is not a 
step to be taken without compell ing j ustification i n  the interest of a sound 
and effective judic ial system, the proper c ircumstances for such a move may 
well be present, or imminent, i n  the social security area.92 
A similar analysis should  be made before adopting the suggestion of 
transferring review of such actions as Interior Department mining claims or 
federal employee discharges from d istrict courts to the courts of appeals . � 3  
As with social security, we suspect the issues i n  both c lasses of cases are 
largely evidentiary and, especially in  the employee cases, the immediate stakes 
relatively smal l . \i\' e have no information as to the number of mining cases ; 
it appears that perhaps 200 employee cases were fi led in  the district courts 
in fiscal 1974. and \Ve know of 28 appeals. !l4 An extra 1 70 cases of this nature 
annual ly would not destroy the c ircuit  courts ( t hough over half the appeals 
were in a single circuit ,  the District of Columbia ) , but it is worth considering 
vvhether, given the caseloacl problem, even such an addition i s  j ustified. The 
more significant question is whether in it ial c l istrict court review of several 
such relatively smal l categories might in the aggregate provide substant ial re­
l ief to the courts of appeals .  
- - · - ---- ---
90. Under the estab l �shed procedure, a claimant d issat i s fied ,,· i th  the determ ination 
of the state agency, both in i tial l y and upon reconsideration, i s  ent i t l ed to a hear ing before 
a federal adminis tra t i\·e Ia,,- j udge, whose decis ion i s  revi e\\·ab l e  i n  turn, e i t her sua 
sponte or upon the c la imant ' s  request , by an A ppea l s  Counc i l .  20 C. F . R. §� -+04.90 1 -
404.990 ( 1 974) ; see co�D[ !TTEE ST.\FF  1\.E PORT, supra note 69. a t  3 1 -33.  I n  t h e  per iod 
1 960-73, the rate of reve rsa ls . both at  the hearing and appeal s  levels, has dramat ical ly 
increased. Reversa l s  by admi n istrat ive Ia"· j udges i ncreased from 1 9.3 to 52 . 1  percent ; 
rever sa l s  by the A ppeals Counc i l , from 3 .6  to 12 . 3  percent .  See CoM:-.urn:E ST.'\ F F  REPORT. 
supra not e 69, at 77.  247, 249. 254. 
9 1 .  H E'vV, 0Pr:R,\TION .\L A :-.: ALYSIS .  supra note l:)8,  at  3 1 .  House \Nays and ::_ [eans 
Com m i ttee stat ist ics ,  ,,·h i ch a re somC\\ hat less corn pl eie, indicate that i n  the per iod 1 968-73, 
i n  d i sabi l i ty cases e i ther aff irming or rever s ing the Secretary . the affi rmance rate \\·a s  8 1  
perc ent .  r is ing t o  8 5  percent i n  1 973. I f  total d isposit i ons arc taken to inc lude bencfit­
al lo,,·ances after cour t remand, the a ffi rmance rate for the  same period is  62 { 'crccn t , 
r is ing to 64 percent i n  1 973.  Co;-,r �r !TTEE STM F  R1·:PORT, supra note 69, at 269. 27 1 .  
92. The further quest ion i s  ,,·h cther steps should b e  taken t o  protect th e d istr ict  
courts from the  expected Aood of soc ial secu r i t y  cases .  T h e  fact  that these  l i t i gants have 
al ready run the gauntlet of init ial  h ear ing and administrat ive revie\\' suggest :;  that to 
i nterpose sti l l  another admin istrat i \·e hurdle m ight be practically tantamount  to denying 
j ud ic i a l rc,· icw.  The substant ia l  d isadvantages of c reating a special  court,  const i tut ional 
or legislat ive,  for social  security cases are detai led below. Sec text fol iO\'. ing note 347 
infra. vVe th ink that, given the noncol legial nature of the d i s tr i ct cour ts,  the best ,;olut ion 
may be to appoint  addi tional distr ict  j udges. 
93. Sec note 27 supra.  
94. The General  Counsel o f  th e Civil  Service Commission has informed us th a t 
40 1 such cases \\·ere fi led i n  a l l  courts i n  f1 scal 1 974 and that in fi scal 1 969 rou g h l v  bal i 
oi such cases \\·ere fi l ed in the Cour t of Claims.  T h e  appeal figure ,,·e cle r i ,·c  ·tru;.l l c lc­
tai lcd i n formation furn i shed by the Administrative Office to the Admini strative Conference. 
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( b )  National L abor R elation s  Board. ( 1 ) Current  Pract ice : Direct 
Court of A ppeals R cvie7.r.!. The Labor Board seems, at first blush, a natural 
candidate for two-tier review. Its unfair labor practice decis ions-reviewable in 
courts of appeals is either enforcement act ions by the Board or review actions 
by the charged party!l5-make up by far the largest contribution of any agency 
to the direct-review caseload. I n  the last five fiscal years, they averaged 652 
cases annually, 40 percent of a l l  direct-review cases and nearly 45 percent of 
those outside the District of Columbia.% Here, if anywhere in the adminis­
trative area, there might seem a real opportunity for pruning. :\ Ioreover, Labor 
Board cases-unlike, for example, ratemaking or l icense decisions of the trans­
portat ion and energy regulatory agencies-are not obviously unsuitable for 
initial district court review by virtue of their subj ect matter .  Typically, they 
involve narrow questions of specific fact and of law, not broad i ssues of policy 
or  discretion. And the economic interests at stake are often,  though not always, 
too small to be worth pursuing through two levels of j udicial review ; as a 
practical matter, the distr ict court would be the last stop. 
( 2 )  A ppra isal of j'vfanda tor:,• Two- Tier Review. Yet the  considerations 
favoring two-tier review seem to us heavily outweighed by t hose opposing it.97 
\tV e might add, though this i s  not decisive, that we have founcl no Labor 
Board attorney or private labor practitioner who does not resist the  idea of 
initial district court review. I t  is general ly felt that distr ict judges, apart from 
being l ess capable, on the average, than appel late j udges. are also less familiar 
with the intricacies of the Labor Relations Act .  In t ime, they would no doubt 
gain experience in labor matters but they could never gain as much as circuit 
court j udges already have-there are simply too many district court j udges and 
too few labor cases. Competence aside, labor relations is  an area in which vari­
ations in  attitude and phi losophy among dist rict j udges are peculiarly l ikely 
to inHuence l it igat ion outcomes ; a mult i-member court, with its t�?ndency to 
neutral ize bias, is  especially valuab le  here. At present, the circuit courts, w ith 
one exception , are reasonably uniform in their treatment of Labor Board 
cases,ns and there is no assurance that district j udges would be l ike-minded. If 
--··---- ---- -----------· . .  -----· ---·-····---·· . - - ------
9 5 .  29 l.' . S . C. § 1 60 ( e ) , ( f )  ( 1 970 ) . 
96. 1 97-1 A . O. REPORT, supra note 1 ,  table B3.  This figu re, however,  may be gross ly 
m i sleadi ng. By the Board's own tal ly ,  the number of court o f  appeal s decisions in review of 
enforcement  cases i n  the  period 1970-73 1vas only 1 ,384, an annual average oi 346. 1 970-73 
:\ LRB A x x .  Ru• . . tab le 1 9. The discrepancy seems to l ie in the fac t  that the Board's 
figure does not include, wh i l e  the Admini strat ive Office statist ic apparently does. cases 
resol ved by formal court-approved settl ements in which the charged parties st i pulated 
e i ther tu the  d i sposi t i ve facts or  to the entry of a cou r t  of  appeals j udgment. Since the j udg­
ment in such cases i s  pro forma and consumes l i t t l e  if any j u clge t ime .  it 11·ould be 
advisab le .  for our purposes , to th ink in terms of the smal ler  Board fi gure rather than the  
t11 ice-larger .-\ cl minis trative Office figure .  E1·en  on th is  basi s ,  ho11 ever ,  the  Board's con­
t r ibution to the ;1 ppel late caseload remains substant ia l ly  larger than that of  any other 
agency. 
97. S.·c n o tes 54-60 and accompanying text  supra. 
98 During fiscal years  1 968- 72. the  p ercentage of Board decis ions a ffi rmed in  ful l  in 
all except the Eighth Circuit ,  r anged narr011 ly from 63.6 to 74.3 percen t ;  every c i rcuit .  
I 
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they ,yere not , forum shopping could  become a much more serious problem for 
the Board . !JD F inally.  the  ;\fLRB i s  one of the great i ndependent agencies vvhose 
prestige makes direct review by a mult i -member court seem particularly appro­
priate. In sum, the superiority. or at least the perceived superiority. of the 
court of appeals is a factor which i n  t h i s  area deserves more than usual w eigh t .  
Fur t h ermore. i n  terms o f  efficiency. mandatory two-tier r eview for the 
Labor Board would b e  a doubtfu l prescription.  For l it igants who persevere to 
the appeals court .  i t  would fur t h e r  clelily what i s  already a lengthy process .  
The fil ing of a charge. i n formal efforts by the charging party ( fi rst at the re­
gional, then at t h e  national l evel ) to secure i ssuance of a complain t  by the 
General Counsel .  formal hearing. successive decisions by the admi n i st rative 
law j udge and by the Board typically con sume more than 10 months, j u dic i<'l l  
revi ew st i l l  to come 1 110 District court  review wou ld add at least another 
s ix . 101 and in the busier big-city districts  where labor l i t igation i s  heavy .  much 
more 102 Al l  of t h i s  m i ght conceivably h e  j ust ified by the prospect of  major 
sa,· ings to the j udicial system but t here i s  n o  real  prospect.  
\\"hether in a two-tier scheme t h e  appea l  rate would be low enough to 
yie ld  a net reduction i n  total j udge-t ime.  or a s ign i fi cant reduct ion i n  the 
appeliate caseload, i s  entirely conj ectura l .  The economic stakes i n  unfair 
labor practice cases. and the resources of the l i t igants .  vary widely : A bare 
indication i s  the fact that  a quarter of the situat ions  that come before the 
Board i nvolve establi shments with fewer than ten employees : another quarter, 
establ ishm ents with 1 0  t o  40 employees : and still anot h er quarter, establish­
ments with 1 90 o r  more employees . 103 -:\ J  oreover. i f  employers charged with 
unfair l abor pract ices frequently pursue j udic ial revtew, even i n  hopeless 
- ----·--- - ----- ----- ------ - - · - ·  -- -
that i s .  11·as 11· i t h i n  1 0 points of the national percentage o f  65.8  percent.  The affirmance 
rate for the Eighth Circuit .  h c lll·ever,  was only 44 percent .  1 973 :.J LRB A N :\" .  REP. ,  table 
1 9.-\ . at 25 1 .  
99. Foru m-shopping by pa rt ies t o  !\'LRB p roceedings has been the subj ect of much 
d iscussion and concern. S,·c ,  r . r; . . Comment .  Fon! l l l -Sh oppin.r; in th r Rr:< ' iC'<l' of !\'l,R /5 
Orders.  28 l; ( I I T .  L. En. 5 52 ( 1 96 1 ) .  T h e  N L R B  i t se l i i n forms us that i ts operat ions 
arc nut sign i fican t l y  a ffe�tecl by forum- shopping, s e c  Let t er from Peter G .  :.Jash.  Genera l 
Counsel .  :\ L R B ,  to .-\ntonin Scal ia. Chairman of Adminis trat ive Conie rencc. Oct .  23 .  
1 974. hut 1ve a r e  tol d by P r o fessor Ciyde Summers. \1"110 i s  preparing a paper on t h e  
Board for the  Commissi < >n on Re vi sion of the  Federal Court  Appel la te  System, that 
shopping is st i l l  extens i 1·e !y practiced by pr iva te attorney s.  de sp i t e the i ncreasing un J ­
fonn ity i n  d ec i s i ons by t h e  var ious c i rcui t  court s . 
1 00.  / fcar in rJS on S. 3671 Bdorc lh <' Sul.• co ;mn. on Separation of P ocl'Crs of the 
S<" n a t c  Ct l ll l l l l .  ; 1 11 th e  Judicinr_\·. cJ ! st Cong . . 2d Sess .  308 ( 1 970 ) [ h ereinafter c i ted as 
1 l ! 'ari i i (JS 0 1 1  S. 3671 ] .  
1 0 1 .  The median t ime in t erva l . from fi l ing to d isposition. i n  a l l  civil  cases in a l l  
d is tr ic t courts in fiscal  yea r 1 973 ,,-as 1 0  months .  A mong cases di sposed of pr ior to 
tr ia l . I W \\·e\-cr .  t i l e  median time 11·as onl v six months .  1 973 A . O .  REPORT, .l" l ! f7ra note 1 .  
t a h l e  c :; .  
-
1 02. I n  the S ou t h ern Di str ic t  of ::\ e\\· York.  the  period from f il i n g  to d i spos i t ion 
\\" as  2.o l l lOll t h s : in t h e Ea stern Di s t r i ct of Pennsyh·ania.  1 7  ll lOllths .  1 973 . ..1,. . 0 . R EPORT, .1"11/•ru n u t c  1 .  tah le  CS. There is some d ispute as to \l·hether the great urban dis tr icts are .  
1 1 1  fact ,  the main luci  u f  labor l i t igation. Sec 1 / carin.r;s 0 1 1  S. 3671 . supra note  1 00.  a t  75.  
1 03 .  1 973 :\ L R B  .-\ 2\" x .  REr . . . \pp table 1 8 . at 2-18. 
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cases, for the purposes of delay, the two-tier system would play i nto thei r 
han ds .  
Thus, the picture i s  m ixed : The Labor Board cases l i e  halfway between 
the small-l it igant, small-stake model exemplified by t l1e  S SA and the l arge­
l it igant, large-stake model typifi ed by the Federal Power Commission ( FPC ) ,  
Civil Aeronautics Board ( CAB ) ,  I\'uclear Reactor Commission ( N RC, for­
merly the Atomic Energy Commission ( AEC)  ) ,  and by I C C  rai lroad regula­
t ion . Mandatory two-tier rev iew does not seem warranted or politically 
possible. 
( 3 )  Appraisal of D iscretionary Two- Tier Review. There remains the 
question of discretionary two-t ier review. Its sole advantage would be to  assure 
a reduction in the appel late courts' on-the-merits caseload regardless of the 
rate of appeal .  The present volume of labor appeals seems large enough to 
make this option worth considering, but the other two conditions we have 
suggested as prerequisites for discret ionary review are not c learly sat isfied. 
One cannot confident ly say-as one could, for ex.ample. of social security, 
deportation, or longshoremen's compensation cases-that few Labor Board 
cases would qual ify for discretionary review. A substant ial number of such 
cases do involve issues of law t ranscending the particular situation. albeit 
usually narrow and technical questions of statutory construction and, more 
often, applicat ion. The ongoing conduct of  labor-management relations fre­
quently depends on there being authoritative answers to these questions .  And 
even many cases challenging the substantiality of the evidence u nderlying the 
Board's orders involve important enough interests .  e i ther in  purely monetary 
terms or in terms of the ongoing life of the plant , to make t hem eligible for 
discret ionary review. The caseload savings. while probably substantial ,  m ight 
therefore be rather less than one would expect from t he present volume of 
appeals alone. ?\fore important .  and in our view decis ive ,  is the widely per­
ceived inferiority of the district court as a forum for labor matters, the felt 
danger of b iased or misguided c\ecisionmaki!�g by district j udges unversed in  
labor law. Th i s  consideration alone, we  think.  demands that the  court o f  appeals 
be automatically avai lable-if not as a first resort , certainly as a last .  
\i\/e note, final ly ,  that some good might be clone by making Labor Board 
orders, l ike t hose of al l  other major independent administrative agencies .  self­
enforci ng .  This could be clone by providing either that the Board's own order 
should be final unless a petit ion for review i s  filed within a specific period or 
that the Board's order shall be filed forthwith in the appropriate c ircuit court 
and entered as the dec ision of the court unless challenged within a designated 
period. This reform, recommended in one variation or another by the Adminis­
trative Conference104 and others , 1 05 woul d  have two potent ial  advantages .  
1 04. 1 A IBUXISTR,\Tin: (ONF .  OF T H E  U N ITED STATES , RECO)DI E N DATIOKS ,\ i\ D Rr·:­
l 'OkTS, .'\ CU S Eec.  1 0, at 24, 237 ( 1 970 ) [ herei nafter c i ted as A CUS Rec. ] .  
105 .  See, e .g . ,  A DVISORY P.-\ N EL ON LAIJOR-},fA::<r AGDIEXT R EL\TIOX S  L\\\. [ th e  " Cox 
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First .  i t  would el iminate the period of delay that now elapses between i ssuance 
of a Board order and fil ing of an enforcement action. Second, it  would relieve 
the circuit courts of those cases in which a non-complying charged party, 
though willing to r esist an enforcement proceeding, would be unwill ing to tak e  
the init iative in contesting the order. \Ve see n o  j ustification for the  present 
unique requirement t hat the Board go to court in  order to give teeth to its 
decisions. Neither, however, would we expect the proposed change to yiel d  
more than marginal benefits .  \Vhereas a t  one t ime a total o f  1 00 days typically 
elapsed between i ssuance of the order and fil ing of the enforcement action,106 
the interval has now been reduced to about 30 clays . Vve are told, moreover, 
by the head of the Appel late Branch of the Board's General Counsel ' s  Office 
that many recalcitrant employers novv abandon their opposition to the  order 
when advised that an enforcement proceeding i s  about to be, or has j ust been, 
filed 107 The number of cases removed from the appellate dockets by a self­
enforcement provision might therefore be rather smal l .  In  any event . as Judge 
Leventhal has observed, Labor Board enforcement proceedings which are not 
truly contested are no great burden for the courts 1 08 
( c )  lm7 1 l igrat·ion and Natura!i:.:ation Ser7.'ice : Deportation Cases. ( 1 )  
Current Practice : Bifurcated R ec •iwu.•. Deportat ion orders of the Immigration 
and 1\ atural ization Service ( 1 N S )  are another category of cases that might be  
thought appropriate for two-tier review. Prior to 1 96 1 , they were i n  fact re­
viewed by district courts, either in habeas corpus or in nonstatutory actions 
for declaratory or injunctive rel ief under sect ion 10 of the Administrativ e  
Procedure Act. 1 un I n  that year, Congress, disturbed b y  "the growing frequency 
of j udicial actions being inst ituted by undesirable aliens whose cases have no 
legal basis or merit , but \vhich are brought solely for the purpose of preventing 
or delaying indefinitely their deportat ion from this country, "1 1 0  aclded section 
1 06 ( a )  to the Immigration and Nationality Act . The amendment eliminated 
the d istrict court stage and gave courts of appeals exclusive j uriscliction to 
review "final orders of deportation. " 1 1 1 
The wisdom of these amendments was sharply questioned by J udge 
Friendly in his 1 972 Carpent ier lectures. He argued that while the purpose 
of the legislation was to expedite the deportation of certain notorious al iens 
able to afford repeated dilatory appe;:tls .  in the maj ority of cases " i t  has prob­
ably had the opposite effect .  ' ' 1 1 2 \ Vhereas previously most al iens who fai led 
Panel ' ' ] . I�t:: l'OI\T TO SEN. Co�Df .  0:\ L·\BOR & P un. vVELFARF., 0RGA N I Z :\TI0l\ :\ N O  PRo­
l EI > l'f<E OF nn: :\" L R B ,  S. Doc. :\o.  8 1 ,  86th Cong., 2d Sess.  ( 1960 ) .  
1 06.  1 .\ C U S  Rcc. 1 0 ,  supra note 1 0-t, at 259. 
1 07. \Vi l l i ngness to comply may be in Auenced by recent appel late deci sions that 
a party irivolously opposing a Board order may be l iable for the Board's court costs 
as 11·c l l as his O\\' n .  
1 08. Sec Stalcll lcnt  of Judge f.L' c 'C J J t!wl, supra note 2, at 9- 1 0. 
1 09 . .S US. C. § 703 ( 1970 ) .  Sec Shaughnessy v .  Pcclrci ro, 349 U .S .  48 ( 1 9.35 ) .  
1 10. H . R .  REP. No.  1 086. 87th Cong. ,  1 st Sess. 22-23 ( 1 960 ) 
1 1 1 . 7.) Sta t .  65 1 ,  8 U.S .C. § 1 1 05a ( a )  ( 1 970 ) 
1 1 2. H .  FIUENDLY, supra note 1 0, at 1 75-76.  
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t o  obtain a stay of their deportation orders i n  a district court did not appeal, 
the deportee, instead of having to act speedily, "now has six months to fi le  a 
petition for review and this works as an automatic stay un less the  I N S  moves 
to vacate i t ,"1 13  as it rarely does. "Moreover , he noted that the  statute "has en­
gendered numerous j ur isdict ional disputes which have a lready demanded three 
Supreme Court decisions and wil l  probably requi re more ."1 1 4  The clear answer, 
he  concluded, was to repeal section 1 06 ( a ) . return final deportation orders to 
the d istrict courts .  and expect the courts of appeals to give expeditiou s treat­
ment to those district court orders that are appealed . 
There i s  much t o  be said for this proposal .  Deportation appeals  rarely 
involve questions that transcend the particular case. The most frequent issue 
is whether the immigration j udge acted arbitrarily in denying one of the many 
forms of relief which the statute commits to the Attorn ey General's discretion. 
The resources of a three-j udge appellate court are arguably wasted on such 
deliberations .  
Another consideration in  favor o f  restoring deportation orders t o  the 
district courts is  that it wou ld  eliminate the l.Jifurcation of rev i ew that has 
resulted from the Supreme Court ' s  interpretat ions of the scope of section 
1 06 ( a ) . U ncler Immigration Service regulations.  a deportation order is issued 
by an immigration j udge after a formal tr ial -type proceeding,115 in which the 
central issue, unless conceded. is  the alien's deportabi l i ty .  A ppeal l ies to the 
Boarcl of Immigrat ion Appeals .  In aclclition . however. the statute authorizes 
a variety of discretionary relief which. i f  granted . may haYe a bearing upon 
the question of deportab i l i ty or upon the execution of the deportation order . 1 16 
Certain of these discretionary determinat ions can be made only by an immi­
gration judge in  the course of a formal deportation proceeding : others must 
be made by district directors of immigration either before,  during, or after-but 
outside the framework of-the deportat ion proceeding. The question thus 
posed, one which sharply diviclecl the circuits. was whether some or a l l  of 
these discretionary determinations were part of the "final orders of deportat ion" 
which section 106 ( a )  makes reviewable  in  circuit courts .  In  a ser ies of t hree 
decisions, the Supreme Court held that "fin;1l orders of deportation" include 
discretionary determinations hy the hearing officer during and incident to t he 
deportation proceeding, 1 1 7  and denials by the Board of motions to reopen de-
1 13 .  !d. 
1 1 4. !d. 
l l S .  8 U.S .C .  § 1 252 ( b )  ( 1970 ) ; 8 C. F.R. § 242 ( 1974 ) .  
1 1 6. E . .r; . ,  8 U . S . C. § 1 1 53 ( 1970 ) ( class ific;J.tion as a preference- immigrant ) : id. 
§ 1 182 ( c )  ( 11·aiver of inadmiss ib i l i ty ) :  id. § 1 182 ( e ) ( 11 ai ver of 2-year residency require­
ment for exchange visitors ) :  ·id .  § 1 253 ( h )  ( withholding of deportation ) :  id .  § 1254 ( a ) 
( suspension of depor t;J.t ion ) :  id. § 1254 ( e )  ( vo luntary departure ) ;  id. § 1 25 5 ( a )  ( adj ust­
ment of status ) : id. § 1 258 ( change of non-immigrant ciassificat ion ) ;  ·id. § 1259 ( record 
of admission for permanent residence) .  
1 1 7. Foti v .  I N S , 375 U . S .  2 1 7  ( 1963 ) .  
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portation proceedings, 1 18 but do not include non-record discret ionary deter­
minat ions by district directors altogether outside the deportation proceeding. 1 1 9  
The latter are sti l l  reviewabl e  exclusively i n  d istrict courts .  
This spl it-level scheme of review has evoked a good deal of criticism. 
Professor Davis has argued that the present bifurcated structure produces 
confusion. wasteful j ur i sdictional l it igation and piecemeal review, and should 
he replaced by a single judic ial remedy, be it at the district or appellate court 
Jevel 120 The Immigration Serv ice itself favors the latter solution . I t  maintains 
that the continued availability of district court review for non-record d i scre­
tiomry determinat ions defeats the congressional purpose to shorten the depor­
tation process and minimize stal l ing tact ics ; and in  1 97 1  i t  proposed l egislation 
to broaden section 1 06 ( a )  so as to make al l  deportation-related dec i sions 
reviewable solely by circuit cour t s . 1 21  This approach is  open to the persuas ive 
obj ection that i t  woul d  add to the already bulging dockets of the  appellate 
courts a class of cases-non-record discretionary determinations by immigra­
tion field officers-that coul d  harc1l:y be less suitable for appellate review. The 
alternative solution-returning record determinations to the district courts­
seems. from that standpoint, far preferable .  
Furthermore, even if one assumed that interposition of  the district 
courts would,  in the net, increase somewhat the total t ime required for j udicial  
review of deportation. the savings from di rect appellate review woul d  p robably 
he quite smal l in relat ion to the total period of review, especially in those cases , 
of principal concern to Congress . in which the alien i s  determined to postpone 
deportation as long as possible . 122  The abi l ity of determined aliens to postpone 
the evil day has very little to clo with the exist ence of two levels rather t han a 
singl e l evel of review. It has everything to clo with the persistence and in­
genu ity of counsel in  plying the I N S  w ith new appl ications for discretionary 
relief, the denial of which then provides a pretext for successive chall enges i n  
1 1 8. Giova v .  Rosenberg, 379 U.S .  1 8  ( 1964) . 
1 1 9. Cheng Fan Kwok v. I N S, 392 U.S .  206 ( 1968 ) .  
1 20. K. D AVIS, supra note 43, § 23.03, a t  798-99 ( 1970 Supp. ) . 
1 2 1 .  H . R .  2328, 92d Cong., 1 s t  Sess. § 7 ( 19 7 1 ) .  Professor J a ffe also appears to 
favor this solution. L. }AFFE, suf'ra note 4, at 422. 
122. The point is \\· e l l  i l lustrated by some of the "horror stories" c i ted by the 
House . I  udiciary Commit tee in describing the di latory tilctics sought to be remedied in  
section 1 06 ( a ) . H .R .  REP. No.  565 ,  87th Cong., 1 st Sess .  7- 1 1  ( 1961 ) .  The most notorious 
instance was that  of Carlos Marcel lo, who \\·as ordered deported in February, 1953,  yet  
after seemingly endless l i t igation sti l l  remained i n  the country in  June, 196 1 .  · Marcel l o  
fi led fi1·c success ive district court proceedings chal l enging either the district cou·rt de­
portation order or the denial  of discret ionary rel ief .  Three t imes he appeal ed to the 
courts of appeals ( once successfu l ly ) .  T \\· icc he carried his case to the Supreme Court . 
.'\rnong the many c ircumstances that conspired to frustrate e fforts at deportation, the 
availahi l i t v  of d is tr ic t  court review was a verv m inor one . .'\11  told .  the five  district 
cour t pro�eedings consumed about 15 of the ne�rly 1 00 months during which Marce l lo  
evaclecl banishment .  Furthermore. near ly hal f of the  months \\· ere spent i n  the two 
proceedings i n  which, because the trial court proceedings were not appealed, only a singl e 
stage of revie11· occurred. 
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§ 1 105 ( )
s�?) ot d eportati of review IS not the contmumg role of d i strict courts but the k a a h( (1970 ) "'h on Once appeal i s  perfected to the  circuit  court 8 U S C  wee 'S to t d · · 1 ey · · · · · atlt t . e eportat ton !lr POmt out that whereas d istrict court review adds days or oma 1c s• av pr ·d ocess f 1 · · 'f h .  ' <  o ov1 es th 1· � , . court o appea s renew tnncallv takes months and the I S  a r o- " r · - ' . ,ument might 1 esp1te even for the patentlv dil atory all[Jel lant review proced · h · na v b · · • · abl e  the cou ures 111 t e appel] e een h1gh lr persuasive before the adven t of summary tl. G rts to chspose o f  ate  courts .  I t  I S  much less  so now that  those procedures e n -I e  overnment · 1 - Pat 1 - · 1 · · · f d . ' OJ a ck o f  h' ent y t nvo ous petitiOns on roughl y  the same show1no- by o eportat• on s 0 · b · · "' 
111 tt f 
' even were · t . 11· 1 1 1g Y the alien, wh1ch \\·ould be needed to deny a s tay a f;� 
Sr l et�s than th e a�t '  ch scretionary. Mor eover, the automatic nature o f  the stav 
1z - · e!!. 1' 0ti v .  I N s  30 t tuc\ es o f  the j udges. 
• 
J. 19;4 A . O .  REPo{n �. F.2d 779, 785 n.6 (2d Cir. 1962 ) ,  rcu'd, 375 U.S .  2 1 7  ( 1963 ) .  ' 011Pra note 1 ,  tab le B3.  
1 i i 
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fashion, it w·i l l  remain relatively smal l .  and the extent to which two-tier review 
would reduce it is  largely speculative. To be sure. the burden i s  not u ni formly 
distributed among the c ircuits . The Ninth is by far the busiest with nearly 
half the cases in fiscal 1972 ; the Second a di stant runner-up that year with 
about 1 3  percent . 126 For the Ninth Circuit, a d istrict court screen might be of  
some help : for other c ircuits, the relief woul d  be negligible. 
The argument for two-tier review as an antidote to bifurcation i s  also ul­
timately unpersuasive. B i furcation does not seem to us  as great a problem as i t  
seems to  many others . The element o f  uncertainty that once surrounded the  
jurisdictional issue. and  generated three Supreme Court and  countless c i r­
cuit decisions, has now been great ly reduced hy the drawing of a bright l ine  
between decisions of  immigrat ion judges, reviewable only by courts of  appeals ,  
and decisions of district d irectors, revie\vable only by district courts.  Few 
competent lawyers are any longer apt to find themselves (by mistake, at least ) 
in the wrong court . 
To be sure, bifurcation may, as Professor Davis observed, result in  frag­
mentary review of a single deportation case in those s ituations where the dis­
trict director's determinat ion could  be reviewed at the same t ime as the order of 
deportation but must be routed instead to the district court for separate t reat­
ment. But this problem could easi ly be cured by a holding that the district eli­
rector's determination is reviewable along with the deportation order on a 
theory of pendent jur isdict ion .1�7 Furthermore, the bifurcated system does 
not create, and its el imination would not cure. what is  perhaps the most seri­
ous source of delay and multiple l i t igation in the deportation area-the ability 
of the alien to file successive petitions for review from successive denials of 
administrative relief, l imited only by the seemingly inexhaustible ingenuity of 
counsel and the patience of the courts .  Elimination of district court j u ri sdiction 
micrht shorten each round of review, but it would not reduce the number of b 
rounds. 
In sum, vve see no great advantage in a return to two-tier review. There 
are, moreover, at least two hazards : the risk that the extra stage of review 
will be exploited for delay ; and the danger, feared by attorneys on both sides, 
that district judges are more apt to be swayed by subjective attitudes for or 
126.  These figures were obtained from the A dminis trative Office of the  U n ited 
States Courts : 11·e have no rel iable figures for later years . 
1 27. The Supreme Court has expressly decli ned to decide ll'h ether a circuit  court 
entertaining an appeal from a final order o.f deportatio�1, rn i�h t  h ave ' 'pendent  j u r i scl ic�  tion" to revie11· a clemal of chscretwnary rel tef. Cheng I' an Kwok v. I N S  392 U.S. 206 
2 1 6  n. l 6 ( 1 968) : co1 1 1parc Dong Yup �ee v .  I N S, 407 _F.Zd 1 1 10 ( 9th  Cir. 1 969 ) ( r eview ed 
denial of visa petition presented dunng pendency ot deportation hear ing, but found no 
authority to revie\V � imilar denial before proceeding comm enced ) ,  and D ibadj v. I .\J S,  
4 1 1 F.2cl 983 ( 3d C i r .  1 969)  ( demal of 11·.::uvcr for e.xchange vis i t.or after deportat ion 
proceedings com pleted hel d not revi ewable with depo;tatwn o rcJer ) , wtth Wei - �fing Chang 
v. I N S . 4 1 8  F.Zd 1334 (9th Cir. 1 969 ) ( demal ol 1\ ai ver tor exchange vis i tor before 
commencem ent of deportation, j u risdiction assumed and denial uphel d ) ,  and Perdido 
v. I N S ,  420 F.2d 1 1 79 ( Sth Cir. 1 969) ( same) . 
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against the alien than multi-member appellate courts .  \Ve note, finally, that we 
do not find the present scheme as irrational and conceptual ly untidy as many 
cr itics do. That the i nformal discret ionary determinations of  an administrative 
official should be reviewed in the first instance by a singl e  d istr ict j udge ( capa­
ble, if need be, of taking evidence )  whi le the formal ,  on-the-record, albeit 
equally d iscretionary, determinations of a quasi-j udicial hearing officer should 
be reviewed directly by a court of appeals does not, in  princ iple, seem offensive. 
( d )  D epartment of Labor:  Longshoremen's Co ntpensation and Black 
L u ng .  ( 1 )  Curren t  Practice : Direct Co urt of A ppeals R eview. Prior to 1 972, 
decisions of deputy commissioners-officers who investigated claims and held 
hearings-under the Longshoremen's and Harbor \Vorkers' Compensation 
Act of 1 927 were subj ect to review in the d i strict courts . 128  This  was entirely 
understandable : The stakes and the l itigants ( at least the claimant s )  were 
typically small, and i ssues of law or pol icy rarely presented .  The volume of 
cases, to be sure, was not high. In  the five-year period from November, 1 963 
to June, 1 968. there were about 70 district court fi l ings annually, and in  l ater 
years they dec lined to a low of -+4 in fiscal 1 972 . 1 2u \Ve do not have sol id data 
on the number of appeals from d istrict to ci rcuit courts , but it appears t here 
were fewer than 20 per year . 1 �0 In 1 972, Congress amended the Act to pro­
vide for d irect court of appeals review of longshoreman c ompensation cases. 
At the same t ime, i t  added a stage of review to the admini�trative process 
by establ i shing a Benefits Review Board131 to receive appeal s  from the de­
c isions of administrative law j udges, to whom the hearing funct ions previously 
conducted by deputy commissioners were now assignec!Y32 The change in the 
j udicial review provision is not explained in the legi slat ive h istory, but one can 
reasonably assume it reflected a congressional judgment that the added op­
portunity for administrative review made the district court review unnecessary 
and potential ly exhausting. 
One m ight have thought that the institution of direct rev1ew would pro­
duce a substantial increase in caseloacl for the courts of appeals ,  perhaps even to 
the level previously experienced by the district courts .  This  does not appear to 
have happened. From March, 1 973.  when the change went into effect, to 
November, 1 97-+. only 1 9  l ongshoreman compensation cases were fi led in the 
c ircuit courts,1 B:3 l ess than one per month as comparee\ to the nearly four per 
month average in  the district courts in the last ful l  fiscal year before the 
1 28.  44 Stat .  1 436. 33 U . S . C. § 92 1 ( Supp.  I I , 1 972 ) .  
1 29. These i ncomplete fi gures were suppl ied us  by members of the sta ff of the 
Sol ic i tor of the Department of Labor. 
1 30. According to figures suppl ied  us by the S SA .  there \\·ere  five fi l i ngs and 19 
decisions :1t  the c ircui t  court l evel i n  fiscal 1 972, and nine dec i s ions i n  fi scal 1 970. 
1 3 1 .  33 U.S .C .  § 92 1 ( Supp. I I ,  1 972 ) 
1 32 .  !d. § 9 1 9  ( Supp. I I ,  1 972 ) . 
1 33.  These s tatist ics \\·ere suppl ied us by the office of the Sol ic i tor of the Depar t ­
m e n t  of Labor .  
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amendment , and to  the nearly s ix per month in  the late 1 960's. Indeed, i t  
is not c lear that the new procedure has added anything at a l l  to the appellate 
dockets. 
\\' e can only speculate  as to the reason . One possibil ity is that l it igants 
found the district court a more inviting forum.  The other, much more l ikely, 
possibi l i ty i s  that for many l it igants the ne"v Benefits Review Board i s  serving 
as a subst itute for the distr ict court ,  meeting their need for a forum in  which 
to challenge the decisions of the hearing officers and thus making i t  unnecessary 
for them to go to court. In the fi rst eleven months of 1 97 4, well over 200 
appeals were fi led with the Board in longshoreman cases,134 al l  of which , if 
pressed at a l l ,  would  previously have been routed directly to the j udicial  sys­
tem .  In sum , the Board seems to be performing for the c i rcuit courts the same 
screening funct ion that district courts usually perform. The moral of the story 
seems to be that the best way to reduce the j udicial burden of rev iewing 
administrative action i s  to provide a sufficiently lengthy process of administra­
tive review within the agency. Unfortunately ,  the opportunit ies for that are 
distinctly l imited : the former procedure under the Longshoremen 's  A ct ,  which 
sent the decisions of hearing officers directly to the courts, was rare, if not 
umque. 
The number of longshoreman cases in the courts of appeal s wi l l  increase 
substant ially in the next few years. if only because, as another of the 1 972 
amendments ,  Congress expanded the coverage of the Act to include inj ur ies in­
curred in  areas-for example, piers,  wharfs ,  terminals-adj oining the  navi­
gable waterway itsel£ . 1 :>;, This extension has virtually doubled the volume of 
compensation claims. Even so, it  is c lear  that longshoreman's cases present 
no maj or caseloacl problems for the courts of appeals and no great opportunity 
for savings. 
( 2 )  Potentially Increasing Caseload Burden : Appra£sal of Need for 
Two-Tier Re'u·iew. One cannot be at all sure this wi l l  remain the case with 
respect to b lack lung compensat ion claims filed after January 1 ,  1 97 4, which, 
pursuant to the B lack Lung Act of 1 972,136 are aclministerecl . in the absence 
of an approved state workmen's compensat ion scheme, by the Secretary of 
Labor in accordance with the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor 
·workers'  Act . 137 The shift of administrat ive responsibil i ty for black lung 
claims from Social Security to Labor was natural enough, since the post - 1973 
claims are governed by what is essent ial ly  a workmen's compensation scheme, 
with primary l iabi l ity for payment of benefits ass igned to employers rather 
than to the Government. Nevertheless, the transfer has created an anomaly 
-- -- -- ---·-··-·- - --- ------- -- -··--------· ---
1 34. As of ::\ovember 20, 1 974, 208 cases had been 
ca l endar year .  
fi l ed with the Board during the  
1 35 .  33  US.C. § 903 ( Supp. I I , 1972 ) . 
1 36. 30 U.S.C. § §  901 -941 ( Supp I I I , 1973 ) .  
1 37.  Id. § §  93 1 -32 ( Supp. I I I , 1973 ) .  
38 COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 75 : 1  
and, potentially, a problem . vVhereas the black lung cases administered by 
Social Security are reviewed in the fi rst instance by district courts, those 
administered b y  the Labor D epartment will be reviewed d irectly by circuit 
cour ts.  The question thus arises whether the caseload considerations whic h  
vi rtually rule out direct review i n  t h e  former area may not apply to the 
latter as well .  
Since the B enefits Review Board has not yet decided its first black lung 
case, it is hard to estimate what the j u dicial burden will be. I n  fiscal 1 974, 464 
black lung cases were filed against the SSA in district courts ; nearly as many 
( 450 ) were filed in the first four months of fiscal 1 97 5-200 in October alone, 
the last month on record. \Vith the caseload thus rising, and with the number 
of Appeals Council ( the final stage of administrative review ) fil ings for the 
first quarter of fiscal 1 975 more than doubling those for the entire  fiscal year 
1 97 4, 138 it would not be surprising if district court filings for the year ex­
ceeded 3000. 'vVe hasten to reassure the reader that there is no danger the 
Labor Department ' s  b lack lung l itigation wil l  approach this scale.  The great 
maj ority of those eligible for benefits filed their claims prior to 1 974 ; the 
number of claims received by the Labor Department is therefore very much 
smaller than the number received by S SA.139 
Even so, it is evident that the volume of black lung cases directly re­
viewable by the courts of appeals coul d  be very substantial. Indeed, superficially 
at least, one might expect a given number of administrat ive decisions to  gen­
erate a larger volume of court l itigat ion with respect to post- 1 97 3 cases than 
for those filed earlier, since the former involve not only the t raditional medical 
issues that go to eligibility but also difficult problems o f  employer liability. 
Labor Department attorneys, however, foresee no caseloacl p roblem for the 
circuit courts.  They acknowledge t hat a number of important l egal i ssues, 
mainly j u risdictional, will  have to be l itigated in the first year or two of oper­
ation, but after that t hey expect a gradual decl ine in filings. They anticipate 
that coal mine operators will, for the most p:il"t, acquiesce in administrative 
determinations of l iability, at least where the staff bas built a proper record, 
and that the medical issues will present many fewer difficult factual questions 
t han the pre- 1 974 claims, since a great proportion of the latter were filed by 
older miners and widows and had to be decided on the basis of stale  records. 
-------- ------ ·-- -- -· -- --------
1 38. These figures were supplied by the Bureau of H earings and Appeals of the 
S S A .  
139. Figures suppl ied b y  the  :Management I n format ion and Appraisal  Branch of  the 
Office of Administration of the S SA indicate the number of b lack lung claims received 
at the intake level for fiscal 1 972 and subsequent years a s  iol lo11·s : 
1 972 75 ,337 
1 973 1 48,985 
1 974 82,799 
1975 ( July 1-Nov. 20 ) 1 8,425 
The 1 974 and 1 97 5  claims, though fi led i n i tia l ly  w ith S SA, are admi niste red by the  
Labor Department. 
r I l. 
r I 
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\Ve are not able to assess these predictions with any confidence. We sug­
gest ,  however. that black lung l it igation may prove to be a source of serious, 
if temporary, docket pressures for the courts of appeals a year or two from 
now, and that i t  bears close watching. If it  were concluded that init ial district 
court review woul d  significantly reduce appellate dockets, we see no tel l ing 
obj ection on other grounds. 
B .  Informal Rulema!?£ng 
1 . D irect Co u rt of A ppeals Rcviecu : R ule- O rder Distinc tion.  Statutes 
providing for j udicial review commonly speak of "orders,"  which the Adminis­
trative Procedure Act defines as final dispositions in  matters "other than rule 
making. "14 1 1  It is no surprise that this definition was n ever read into the 
statute providing for three-j udge district court review of I C C  "orders,"141 
since that agency's substantial ratemaking business .  t hough later class ified as 
"rule making" by the A PA,142 was c learly meant to be i ncluded. Under the 
same statute and others based upon it ,  the Supreme Court has also construed 
"orders" to include general regulations adopted under the informal notice-and­
comment provisions of the APA H:J Thus, the Supreme Court in CBS v. 
United Sta tcs144 held the FCC's chain-broadcast ing regulations reviewable by 
a three- judge district court under a statute that incorporated the ICC pro­
visions, and in  United S tates v. Storer Broadcasting Co . , 1 45 after review of 
FCC ' 'orders" had been transferred to  the circuit courts, held its regulations 
directly reviev.:able there. In both cases the Court may hav e  been influenced by 
the fact that the alternat ive was no review at a l l ; i t  focused solely on questions 
of standing or ripeness for review, not discussing whether revievv should have 
been sought in a regular district court . 
Nevertheless, the District of Columbia C ircuit in the in t1uential case of 
United Gas Pipe L in e  Co. ·u. FP C 1 .1 0  refused direct review of a Power Com­
mission regulation under a statute similar in wording to the I C C  provision.  
The statute, saicl the court ,  provided for " substantial evidence" reyiew on the 
record at the instance of a party to the administrative proceeding. These 
provisions were said to contemplate "review of a decision based on eYidence 
presentee! in a quasi-j udic ial proceeding before the Commission,' ' 14 7 and to 
"evidence Congressional recognition that an appellate court has no intelligible 
basis for decis ion unless a subordinate tribunal has made a recorcl fully en­
compassing the issues . " 148 United Gas Pipe was immediately followed by a 
1 40.  5 u . s . c .  § 5 5 1 ( 6 )  ( 1 970 ) .  
1 4 1 .  NO\\ 28 u . s . c. § §  1 336, 2325 ( 1970 ) .  
1 42.  5 u . s . c .  § 5 5 1 ( 4) ( 1970 ) .  
1 43 .  !d. § 553 .  
1 44. 3 1 6  U.S.  407 ( 1942 ) .  
1 45 .  3 5 1  U.S .  1 92 ( 1956 ) . 
1 46. 1 8 1  F.2d 796 ( 1950 ) .  
1 47. 1 8 1  F.2d at 798 
1 48.  !d. at 799. 
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similar ruling under the Civi l  A eronautics ActHn and has frequently b een 
cited since, most recently  by the Third Circuit in holding a newly promulgated 
regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission ( SE C )  not an "order" 
directly  reviewable in the court of appeals Y'0 As a resul t  of such reasoning. the 
avenue for pre-enforcement review of regulations. even of  those promulgated 
by agencies whose final adjudicative orders go direct ly  to an appel late court , 
is often an action for in junction or declaration under general j urisdictional 
provisions in a district court . 151 This i s ,  of course, the avenue for pre-enforce­
ment challenges to the constitut ionality of statutes. I n  fact, early decis ions.  
influenced no doubt by the quasi- legislative nature of administrative regula­
tions, tended to treat them l ike statutes for purposes of j ud ic ia l  review.1 52 
The United Gas Pipe rationale i s  in  decl ine, however, both legis latively 
and judicial ly .  In recent years.  Congress. bui lding on the precedent of price 
regulation during the Second \Vorlcl vVar,153 has expressly authorized direct 
c ircuit court review of agency regulations in such fi elds  as automotive and 
consumer-products safety, occupational health ,  water and a ir  pollution, and 
noise . 154 The court that decided United Gas Pipe, having now undertaken 
di rect review of regu lations of both the FPC155 and the C A B ,1 56 has redefined 
its posit ion : United Gas Pipe " has not been fol lowed . . .  where evidence has 
been assembled before the agency and i s  not challenged, and where the i ssues 
p resented are legal and not factual . " 1 5i In such a case, ther e  is "no n eed to 
have the matter adj udicated at the district court level in  order to have an 
appropr iate record compiled .  It is the availabil ity of a record for review 
and not the holding of a quasi j udicial hearing which is now the j ur isdictional 
touchstone ." 1 58 The author of United Gas Pipe, Chief ] uclge Bazelon, noting 
1 49 .  Pub. L .  No. 85-79 1 ,  § 1 8, 72 Stat .  947 ( 1958) ; A rrow A irways v .  CAB,  1 82 
F.2d 705 ( D . C. Cir .  1950 ) . 
1 50 .  P E W  Stock Exchange, I nc .  v. SEC. 485 F.2d 7 1 8  ( 3d Cir .  1 973 ) ,  rcrt. dcJiicd, 
4 1 6  U .S .  969 ( 1974 ) .  The A merican Law I nsti tute's FEDERAL S ECURITIES CoDE \\·oul cl 
reverse the result in the P B TV case by providing for d irect c i rcuit court review not only 
oi a "final order" but also of "other fina l  action'' of the S EC, including ru les .  ALI FEDERAL 
S ECURITIES CoDE § 14 1 5 ( a )  ( Tent. Draft �o. 3 ,  1 974 ) . Sec also S.  25 1 9, § 6 ( a ) .  93d 
Cong., 1 st Sess . ( 1974) ( S EC regulat ions approving, disapproving, or  modifying rules 
of exchanges would be treated as "orders" and thus be revic\\·ahle in the courts of appea ls ) .  
1 5 1 .  Sec, e .g. ,  Abbott Laboratories.  I nc .  v .  Gardner. 387 U . S .  1 36 ( 1 967 ) ( Food and 
Drug Administration ) .  S imi larly,  in  Canada i t  is  only "quasi-j udicia l "  as opposed to 
"administrative' '  orders that are revie\Yed d irectly in the appel late court. Federal Court 
Act 1 970, 19 El iz .  2, c .  1 ,  § 28. 
1 52. Sec, e.g . .  Pacifi c  Sta tes Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U . S .  1 76 ( 1 935 ) .  
1 53 .  Emergency Price Control A c t  o f  1 942, ch .  26, t i t .  I I ,  § 204, 56 Stat.  3 1  ( 1 942 ) .  
1 54. 1 5  U . S . C. § 1 394 ( 1970 ) ( automotive safety ) : id. § 2060 ( consumer products 
safety) ; 29 U.S .C .  § 655 (£ )  ( 1 970 ) ( occupat ional heal th  and safe ty ) : 33  U.S .C .  § 1 369 ( b )  
( 1 970 ) ( water pollution ) : 42 U.S .C .  § §  1 857h-5 ( b )  ( 1970 ) ( a ir pol lut ion ) ; id. § 491 5 ( a )  
( noise ) . Sec aiso note 1 50 supra. 
1 55 .  City of Ch icago v. F P C, 458 F.2cl 73 1 ,  740-4 1 ( D . C. Cir .  1 9 7 1 ) ; New England 
Po11·er Co. v. FPC. 467 F.2d 425 ( D .C.  Cir. 1 972 ) .  The Supreme Court passed on the 
meri ts  in the latter case without adverting to the issue of direct  review, FPC v .  :\' C\\. 
Engl and Power Co.,  4 1 5  U . S .  345 ( 1974) . 
1 56.  Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesel l schaft v. CAB,  479 F .2d 9 1 2  ( D.C .  Cir .  1 973 ) .  
1 57. !d. a t  9 1 5- 1 6. 
I 58. I d. at 916 .  
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Professor J affe's crit ic ism that the decision divided review of a single agency 
between trial  and appellate courts, has now abandoned it altogether.159 
J\Iost recently ,  however, doubts have b een raised once again about the 
appropriateness of direct appellate review of informal rulemaking. Concurring 
in Texas �·. EPAy;o a challenge to the regulations for implementing air­
qual ity standards in  Texas, Judge Clark of  the Fifth  Circuit  protested "the 
adverse effects Hawing from the legislative mandate that j udicial r ev iew pro­
ceedings be  inj ected into the court system at the appellate l evel ."161 H e  
explained : 
X o formal hearing has ever been held in this highly t echnical . 
factual ly complex matter .  The administ rative "record" upon which 
we had to base our revie\v was comprised of only the sparsest of 
documentat ion ,  for it essentially evoh·ed from an act of agency rule­
making . . . .  The writ ing judge was required to hold both pre- and 
post-argument conferences with counsel for the parties to enab le  the  
three of us as  a court to comprehend the substance of  the issues and 
conduct a minimally meaningful review. 
The subj ect matter of this action involves the health and welfare 
of mil l ions of c i t izens ,  the cont inued business v ital ity of tens of 
thousands of fi rms and compl iance expenditures costi1;g bi l l ions of 
dollars. 
These extensive rights deserve a more orderly process of j ud icial 
reH ection _ H >::! 
Judge Clark did not further specify what judic ial processes would be  more 
orderly or otherwise more appropriate. 
St i l l more recently, the First Circuit in South Terminal Corp . v. EPA163 
lamented that upon direct review the  only vvay to obtain additional information 
as to facts not adequately establ ished in a rulemaking proceeding is to remand 
to the agency : "The normal way courts evaluate a t echnical issue i s  through 
proceedings attended by expert w itnesses ."164 
2. A ppraisal of N ced for Appellate Co urt Factfinding. ·whether direc t  
appellate review of  informal rulemaking makes good sense depends in  the 
first instance upon whether United Gas Pipe was correct i n  its perception 
that the need for j udic ial trial of the facts renders the appeals court an in­
appropriate forum. vVhen regulations are required to be based upon a trial­
type administrative record, as in the widely crit ic ized Food and Drug 
1 59.  Envi ronmental  De fense Fund,  Inc .  v. H ardin,  428 f<'.2d 1 093, 1 098-99 & n .27  
( D .C.  Cir .  1 970 ) ( Bazelon .  ] . )  ( d ictum ) ,  citing L. ] .\FFE, supra note  4 ,  a t  423. 
1 60.  499 F.2cl 289 ( 5th  Cir .  1 974 ) . 
1 6 1 .  ld. at 32 1 .  
1 62.  !d. a t  321 -22 . 
163 . 504 F.2cl 646 ( 1 st Cir.  1 974 ) . 
1 64. !d.  at 665-66. Sec also 52 T EX .\S L. RE\·. 1 0 1 4. 1 0 2 1  ( 1974) ( district  court was 
a preferable  forum for reviewing the  SEC regu l ation chal l enged in P B 'vV Stock Exchange, 
l nc.  Y. S EC,  485 F.2d 7 1 8  ( 3d C i r. 1 9 73 ) .  ccrt. dc11 icd, 4 1 6  U.S. 969 ( 1 974 ) ,  "because 
the case raises factual issues [ such as 'the rule's potential  anticompetit ive e ffects '  J that 
can be more elf1ciently determined i n  a tr ial  court" ) .  
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Administ ration proceclure, 165 facts relevant t o  the val id ity o f  the regulat ion 
present no problem : Val id i ty is determined on the  admin istrative record. 
More commonly, however, regulations are adopted after notice and opportu­
nity for comment, with no express A PA requirement that the agency base its 
action on the record . 1 6n It i s  therefore conceivable that a j udicial hearing may 
be necessary to elicit facts bearing upon the question of val idity.  
The scope of j udicial review of informal rulemaking i s  currently a matter 
of interesting debate . 1 67 Except where the agency is required to decide on a 
record, the APA l imits review generally to such "legal" questions as whether 
agency action is within statutory authority or is "arbitrary. "168 At least one 
c ircuit  court has held that the sole test of val idity was "whether on the factual 
premise upon which the Commission acted" the rule adopted was arbitrary, 
for " i f  the factual premise itself were open to review, then i t  would be neces­
sary for all general rule-making to include a trial-like hearing. " 169 
If the  factual premises u nderlying a regulation are  unchallengeabl e  in 
court, there is  obviously no need for a trial to determine their correctness. 
This approach, however, i s  c learly in disfavor, and properly so. Statutory 
authority, though a " l egal "  question, is often dependent upon the existence of 
certain facts .  In  Citi:::ens to Preserve O ve1·ton Park, Inc.  v. Volpe , 170 for ex­
ample, the administrator was authorized to approve federal funding of a 
highway through a park only i f  there was no "feasible and prudent alterna­
t ive." 1 71 The Court said a reviewing tribunal must determine "that the Secre­
tary could have reasonably bel ieved that in this case there are no feasible 
alternat ives. "172 The further " l egal" guarantee against arbitrariness similarly 
demands a factual investigation : I t  requires, according to  Overton Park, a 
court to determine whether an administ rator's decis ion was "based on a con­
siderat ion of the relevant factors and whether there has b een a clear error of 
judgment . "1 7x These criteria, although enunciated in the  context of informal 
adj ud ication, are equally appropriate in review of regulations, and they have 
1 65. 2 1  U . S .C.  § 37 1 ( e )  ( 1 970 ) . See Ham il ton, Procedures for th e A dop tion of 
Rules of General A pplicability : The Need for P rocedural Innovation in A dm il l islroli·vc 
R u le ll lak iHg, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1276 ( 1 9 72 ) . 
1 66.  5 l1 .S . C. § 553 ( 1 970 ) .  
167.  See Verkuil,  Judicial Review of Informal R ule making, 60 VA. L .  REv. 18) 
( 1 974 ) . 
1 68. 5 u . s . c .  § 706 ( 1 970 ) .  
1 69. Superior O i l  Co. v. F P C .  322 F.2d 60 1 ,  6 1 9  ( 9th C i r .  1 963 ) .  The court in 
Superior O il rel ied upon the l eading case of  Pacific States Box & B asket Co. v.  'vVh i te, 
296 U . S .  1 76 ( 1 935 ) ,  where }.J r .  J u stice B randeis had written t h a t  if ' 'any conceivable 
state of facts" would make a state regulation valid, those facts should be presumed to 
exist .  But Pacific Sta les H ux d i d  not hold the presumption i rrebuttable ; i t  merely held 
that i t  was not overcome by general a l legations that the regulation served no valid 
purpose. 
1 70.  40 1 U . S .  402 ( 1 97 1 ) .  
1 7 1 .  !d. at 405. 
1 72 .  !d. at 4 1 6 .  
1 73 .  !d. 
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been widely appl ied in such cases . 1 74 \Ve do not see how a court, without delv­
ing into the facts, can responsibly determine whether or not a regulation meets 
a statutory requirement that emission standards be "achievable" by control 
systems that have been "adequately demonstrated,"175  or whether a motor 
vehicle safety standard is "practicable" and meet s ' ' the  need for motor vehicle 
f t "1 76 sa e y .  
To say that courts should and i ncreasingly do scrutinize the factual sup­
port for regulations does not imply, however, that the relevant facts must be 
developed in court , much less by an evidentiary trial .  The Office of Price Ad­
ministration ( OPA ) legislation, for example, in it ial ly i nterposed before 
appellate court review an administ rative appeal in which a full hearing could 
be had on any relevant factsY7 ::\ Iore s ign ificantly, while other direct-review 
statutes contain no comparable provisions, courts of appeals are increasingly 
finding ways to base their factual scrut iny of regulations on materials that 
were in some manner brought out before the rulemaking agency. 
The Occupational Safety and Health Act ( OS HA ) ,  for example ,  makes 
this construction easy. Although it does not require the Department of Labor 
to conduct a trial-type hearing,!'� it explicitly makes the Secretary's deter-
1 74. Sec,  e .g. ,  Portland Cement A ss'n v .  Ruckel shaus, 486 F.2d 375,  402 ( D .C.  Cir .  
1973 ) ,  '"'''"/. den ied suh 1 10 111. Portland Cement Corp. v.  Administrator, 4 1 7  U . S .  92 1 
( 1974 ) . Sec also City of Ch icago v. F PC, 458 F.2d 73 1 ,  742 ( D. C .  Cir .  1 97 1 ) ( " [I j t  makes 
l i t t le  sense to require that the legis lature art iculate i ntel l ig ib le  standards to  govern 
agency action if rea l i s t ic  inquiry into w hether those standards are being fol lowed were 
foreclosed. " ) .  
1 7 5 .  Sec Portland Cement Ass 'n v .  Rucke l s haus ,  486 F.2d 375 ( D .C.  C i r .  1 973 ) ,  
ccrt. dnz icd sub n o 11 1 .  Portland Cement Corp. v. Administrator,  4 1 7  U . S .  92 1 ( 1 974 ) .  
1 76. Sa Chrysl e r  Corp. v .  Depar tment o f  T ransp. ,  472 F.2d 659 ( 6th  Cir .  1972 ) . 
1 77.  Emergency Price Control A c t  o f  1 942, ch. 26, t i t .  I I ,  § §  203-04, 56 S tat.  3 1  
( 1 942 ) . .-\ later amendment authorized the Emergency Court o f  Appeals ( E C A )  t o  pass 
on regulations, fol lo\\· ing entry of a c iv i l  or c r i minal j udgment, \\· i thout pr ior administra­
tive hearing.  but a l l owed a reference to the Admin i strator i n  such cases in l ieu of  a 
court  tr ia l .  Act  of J une 30, 1 944, ch .  325,  t i t .  I I ,  § 1 07,  58 S tat .  639 : sec E C A  R. 1 8, 
follo\\· ing id. § 1 07, providing that  upon sat is factory o ffer of proof the court might  refer to 
the Administrator o r  hear the fact s  i tself  by depositions, i nterrogatories,  affidavits,  or  
. .  in opten court ."  Section 204 ( c )  gave the ECA, s i t ting i n  pa.�els o f  three  or  more, the  
' 'po\\·ers o f  a distr ict  court ' '  except that no prel iminary re l ief  against  pr ice  r egulations 
could be granted. Ch.  26. tit .  I I , § 204 ( c ) .  36 Stat .  32. 
1 78. Under 29 U . S .  C. § 655  ( b )  ( 3 )  ( 1 970 ) ,  the Sec retary upon request must a fforcl 
a ' ·pub! ic hearing" on the proposed standards. P rovisions in the same sect ion that he 
designa te "a time and place" for the hearing, and that the request be made during 
"the period provided for the subm i s sion o f  \\T itten comments," preclude reading the 
hearing requi rement as satisfied by informal notice-and-comment procedure, as the Su­
preme Court held w i t h  respect t o  the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U . S . C .  § I ( 1 4 )  ( a )  
( 1 970 ) ( I CC freight-car a l location regul ations ) i n  Uni ted S tates v .  Florida East Coast 
Ry., 4 1 0 U . S .  224 ( 1 973 ) . A t  the s;�.me t ime, however, the abandonment o f  an earl ier 
House bi l l  provision that would haYe required a tr ia l-type hearing has led  two circuit  
courts understandably to the conclusion that the hearing required is  only a "legis lative" 
one ( not a quasi-j udic ia l  tr ia l ) characteri zed by s peechmaking in support of or  against 
the proposed regulati on. A ssociated Indus.  of  N . Y . S . , Inc.  v .  D epartment of  Labor, 487 
F.2cl  342.  348-49 ( 2d Cir.  1 973 ) : I ndustr ial  Union Dep't ,  A FL-CI O v.  Hodgson, 499 
F.2cl 467, 474 ( D .C.  Cir.  1 974 ) . Both cuurts,  however. required that  t h e  D epart ment's 
regulati ons be based on the "record."  487 F.2cl at 349 : 499 F.2d at  475-76. In order 
to faci l i tate the compilation of such a " record," the Department has modified its pro­
cedures to allow, for example, some c ross-examination. 29 C. F.R. § 1 9 1 1 . 1 5  ( 1 973 ) .  
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minations underlying a regulation "conclusi·ve i f  supported by substantial 
evidence in  the record considered as a whole. "179 This provision,  the Second 
Circuit  has held, imposes "some responsibi l ity on the part of the  Department to 
explain and support the proposals i t  i s  advancing, at l east when these have 
been opposed on substantial grounds . "180  S ince the statute does not make 
c lear that the "record" that must support the regulation i s  the  record made 
before the agency, it might be read as al lowing new factual material to be 
presented in court . I n  accordance with the usual meaning of the term, how­
ever, the Department of Labor by regulation construed the  statute--correctly, 
according to the Second Circuit181-to require that the  rulemaking itself be 
clone "on the basis of a record to which a substantial evidence t est . . .  may 
be appl ied ."182 Thus, in remanding for vvant of record support , the court 
i nsisted that the Department should have presented "at the outset of the 
hearing some j ust ification" for its proposed regulation . 1 8:� The Dist r ict of 
Columbia Circuit ,  while concluding that pol icy. as opposed to  factual , deter­
minat ions do not l end themselves to evaluat ion in l ight of evidence. agreed that 
the statute requires the Secretary to make factual dec is ions on  the record be­
fore him,  and j udicial rev iew is to be based on that record . 184 
Even statutes less explicit than OSHA have been construed by some cir­
cuit courts to impose the same requirement. The N a t iona! Traffic and l'-Iotor 
Vehic le Safety Act is s i lent as to hearings, l S R and it says noth ing about the 
standard of review. Yet i t  does require filing in the circuit court of the "record" 
on which the order sett ing the standard was "based . "186 The S ixth Circuit 
has read this requirement to mean that review is to be on  the basis of that 
record and that the "substantial evidence" test applies 1 87 
1 79. 29 u . s .  c. § 655 ( f )  ( 1 970 ) .  
1 80. A ssociated I ndus. of N . Y . S . , Inc. v .  Department of Labor, 487 F .2d 342, 3 5 1  
( 2d C i r . 1 973 ) .  
1 8 1 .  !d. at 349. 
1 82. !d. 
183. !d. at 35 1 .  
1 84. ·what we are entit led to a t  al l events i s  a careful iden t i ficat ion b y  the 
S ecretary. \\·hen h i s  proposed standards are c!1al lenged, of t h e  reasons why he 
chooses to fol low one cou rse rather than another.  \Vhere that choice purports 
to be based on the exi stence o f  certai n determ i nable facts . t h e  S ec retary must, 
i n  form as \\· e l l  as substance, fi nd those facts from evidence in the  re:ord . . . .  
Industr i a l  Union Dep't ,  A FL - C I O  v .  Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 -76 ( D.C.  C i r .  1 974 ) .  
1 85 .  1 5  U. S.C.  § l 392 ( b )  ( 1 970 ) provides only that safety s ta ndards shall be adopted 
in accord with the A d m i nistrat ive P rocedure Act, which in  the absence of spec i fi c  
statutory d i rection requi res o n l y  notice a n d  comment, 5 U . S . C. § 5 5 3  ( 1 970 ) .  Sec 
Automotive Parts & Accessories A s s ' n  v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 ( D .C.  C i r .  1 968 ) ( upholding 
informal rulemak i n g ) . 
1 86. 1 5  U . S .C. § 1 394 ( a )  ( 1 970 ) .  
1 87. Clearly when factual i ssues are invol ved, including the  i ssue o f  whether 
com pliance i s  technologica l ly  feasible .  the reviewing cour t  must consider the 
record upon which the Agency based i ts  order.  . . [ A ] ny r u l e  which i s  re­
qui red to  be ,  inter al ia, "practicable" and "obj ect i n ' '  must  be  revie\ved on t h e  
bas i s  of the data which the Agency considered i n  its  promul gation, rega rd l ess 
of \\·hether formal h ear ings \\·ere or were  not held .  
Chrys ler  Corp. v. Department of T ransp. ,  472 F.2d 659,  668 ( 6t h  Cir .  1 972 ) .  B u t  sec 
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The Clean A i r  Act188 is devoid  of any suggest ion that j uclicial r eview of 
Environmental Protect ion Agency ( EPA ) regu lations is to be based upon 
Jll<lterial  that was before the A d m i n i strator .  Yet i n  remanding an emis sion 
st<lnclard to t h e  agency for inadequate d i sclosure of the  basis  for  i ts  in i t ia l  
proposal . the  District of Columbia Circuit  has gone a l ong way toward so 
holding.  Regulations,  w rote J udge Leventhal  in Portland Cemen t  Ass'n 1.1. 
R11ckelslzaus , 180 may not be promulgated on inadequate data 
or on data that . to a cr it ical d egree. is kno\vn only to  the agency . 
[ I ] nformat ion should generally be disclosed as to the basi s  of a 
proposed rule  at the  t ime of i s suance r and court chal l enges must gen­
eral ly be J l imited to points m ade bv petit ioners in agency pro­
ceecl i ngs . 1 0' '  
None of these  dec i sions squarely rej ects an effort to  bring b efore the 
court factual information that was not made a matter of  record before t h e  
agency. for i n  none vvas that the i s s u e .  Y e t  the  c lear trend of s u c h  decis ions 
i s  to base j uc l  ic ia l  review upon an acl m i  n istrat i,·e record.  despite the absence of 
a trial-type hearing. If  such is  the  law. t here is no need for a j ud ic i al t rial of 
facts relating to vali dity. 
This Yiew of the reviewing function der ives support from l\ I r .  Justice 
Frankfurter 's  opinion for the Supreme Court i n  Natio nal  Broadcasting Co. ,  
Inc . 'Z ' .  United States,191 affirming t h e  dec is ion o f  a t h r ee-judge distr ict court 
uphol ding FCC chain�b roadcasting regulat ions  as adopted . N ot only does 
the opin ion state that ' ·  [ o] ur  duty is at an end when we find that the act ion 
of the Comm ission was based upon fi nd ings supported by eviclence, "1 !l2 but it 
goes on expl icit ly to say that matters not before the  FCC should not be con­
si dered : 
The court belmY correctly helcl that i ts  inqui ry was l im ited to re\· iew 
of the evidence before the Commiss ion . T rial  de nm·o of the matters 
heard by the Comll l i ssion and dealt vvith in its  Eeport woul d  h ave 
been improper . 1 !':; 
Yet it woul d  be too hasty to conclude that materials not placed in t h e  
record before the rulemak ing agency may ne·er be produced i n  court .  T h e  
Consumer Product Safety Act. f o r  example.  t hough req u i ring that the Com­
mission file the " record of proceedings ' ·  on \\·h ich it "based its rul e" and 
proYic l ing that Commission findings he upheld only i f  supported by "sub­
stant ial evidence on the record taken as a \Vhole. " goes on to define the  
-·-------
tion of t h e  "substantial  e\' idence' '  test  to '.·ehic le- safety standards because the statute does 
not req u i r e  an agency hearing ) .  
1 88. 4.2 G . S . C .  § 1 85 7  ( Supp. I I I . 1 973 ) .  
1 89. 48G f.2cl 375  (D .C. Cir .  1973 ) .  
1 90 !d. at 393-94. 
1 9 1 .  31 9 u . s .  1 90 ( 1943 ) . 
1 92. Td. at 224. 
1 93 !d. at 227. 
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"record" t o  include not only such matters a s  the notice o f  proposed rulemaking 
and the comments received, but also "any other information which the Corn­
mission considers relevant to such rule."1 94 This appears to embrace material 
not made public during the rulemaking proceedings and even, perhaps, ma­
terial not considered by the agency in  adopting the rule .  S imi larly, the Ad­
ministrative Conference has recommended that the record on review of m­
formal rulemaking include factual i nformation not elsewhere included 111 the 
record "that was considered by the authority responsible for promulgation 
of the rule or that is proffered by the agency as pertinent to the rule ."195 And 
the First C ircuit i n  So uth Terminal Corp. v .  EPA1% recently indicated that 
additional material wou ld  sometimes be appropriate for i ntroduction at the 
j udicial review stage. 
If factual material may be presented for the first t ime 111 court, fairness 
surely demands that affected persons have an opportunity for rebuttal , either 
i n  court or  before the agency, and neither alternative i s  v ery palatable .  For the 
reviewing court to accept rebutting information and to make its own decision 
based upon material not considered by the rulemaking agency, as suggested 
in So u th Tcr11 1 inal, l D7  woul d  hardly be consistent with the statutory command 
that the agency make the regulations .  \Vhat the Supreme Court said m re­
fusing to allov\' new evidence in court upon review of  a rate order seems 
equally appl icable here :  "To allow [ the]  . . .  findings to be attacked or 
supported in court by new evidence vvould substitute the court for the admin­
istrative tribunal as the rate making [or  rulemaking] body. ' ' J !lS The alterna­
t ive  i s  a t ime-consuming remand to the agency for additional input . 1 9!l 
1 94. 1 5  u. s .  c. § 2060 ( 1 970 ) .  
1 95 .  A CU S  Rec.  74-4, supra note 1 04, at  1T 1 ( 4 )  ( adopted �hy, 1 974 ) .  The suppur t ing 
memorandum o f  the Commi ttee on T udicial  Revic11· \I'Ou!cl l i m i t  material  not considered 
by the agency to that "becoming av�i lable after the deci sion to promulgate the rule was 
made, " and asserts that the recommendation does not decide whether the review ing court 
should be " l imited to the information before the agency." Com m ittee on J udic ia l  Revie11· . 
Administrat ive Conference of the U . S . ,  Supporting Mc;n orczndznn He A C US Rcc.  '1'·1- 1 .  
1T 1 ( 4),  May. 1 974. Sec also Chrysler Corp.  v. D epartment of T ransp. ,  472 F.2d 659, 66() 
( 6th C i r. 1 972 ) ( record on review for purposes of Nat ional T raffic and :VIotor Veh ic le  
S afety A c t, 15  U . S . C. § 1 392 ( b )  ( 1 970 ) inc ludes "the technological  and stat i s t ica l  data 
rel ied upon by the Agency in  a r r i ving a t  i ts  conclusions" ) .  
The A d m i n istrative Conference has adopted somewhat contrad i ctory pos i t ions 11· i th  
respect to what  consti tutes the  record for revi e11·. N othwithstanding i t s  recommendation 
for broad definit ion of the record on review, i t  agrees that in not ice-and-comment rule­
making an agency "to the extent feasible" shou l d  "make ava i lable  documents.  mater ia l s 
and pub l i c  sub m i ss ion upon 11·hich the proposed rule i s  based."  2 A CU S  Rec.  7 1 -6, supra 
note 1 04, at 3 5  ( 1970-72 ) .  Contrast  the Conference ' s  ret rograde Recommendat ion 72- 5,  
2 id. at  66,  that " in future grants of r ulemaking authority . . . , Congress ordina r i l y  
s hould n o t  impose mandatory procedural requ i rements other than t h o s e  requ ired b y  5 
U . S . C  § 553 ."  Part ia l  reconci l iat ion.  probably unintended by the Con ference. 11 ould 
result from making c iear that  Portland Cczn cnt i nterprets rather than adds to � _; _;3 : 
perhaps i t  i s  t ime the  Conference gave the 11·hole problem a fresh look.  
196.  504 F.2d 6-!6, 665 ( 1 st  Cir .  1 9 74 ) . 
197.  ld. <Ct 665 -66. 
1 98. Tagg B ros.  v .  United S ta tes. 280 U . S .  420. 44-l ( 1 930 )  ( B randeis .  j . ) .  c i ted  
appro<.·ingl_\' in  NBC v .  United States,  3 1 9  U.S .  1 90,  227 ( 1 943 ) (a  r u l emaking case ) . 
199. T h i s  i s  c learly contemplated by the Consumer Product Safety Act.  The statute 
l ' 
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A requirement that rules adopted by an admin istrative agency be sup­
ported by a public record developed in a notice-and-comment proceeding 
would, of course, depart markedly from the analogy of l egislative enactment.200 
Whi le  it seems difficul t  to deny that the development and rebuttal of a factual 
case to support proposed legislat ion \vould often be likely to improve the 
product, we think the situations distingu ishable. I t  i s  tradit ionally acceptable  
for legislatures, not composed o f  technical experts, t o  act informally i n  the  
exercise of a j udgment essential ly more pol itica l  than factual ,  t o  accommodate 
the clashing interests of  d iverse groups. The very purpose of statutory dele­
gation to a special ized and expert agency, hovvever, i s  to  obtain a more pro­
fessional ,  l ess political j udgment.  The statutes emphasize this purpose by laying 
down standards, often technical ly exacting, to govern the exercise of rule­
making power, and by imposing procedural formalit ies-notice, comment and 
a concise statement of reasons-that are not appl icab le  to the legislature itself. 
The j udicial impulse to convert informal rulemaking into what m ight be 
called semi-formal rulemaking-more accurately, rulemaking based upon a 
record developed through somewhat structured dialogue between the agency 
and the affected parties-can be viewed as an effort to make the statutory op­
portunity for comment a meaningfu l  one in l ight of the statutory purpose. 
Moreover, significant procedural d ifferences may be d ictated by the sheer dif­
ference in size between the two decisionmaking bodies. It would  obviously not 
be feasible to demand that a legislature of several hundred mem hers adopt even 
provides for remand when "the pet i t ioner appli e s  to  the court for leave to  adduce 
addit ional  data . . .  and shows . . .  t h a t  there \\· er<.: reasonabl e  grounds for the p et itioner's 
fai lure  to  adduce such data . . .  i n  the p roceeding before the Comm ission . . . . " 15 U. S . C. 
§ 2060 ( b )  ( 1 970 ) .  Sec Scal ia  & Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Constt m c r  P rod u ct 
Safety .cl e f, 20 U.C.L.A.  L .  REV. 899, 923, 936 n. 1 44 ( 1973 ) .  
The Environmental P rotect ion A gency, stressing t h a t  a remand to counter  agency 
i nformation discl osed for t h e  fi rs t time in court may postpone the e ffective elate  of im­
por tant regulat ions .  argued agains t  a loose de fi n i t ion of "r ecord" p roposed by the Ad­
m i nis trat i ve Conference, sec no te 1 95 and accompanying text supra. Requi r ing d i sclosure 
of agency support material  during the  rulemaki n g  proceedi ng and l imi t ing t h e  record 
essent ial ly to matters so di sclosed w i l l, the  E PA argued, " improv [ e J  the process of 
i n formal rulemaking i tself and l essen . . .  the need for j udicia l  re\· i e \\· · ·  by ''faci l i tat ing 
t i m e ly and informed comment and increasing the l ikel i hood that  hard prob l em s  wil l  b e  
addressed beiore fi nal promulgat ion,"  rather t h a n  " o n  remand from a revie\\· ing court ."  
The E P.\ m emorandum, moreover, endorsed the requirements imposed upon i t  i n  the 
Por tla1 1d  Ccii / C / 1 1 case : "There seems to be no adequate j ust i fication for revea l ing such 
material only at  the time of  final promulgation ( much less at th e time the record for re­
view i s  compi led ) . ' '  EPA, co�DI E'\'TS ON PROPOSED .A C U S  REc. 74-4, � 1 ( 4 ) : PREEN­
FORCD! E i': T J L' DICI :\L REn E\\. OF l{uLEs OF GENERAL A PPLICA BIUTY 1 4, 22 ( 1974 ) . Most 
d ramatica l l y, the EPA has in tegrated the Portland Cc1 1 1cnt procedure into i ts  practice 
for adoption of efHuent guidel i nes under the water pollution statute.  33 U . S .C.  §§ 1 2 5 1 -92. 
1 3 1 1 -28. 1 341 -45 , 1 3 6 1 -76 ( Supp. I I I , 1 973 ) .  Sec 38 Fed. Re g. 2 1 202-06 ( 1 973 ) .  
Even i f  the A d m i n istrat ive Con ference gels i ts way and an agency i s  permitted tn  
bring before the court new factual mater ia l ,  the desirab i l ity of avoidi ng a remand may 
discourage remand s  in any case .  Sec Sca l ia & Goodman, snpra note  1 99, a t  923. 
200. Sec vVi l l iams.  Judicial Co lllf'ulsion of Procedures Not Requ ired b�v Sec t ion 553 in 
" No ticr-a l zd-Co n z n t c/11" Rulcntak·in (J 5 5 - 56 ( 1 974)  ( unpubl i shed draft submitted to the  
Administrat ive Conference of the United  States ) :  " I t  seems appropr iate  that  the same 
device employed ( \\·here necessary ) to ver i fy the  factual underpinnings o f  legis lat ive acts 
shou l d  he ava i l ab le  for a court to ver i fy the factual support of agency rules . . . . " 
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the "concise general staten1ent" of reasons that the A P  .l\ requires of rule­
making agencies. Finally, the constitutional d ignity of the l egislature, its 
broad-based mandate from, and closeness to, the sovereign electorate, and 
above a l l  the immediate political checks on i rresponsible l egislation make 
tolerable a procedural looseness in  Congress that would b e  l ess acceptable in  
an administratiYe agency. 
A requirement that a publ ic record be cle\·elopecl to support rules promul­
gated by an administrative agency should not . hovvever, be taken to require 
t rial-type hearings for rulemaking. The agency must simply make publ ic  its 
supporting factual information i n  time for rebuttal : the method of presenta­
tion is an ent irely separate question . 
This requirement may. howe\·er. invest rulemaking proceedings with a 
degree of finality more common to quasi-j udic ial dec i sions .  Carried to the 
extreme of requ iring challenges within a short period, as in the Clean Air 
Act,201 final ity can easi ly cut off important rights of unsuspecting persons-a 
danger much reduced in adj udication because only the parties are bound. We 
see similar dangers in  l imit ing review of regulations to persons who partic i­
pated i n  the rulemaking proceedings : there is  no just ification in policy for 
holding that persons not so participating can only sue in a district court ,202 
so long as review is ,  as we have ach·ocatecl. l imited to the administ rative record. 
Even this l imit  may cut off legit imate claims that coul d  not reasonably h ave 
been anticipated : but i f  the preservation of reasonably unanticipated claims 
i s  thought to j ust i fy allowing reexamination of regulations on the basis of new 
information, >ve think it more consistent with the theory of delegated rule­
making that the data be fi rst presented . and the in i t ial reassessment made, in  
the rul emaking agency, not in court . 
Further, e\·en under the Consumer P roduct Safety Act .208 where the 
agency may bring before the court materials i t  did not earl ier  make public, 
t here ma:' be no need for taking evidence in  court <1s to the ya]icl ity of a regu­
lation. That statute. in the first place. speaks of "fil ing' ' such material as a 
part of the record, j ust as if i t  had been introduced formal ly before the agency ; 
it does not contemplate presentat ion by \Y itnesses in open court . And if a 
party challenging the regulation wishes to rebut the new material ,  the statute 
envisions a remand to the agency. not a j udicial triaJ .!2°4 
Finally, apart from such spec ific statutory language, the traditional d i s­
t inction behveen "legislative" and "adjudicative" facts suggests that oral test i -
20 1 .  42 U . S . C. § 1 857h-5 ( b ) ( Supp. I I I ,  1 973 ) .  
202. Sec Gage v. A EC, 479 F.2cl 1 2 1 4  ( D .C.  Cir .  1 973 ) ,  const ruing the H obbs 
A ct, 28 U . S . C. § 2344 ( 1 970 ) .  \Yhich a l l0\1"5 d irect c i rcuit  court reYi e \\" by a " ' party" to a 
proceeding m ade re\· ie\1 able by the Atomic Energy .-\c t ,  42 U . S  C. � 2239 ( 1 970 ) ,  \\ h ich in  
turn includes r egulations. 
203 . 1 5  U . S . C .  §§ 205 1 -8 1  ( Supp. 1 1 1 ,  1 9 73 ) . 
204. See note 1 99 supro. 
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111ony \v ii i  not be t h e  standard method of presentation if a court accepts new 
factual material respecting the validity of a regulation.  Professor Dav i s  has 
stated : 
Adj u dicative facts are the fact s  about t h e  parties and their act iYit ies . 
businesses, ancl propert ies . . . .  Legislat ive facts do not u sually con­
cern the immediate parties but are general facts \Yhich help the t r i ­
bunal clec icle  quest ions o f  law and policy ancl d iscretion . . . .  
. . Because the parties may often ha,·e l i t t l e  or nothing t o  
cont ribute t o  t h e  de\·elopment o f  l egislat i Y e  facts .  t h e  method o f  t rial 
often i s  not required for the determination o f  d i sputed issues about 
l egislative fact s  . 
. . . and should not be requirecl . �o:; 
The facts u pon which regulations of general appl icability are based are l ikely 
to be legislative fac t s  in this sense. Professor Karst has forcefully argued for 
more att ention to adequate presentation of legislative facts i n  consti t u t ional 
cases and has cited instances in which such matters were establ ished by evl­
clence at tr iaJ . :?OG The First Circuit's dictum in Sou tlz Term inal i ndicates t hat 
such a presentation would be proper i n  distr ict court review of a r egu l at ion.  
Yet as Karst points out ,  i t  i s  common pract ice t o  establ ish legislative fac t s  i n  
cour t ,  when they are not simply noticed b y  the court o n  i t s  own . throu gh such 
informal means as affidavits or B randeis briefs .  It would hardly be surprising 
if the same were clon e  with iegislat i \ e facts in rulemaking cases. espec iai ly since 
no tr ial i s  u sual ly r equi red for development of such issues before the agency 
itself.  
The foregoing survey of j udicial reY iew of  info rmal rulemaking suggests 
that t h e  absence of a t rial-type record may not present as substantial an ob­
stacle to direct court of appeals review as m i ght  appear at fi rst blush .  Often the 
sole issues w i l l  involve pure statutory construct i o n .  Sometimes a court may 
st i l l  adhere to the  old-fashioned view t hat it  may not inquire into the facts. 
Increasingly. we bel i eve, factual matters w i l l  !Je determined on t h e  basis of 
material that was b efore t h e  agency.  And if n ew matter is allowed, it seems 
l ikely to be presented either as a part of t h e  " record" rel ied on be!mv, or befor e  
the agency o n  remand, or  a s  l egislative fact i n  t h e  form o f  a B randeis brief. 
\Ve do not say the occasion for t aking evidence in court will n ever arise .207 
20.5 l( D.wrs .  An�r r �'rsn,\Trn: LA\\. TnT. § 7.03. at 1 60 ( 3d eel.  1 972 ) .  
206. t,: a r st .  L c,r;isla tiz•r Fads in Co11stitu tio 1 1ol  Lit iga lion, 1 9()() S t " P. CT. Rc:1·. 7 5 .  
F" r add i t ional exam ples.  sec 'vVi l l iams,  supra note 200, a t  5 5. 
207. I n  at l east one case under the Emergency Price  Control c\ct  of 1 9.:!2, CJ1 .  26, 
t i t .  l f .  ,:;6 Stat .  3 1 .  the Emergency Court of .-\ ppea l s, after an initial admini strative re­
vi el\ hearing and nut one but t \\"o remands, itself heard add i t ional evidence bearing on 
the  '> :i l i cl i ty oi a r egulation. Hei nz v .  Bo11· l es .  1 49 F .2cl 277 ( Emcr .  Ct  . .-\ pp.  1 945 ) . And 
in Tc:-;as \ " .  EP,-\ , 499 F2d 289 ( 5th Cir.  1 974 ) a single m ember of the appel la te  p:\ilel 
cnnrluch'd conferences \\ i t h  counsel tn s t retighten ou t matt ers u f  fact. P ro fessor S t even 
\-\'i l l i ams has ca l l ed attent ion to an old Supreme Court case, Hou ston v. St. Louis 
I ndep emkm Packing Co.,  249 U.S . .:179 ( 1 9 1 9 ) .  cited in \Vi!  iian1s ,  su pra note 200, at S3- S4, 
in \i·h ich the val i d i t y  oi a regulat ion ,-,·as determined on the  basis of cou rt testimony. 
Professor vVi l l iams has a l so noted some p ieces ui l egislative h i st ,;ry sugg:cst ing th::t 
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But o n  the strength o f  our examination t o  date, w e  think such occas1ons may 
be the exception rather than the rule.  V/hen they occur they can be dealt with 
in  a variety of ways short of a cumbersome trial before three j u dges : by con­
ferences as in Texas v . EPA ,208 by a hearing before a master209 or  perhaps 
before a single circuit j udge,210 by remand to the agency, or .  statute permitting, 
by transfer to a distr ict court for hear ing.211  Admittedly, any of these pro­
cedures would be burdensome in  the particular case. If we are r ight, however, 
that they wi l l  rarely be necessary, it would seem unfortunate to sacrifice the 
obvious economies of direct review in the many manageable cases in order to 
avoid an occasional burden. 
There are, however, further complications respect ing the possible need for 
j udicial factfinding in rev iew of i nformal rulemaking. First ,  for reasons noted 
in connection with review of aclj u cl ication, factual issues relat ing to motions for 
i nterim reli ef can be handled by requiring the agency to pass first upon such 
motions, or  by reference to a master, or by summary proceedings before the 
appellate court itselC:?12 Second. although facts outside the agency record may 
be relevant to a determination of stancling,21 8 an issue largely foreign to re­
v iew of quasi-j udicial orders, the usual d ispute, one suspects,  concerns not the 
Congress in enact ing the A PA contemplated j udicial evidence-taking as a matter of 
course to determine the valid i ty of non-r ecord regulat ions : 
vVher e  a rule or order i s  not requi red by statute to be made after opportunity 
for agency hearing and t o  be  reviewed solely upon the record thereof, the facts 
pert inent to any r elevant quest ion of law must be tr ied and determined de  novo 
by the reviewing court r especting either the validity or appli cat ion of such 
rule or order-because facts necessary to the determination of any r el evant ques­
tion of law must be  determined of record somewhere and, if Congress has not 
provided that an agency sha l l  do so.  then the record must be made in court .  
H . R  REP.  No. 1 980, 79th Cong. ,  2d Sess. ( i 946 ) , quo ted in ·wi l l iams,  supra note 200, 
at  52. See a lso S.  REP. No. 572, 79th Cong., 1 st Sess. ( 1945 ) .  This stat em ent purported to 
explain 5 U. S .C. § 706 (2 )  ( f )  ( 1970 ) , which p rovides in relevant part : 
The r evie\Ying court shall  . . .  set aside agency action, find ings and conclusions 
found to be  . . umYarranted by the facts  to the extent the  facts arc subj ect 
to trial de novo by the r evie\\· ing court. 
Regardless of the committee's intention, this provision appears not to prescr ibe \\·hen a 
tr ia l  i s  to be had, but only to indicate  the scope oi review when sont e  other Ia\\. 
prescribes t r ia l  de novo. In any case, the impos i t ion of procedural r equi rements looking 
toward development of a non-adj udicat ive record, as i n  the Portland Cc11 zent  c:tse, has 
substant ia lly undermined the prem i se of the comm ittee posi t ion, and Professor \Vi l l i ams 
affirms ' ' the apparent rar i ty of j ud ic ia l  t r ia l"  of facts relating to val idi ty.  vVi l l iams,  
supra note 200.  at 55.  
208. 499 F.2d 289 ( 5th Ci r .  197 4 ) . 
209. for the comparable problem of ascertaining facts  in a proceeding for contempt 
i n  the court  of  appeals, s e e  notes 41-5 1 and accompanying text supra. 
2 10. Unl i ke the three-j udge d i str ict  cour t . 28 U . S .  C. § 2284 ( 1970 ) . the c ircuit  
court i s  not c learly d isabled by statute from delegating the evidence-taking function to a 
s ing le  j udge. /J u t  sec id. § 46 (b ) ( authorizing ' " h earing" as \\· eil as "determinat ions" o f  
cases by three ci rcuit j udges) . Cf. Texas v. EPA,  499 F.2d 289 ( _1th Cir .  1974 ) .  
2 11. 28 U. S .  C. § 2347 ( 1 970 )  ( " \\·hen a hearing i s  not required by law and a 
genuine i ssue of material fact i s  presented'' ) . The same section authorizes a reference to 
the agency for addit ional evidence \\·here  there are "reasonable grounds for failure to 
adduce the evidence before the agency . "  
212. Sec notes 41 -5 1  and accompanying text suf>ru. 
2 13. Cf. SCRA P  v. United States, 412 U.S. 669 (1973 ) . 
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extent of the plaintiff's interest but its l egal sufficiency . a subj ect for argument 
not proof. 
lVIore important ,  the discussion so far has assumed that the regulation i s  
attacked on i t s  face. while i t  may be possible  for an  affected person to challenge 
the validity of  a regulation as applied to his individual situation .214 Individual­
ized facts-for example, the absence of space at the petitioner's plant to in­
stall a pollut ion-control device-are not l ikely  to have been brought before 
the agency : it would be cumbersome to provide a hearing on all such questions 
with in  the  rulemaking process. :i\foreover, the facts giving rise to a claim of 
individual hardship are almost by definition "adj udicative" rather than " legis­
lat ive, " so that a trial-type hearing-such as is seldom afforded in rulemaking 
-may be constitutionally requirecl . 2 1 5  One court has concluded that such 
chal l enges may be brought in  a court of appeal s .�u; another court .  not ing the 
impract icabi l ity of providing an adequate hearing on individual claims during 
rulemaking, disagreecl . 21 7 If this latter v iew prevail s .  review of agency regula­
tions vvi l l  be bifurcated : Facial validity wi l l  be determined by the  circuit 
courts ,  validity as appl ied by the district courts .  
That neither the rulemaking process nor the  appellate court i s  well­
equ ipped to determine the facts bearing on applicabi l ity of a regulation to 
individual cases seems manifest : the practical significance of this problem in 
determining the appropriate forum for judicial review, however. i s  l ess c lear .  
Truly individualized facts should as a matter of statutory construction rarely 
render a regulation inval id as appl ied : The very purpose of a regulation is to 
avoid the necessity of determining the appropriate rule on a case-by-case basis .  
Section 1 1 1  of the Clean Air Act,  for instance. prescribes that new-source 
performance standards "reHect the degree of  emission l imitation achi evable  
through the  application o f  the  best system of emission reduct ion which ( taking 
into account the cost of achieving such reduct ion ) the Administrator deter­
mines has been adequately clemonstrated . ":!l S One would hardly expect the 
EPA to make a plant-by-plant determination as tc the best practicab le  control 
technology in setting such a stanclard . 2 19 On the other hand, determining 
2 1 4. Getty O i l  Co . v. Ruckelshaus, 342 F. Supp.  1 006 ( D . Del .  1 972 ) .  rcv'd in part on 
o tlz cr grounds. 467 F .2d 349 ( 3d Cir. 1 9 7 2 ) : Buckeye Po11 er,  I nc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1 62 ,  
1 73 ( 6th C i r .  1 973 ) ; Gage v. A EC, 479 F.2cl 1 2 1 4, 1 2 1 8- 1 9  ( D .C.  Cir .  1973 ) .  
2 1 5 . Sec Londoner v. Denver. 2 1 0  U . S .  373 ( 1 908 ) . 
ZIG. Get ty O il Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 324 F. S u p p .  1 006 ( D. Del .  1972 ) .  
2 1 7. Buckeye Power, Inc.  v. EPA, 481 F.2cl 1 62, 1 73 ( 6th Cir .  1 973 ) .  
2 1 8 .  42 U . S . C. § 1 857c-6 ( a )  ( 1 )  ( Supp. I I I ,  1 973 ) 
2 1 9. Cf. H ei nz v. Bowles,  149 F.2d 277. 28 1 ( Emer.  Ct .  App.  1945 ) ,  where the cou r t  
i nterpreted a statute requiring maximum p r i c e s  t o  be  "generally fair and equitabl e" : 
I f  the price enabled most of the non-proces s ing s laughterers to operate profitably, 
the regulation wou lrl not be rendered inYal i cl by the  iact that an uccas i ona l  
margin a l  producer in t h e  group could not s tay in  business under t h e  establ ished 
c e i l ings. 
Indeed, when i nd i vidual hards h i p  i s  deemed to excuse one from compliance.  statutes 
commonly proyide a qua si-j udicial variance procedure in \\·h ich the expert agency may 
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whether whole classes of emission sources requ ire separate treatmen(?20 in­
volves legislahve facts and i s  the ver_y· sort of question vvi th  which the rule­
making process i s  designed to  deal. Thus, the danger that individual facts 
may have to be established in  a court of appeals to determine the validity of a 
regulation as applied may be more theoret ical than real ; many such conten­
tions can appropriately be disposed o f  by the equ ivalent of  a demurrer without 
trial . 
I n  short, unless the court t akes what we think would be  the unusual and 
misguided step of allowing new factual evidence on the issue of facial validi ty, 
the occasions for factfinding in pre-enforcement review even of informal 
rulemaking seem l ikely to be relatively minor. \Ye are strengthened in th is 
conclusion by the fact that the agencies responding to our quest ionnaire  re­
port that d irect review of regulations has caused no practical problems.221 I f  
other considerations c u t  strongly i n  favor o f  direct appellate review o f  such 
regulations , it may be inappropr iate to let the tai l  wag the clog by requir ing a 
trial court forum rather t han allowing a modicum of awkwardness at the 
appell ate l evel . 
The most compel l ing argument for bypassing tl1e trial courts in  rule­
making cases i s  that regulat ions of general applicabi l ity, almost by definit ion, 
are relatively more significant than inclivi clual adj u dicat ions.  Affect ing often 
an ent ire industry or class of persons. the question of the validity of such 
regulations i s  quite l ikely to end up in a court of appeals anyway. Unless fact­
finding requirements substantially discommode the circuit  courts, it makes 
sense to avoid the delay and expense of prior district  court l i tigation .222 T his 
·· - --- ----·-----
determine the facts. E.g., 42 U . S . C .  § 1857c-.J ( f )  ( Supp.  I I I , 1 973 ) ( a i r  pol l u t i on ) .  
Exhausticm of such ::�n ac! m i nistrati 1:e rem edy should perhaps be :1 prerequ isite to j "Jcl ic i ::�l 
attack on a regulat ion as a pp l ied. Sec Commonwealth Ed ison Co. v. Pol l u t ion Con trol 
Bel., I i l .  A.pp 3d , N E .2cl . ( 1 st D i s t .  1 974) 
( l imit ing d i rect a ppel l ate review of r egu lat ions to questions of fac ial val i d i ty : confining 
i ndividual hard sh ip cases to  seeking var iances from the agency ) . 
220 . E .y . ,  H e i nz v. Bow l es , 1 49 F.2d 277, 28 1 ( Emer . Ct.  A pp. 1945 ) ( inval idating 
app l ication of meat-price regulation to no!l·processing s laughtc rers b ecause " 'a co!llmon 
economic s ituation . .  sets them apa r t  from the rest of ihe industry" ) .  
22 1 .  See letters to Antcnin Scalia, Chair11 1an of the Administrative Conference 
from G ener::�l Cout�scl Office of the AEC, Oct . 7 .  1 974, Dcp't  of Tr�msponat ion ( h igh-
11 ay safety ) .  Oct. 30, 1 974, and Consumer Product Saiety Commission, Nov. 18, 1 974. A s  
t h e  C-\ 13 has pointed out. circuit courts  sometimes m u s t  rev i ew t h e  validity o f  regu lat ions 
11 i thout benefit of d i strict  court fac tfinding when regulations are cha l l enged on appeal 
from a quasi-judic ia l  enforcement order . Sn· letter from T homas ] . Heye, CA B  General 
Counsel,  to Antonin S ca l ia. Ch::�irman of _-\dmin is tr::�tivr� Collference, Oct. 18. 1 974. citing 
Great Lakes _\ ir l ines, Inc. v. CA B ,  291 F.2cl 354, 367 ( 9th C i r .  196 1 ) ( the agei:cy' s  trial 
exam in er had e:,cluded eo,·idence going to the  val id i ty  of the regulat ions ; the court said 
th::�t i f  fac t s 11 ere necessary a r emand would be i n  order but held the regulations val i d  as 
a matter of law ) .  
222. The C,\ B ,  ::� rguing that ' ' in terposing a d ist r ict cour t  proceed ing bet 1Yeen agency 
decision and appel l ate dec i sion has achieved noth ing but c!eby,' '  has asked Congress to 
make i ts regulat ions re1·ie11·ab!e by the ci rcu i t courts under the Hobbs Act,  28 U . S .C. 
§ 2344 ( 1 970 ) .  Sec letter f;·om Thomas J .  Hcye, C:\ B  General Counsel . to An ton in Sc::�l i::�, 
Chairman of .\clm in i strat ive Confer ence . Oct .  1 8 ,  1 974 ; S. 2609, 92d Cong., l s t S ess.  
The Federal I�cserve Board has  asked the cou rt s to huh\ i ts  regulat ions ' "orders" sub­
j ect to d i rect appelbte cou r t  review under the Bank H ') \d ing Company Act,  1 2  T_T S . C. 
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may be especially important when Congress deems t ime to be of the essence, 
as it did with wart ime price regulations and more recently with air and water 
pollution. 
3 .  Appraisal of O ther O bjections. The problem of bifurcated rev iew in 
the area of informal rulemaking cuts both ways for many agencies .  O n  the 
one hand.  there i s  the often-voiced obj ection22a that it i s  undesirable to have 
orders reviewed by the appellate court and regulations by the dist rict court ,  
as is the case under many current deci sions. On the other , there is  the likeli­
hood that the validity of regulations may in  any event be determined by tr ial 
courts in enforcement actions that cannot very well be  brought i n  a circuit 
court because of the frequent need for a fact hearing on the question of viola­
tion . One answer would  be, as in the Clean Air Act, to forbid the raising of 
invalidity as a defense :2�4 this i s  a harsh measure that may tr ip the unwary 
litigant who cl id not suspect the regulation was meant to apply to him, and we 
do not recommend i t  absent the most stringent necessity-as, for example, in 
the case of price control-for expedit ious final  cletermination .225 Nor would  we 
recommend certification of val idity questions in enforcement proceedings to the 
appellate court ,226 for that would spl it  a single case between two forums, with 
consequent delay and expense.227 The only other way to avoid all bifurcation 
would be to make not only regulations, but all orders, revievvable in the district 
courts : but that would impose substantial additional burdens on courts and 
litigants alike. All of these alternatives seem to us much worse than a l i tt le 
bifurcation : after all ,  the circuit courts can review determinations of validity 
made in  enforcement cases, so any disuni formity or other damage done by 
bifurcated review will be short- l ived. 
The concurring opinion in  Texas v .  EPA ,228 call ing for d istric t  court 
review of regulations, seems to have focused not only upon the role of the 
trial j udge in the taking of  evidence but  also upon his  ro le  as  fact s ifter. The 
thesis seems to  be that . quite apart from the necessity of a hearing, judicial 
economy is served and an ult imately correct decis ion made more likely i f  a 
� 1 8.:!8 ( 1970 ) .  Sec letter from T homas J. O' C01mel1, General Counsel of the  Federal 
Reserve Board, to A ntonin Scalia,  Chairman of the Administrative Conference, Oct. 
1 0, 1 974. 
223. Sec. c.y., L. J .-\ HE, supra note 4, at 423 : :Mullan. The Federal Court A c t :  A 
Misu u idcd A l lcll l p t  a t  A d1 1 1 in istru ti·uc Law Reform ?, 23 U. ToRONTO L.J .  1 4, 1 6, 29 ( 1 973 ) .  
22.:!. 42 US.C. § 1 857h-S ( b )  ( Supp. I I I ,  1 9 73 ) .  
225. Sec Yakus v .  United S tates, 32 1 U . S .  4 1 4  ( 1 944) ( wart ime need for exped i tion  
in pr ice cont rol ) .  
226. Such cert i ficat ion is  required for substantial  const i tu tional  questions a r is ing i n  
enforcement cases under section 2 1 1 of t h e  Economic S tabi l i zat ion A c t  o f  1 970 ( T empor­
;cry Emergency ?\'ational Cour t  of Appeals ) ,  12 U . S . C . A .  § 190.:! ( Supp.  1 974 ) as 
anlcndcd, Act of Aug. 2-1, 1 974. Pub. L. :t\ o. 93-387. § 21 1 .  88 Stat .  750. Sec. e .g . ,  
Del\ i eux v. The Five Smi t hs .  I nc. ,  -199 f . 2 d  132 1 ( T emp. Emer .  Ct .  A pp.  1 9 74 ) . 
227. Cf. Note, Consequences of A bstention l>y a Federal Co uri .  73 H .wv. L .  REv. 
1 3 S8 ( 1 960 ) ( the d elays a t tending t h e  prac t ice  of abstention by iederal courts  to ascer­
t;c in  state \·icws n n  state  Ia\\· ) .  
228 . .:!99 F.2d 289, 32 1 -22 ( 5th Cir .  1 974 ) : see text  accompanying notes 1 60-62 supra .  
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trial judge first undertakes the  formidable task of organiz ing and understand­
ing very complex and informal factual records . A mammoth case such as that 
one, involving the validity of a variety of provisions of Texas 's plan for imple­
menting air-quality standards. obviously imposes a considerab le  burden on 
any court . \Vhi le  this very complexity m:1kes it al l the more imperative t hat 
the appellate court ult imately decide. i t  does not require t hat three j udges do 
the preli minary digging. B ut there i s  no indication that th i s  is what happened 
in  Texas ; the complaint is t hat the burden was great for the  vvrit ing j udge. 
To the extent that the argument i s  that prior district court scruti ny faci l i tates 
correct appellate decision, we recognize the  force of the point . The Supreme 
Court surely benefits when difficult i ssues have first been tackled by the circuit 
courts .  The question remains whether in rulemaking cases the gain from the  
input o f  a s ingle district j udge i s  great enough to just ify the  added burden. I t  
should be borne in  mind  that no t  a l l  rulemaking cases are  as complex on their  
facts as Texas v .  EPA . 
This obsen-ation bri ngs to  mind a related one :  Not a l l  regulations are 
of equal general importance. To provide for direct review of  all regulations 
because some of them are of great import would be overhasty ; i t  might r isk 
burdening the courts of appea ls  with a myriad of trivial cases that might better 
end in t he d istrict courts. Once again, the uncertainties and burdens of j ur is­
dictional l i tigation counsel against simply making " important" regul at ions 
directly reviewable upon individual determination of importance, as they 
counsel against the District of Columbia Circuit 's apparent position22!l that 
the proper forum turns on the  necessity for j udicial factfinding in the  i n cl i ­
v iclual case. The best  approach would seem to be for Congress to consider 
separately each category of regulations with a view toward ascertaining 
whether t hey are l ikely to be of sufficient importance to j ust ify b::-·passing the  
district courts. I n  th i s  l ight ,  i t  would seem to  make eminent sense t hat the  
circuit courts have original review authority over such broad and  s ignificant 
regulations as those sett ing national air-qual ity standards or the emission 
standards for ach ieving them.2ao In such cases .  i t  should be  acldecl ,  the prob­
ability ancl desirabi l ity of further review in  the circuit courts strongly argues 
that those courts would not be substantiall v  rel ieved if such cases were in it ial lv 
reviewed in  the trial courts .  
C .  Infonnal A djud·ication 
. -
This amorphous and miscellaneous category , const ituting "the vast bulk 
of  administrat ive  adj udication, "231 i s  defined by a characteristic highly rele-
------�------------
229. Deutsche Lufthansa A . G. Y. CAB,  479 F.2d 9 1 2  ( D.C.  Cir .  1 973 ) .  
230. A s  now provided i n  42 U.S .C. § 1 857h-S ( b )  ( Supp. I I I .  1 973 ) .  
23 1 .  ATTORr\EY GENERAL's Co�Df !TTEE ON A uc.u;,r rsTRxn n: PRoCEDURE, FrNAL }�Er . 
• lJ ( 1 95 1 ) ,  c ited in Gardner, The Proccdurr .s FJ J I V  hi eli Informal A c lion is Tak en ,  24 
Au.  I . . REV. 1 5 5 ,  1 56 ( 1972 ) . 
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vant to the choice of a tr ia l  or appel late forum for review : the absence 
of a record based upon a formal adjudicatory hearing. Sub j ect to that con­
straint, the myriad types of adjudication vary almost infinitely in  procedural 
characterist ics-in opportunity for input by interested parties. scope and 
thoroughness of administrative investigat ion, nature of the administrative 
record, i f  any, and so on. They range from unstructured discretionary decisions 
of enforcement agencies whether to prosecute to  quasi-formal decisions of 
the Comptrol ler of the Currency-governed by specific statutory criteria, after 
extensive investigation, and upon information received informally from all in­
terested parties-whether to grant a bank charter.232 This alone would make 
useful generalization concerning the appropriate forum for review extremely 
difficult .  The difficulty i s  compounded. however. by our general lack of knowl­
edge about the nature of the beast . In contrast to the formal processes of 
administrative action, the "procedures which govern informal action by the 
Government have unt i l  the last few years received almost no attention,"�:la 
and most of this complex and diverse terrain remains unexplored . The ques­
tion of the appropriate forum depends upon more basic variabl es-such as the 
nature of the issues typically raised on review. the character of the admin­
istrative record, and the procedures available to the reviewing court to supple­
ment that record when necessary-all of which are themselves highly uncertain .  
The state of our knowledge with respect to the relevant administrative prac­
tices, and the state of the l aw with respect to the permissible judicial t echniques 
are alike fluid and developing. 
The informal orders of agencies which do l i t t le or no fonnal adj udication 
are ordinari ly reviewed in district courts  in suits for declaratory or equitable 
rel ief under the general re\· iew provisions of the APA. The j urisdictional sit­
uation is less clear. however, in the case of agencies whose main business is 
formal adj udication and some or all of whose "orders" are reviewable in c ir­
cuit courts under specific statutory review proYisions. I n  FPC < ' .  111 etropohtan 
Ediso n  Co .234 the Supreme Court held that such a provision appl ies only to  
formal orders . The statute prov ided for revie\v of orders arising out  of  "pro­
ceedings under the Act ' '  and required a transcript o f  the record to be fi led 
with the appel late court . ��" The Court ruled it inapplicable to an order com­
mencing an investigation to determine "the ownership, operat ion, management, 
and control" of the plaintiff company. Not content to hold the order nome­
viewable because of its "procedural ' ' and "prel iminary' ' character, the Court 
further declared that the statutory "orders ' '  were l imited , ;to orders of a 
defini t ive character deal ing with the merits of a proceeding before the Com-
232. Sec Camp v. P i tts ,  4 1 1 U.S .  138 ( 1 973 ) .  discussed at notes 253-54, 258 and 
accompany ing text infra. 
233. Ga rdner, supra note 23 1 ,  Ztt 1 56. 
234. 304 U.S . 375 ( 1938 ) .  
235 .  1 6  U . S . C .  § 825/ ( b )  ( 1970 ) 
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mission and resulting from a hearing upon evidence and supported by findings 
appropriate to the case. "236 I n  this aspect, however . Jvf etropolitan E dison has 
not generally been fol lowed. Regulatory orders,  for example,  suspending237 or 
refusing to suspend238 a proposed rate ,  or accepting a proposed rate for 
fi ling, 230 have been held reviewable  by circuit courts even i n  the  absence of a 
formal record . The appel late court s tend to approach the  j u r iscl ictional ques­
t ion in an ad hoc, pragmatic  way , as two decisions of the D istrict of Columbia 
Circuit i l lustrate. 
In Environmen tal D efense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin 2·10 the  court accepted 
jurisdiction to review the Secretary of Agriculture's refusal to act on a requ est 
that he suspend the registration of DDT pending a cancel lation proceeding. 
Review of this important interlocutory order was surely appropriate s ince later 
review wou l d  be of no use. Since there v.ras no admin i st rat ive record. i t  was 
argued that mandamus in the d i strict court \vas the sol e  remedy. although the 
final order in the cancellation proceeding would  be taken to  the court of  ap­
peals. The court disagreed : · 
There is some authority that only a trial court i s  capable of re­
viewing orders issued without the benefit of formal factfinding based 
on a record. That view has been cr it ic ized. however. for dividing be­
tween two courts the rniew of the \·arious orders involved in a single 
administrative proceeding. \\'hat ever its continuing Y ita l  i ty, that I ine 
of authority i s  especial ly inappropriate here. where the  facts i n  issue 
l ie peculiarly within the special competence of the Secretary. The dis­
trict court could do no more than remand to the Secretan·. as we do 
here . . 2 4 1  
• 
Recogni zi ng that "meaningful j ud ic ial review' '  would be  i mpossible without 
more of a record, the court remanded the case to the Secretary for a fresh 
determinat ion or a statement of reasons. 
In  iV!ed-ical CoJJ11n:it tee for Hu 111an R ights  v. SE C242 the same court enter­
tained a chal lenge to the SEC's  decision not to prosecute an a l leged violation 
of its proxy rules .  There had been no aclj uclicatory hearing : the action was not, 
as in  Hardin, ancil lary to any pending or potential formal proceeding : and the 
substantive quest ions coul d  have been raised in  a private action in  a d i strict 
court . The court of appeals .  however . was held the "more appropriate" forum 
236. 304 U. S .  at  384. 
237.  Phi l l ips P etroleum Co. v. FPC, 227 F.2cl 470, 475 ( l Oth Cir. 1 9 5 5 ) .  ccr t. 
denied sub nom. Michigan \Vi sconsiu Pipe Line Co. Y. Phil l ips Petroleum Co . . 350 U.S.  
1 005 ( 1 956 ) . 
238. Isbrancltsen Co. v. United S tates. 2 1 1  F.2cl 5 1  ( D . C. C i r. ) .  ccrl.  den ied su/J 
no m .  Federal  rviarit ime Bel. v. United S tates, 347 U.S.  990 ( 1 954) . 
239. Cit ies Service Gas Co. \". F P C, 255 F2cl 860. 862-63 ( 1 Ot h  Cir . ) ,  ccrt. den icd 
su/J nom.  }.hgnol ia Petroleum Co. v. Cities S ervice Gas Co . . 3 58 U . S .  837 ( 1 958 ) .  
240. 428 F.2d 1 093 ( D.C.  Ci r .  1 970 ) . 
2 4 1 .  !d. at 1 098-99. 
242. 432 F.2cl 659 ( D. C.  Cir. 1 970 ) . 
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because the petit ioner "does not seek to contest any matters of fact which 
would require a trial de novo. "�4:' 
The absence of a formal adj udicatory record j ustifies, we think, a pre­
sumption in favor of district court revievv. \Vithout such a record, a j udicial 
trial wil l  very often be necessary to determine either the basis upon which the 
administrator acted or the facts relevant to an evaluation of his action . Further­
more. even where the issues raised are str ictly legal ,  a district court opinion 
may, in the absence of a formal opinion at the administrative l evel ,  be u sefu l  
t o  the circuit court i n  organizing the case for appellate review. 
To be sure, we suggested earl ier�44 that . in general , notice-and-comment 
rulemaking should  be revi ewed in courts of appeals despite the absence of a 
trial-type hearing record, and that if further factfincling became necessary 
the appellate court could refer the case to a district court, a master, or the 
agency itself. The same treatment might be thought equally appropriate for 
informal adjudication. There are, however. at least three pertinent d ifferences. 
of degree if not of kind, between the two types of informal action. 
First, review of rulemaking more often presents quest ions of law or 
questions of legis lative fact that can be resolved on the basis of Brandeis br iefs ; 
conyersely, adjudication usually hinges on quest ions of specific fact that may 
have to be tr ied. Second, while the AP A prescribes no procedures at all for 
non-record adj udication, it does impose a degree of structur e upon the rule­
making process.�45 The requirements that interested persons have an oppor­
tunity at least for written comment and that the agency provide a general 
statement of reasons Yirtual ly assure that an appellate court will have a mean­
ingful record to review. vVhile it is t rue that in many instances informal adju di­
cation also produces an administrative record. the nature and scope of the 
records vary widely from one type of action to another and cannot provide the 
same assurance that appellate review wil l  be feasible. Final ly .  review of rule­
making much more often involves quest ions of general importance or broad 
impact . questions that will eventually be brought to the appellate courts in  any 
event and cannot be postponed without maj or social costs .  Review of informal 
adjudication, on the other hand, is more l ikely to affect only the i mmediate 
parties and in most cases would not be appealed beyond the district courts.  
The distinct ions we have drawn do not cut c leanly .  Informal adj udica­
tion, we repeat . frequently does gener;1.te an CJ.clmin istrative record suitable for 
the purpose of reyiew. Moreover, scholars and pract i t ioners of administrative 
law are coming to recognize a neecl for gre;J.ter procedural regularity in  the 
field of informal agency action.216 The reforms they contemplate-including a 
243. I d. ::tt 672. 
244. Sec notes 1 67-222 and accom panying text supra. 
2-Li. 5 U.S. C.  s 553 ( 1 970 ) . 
246. Gardner, supra note 23 1 .  
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requirement that the admin istrator state t h e  facts and reasons upon which he 
bases h is  decision247-would,  as a byproduct ,  yield more adequate records. 
Furthermore, deficiencies in the administrative record which make it un­
suitable for review can often be remedied withoi1t resort to a j udicial tr ial . The 
Hardin case i s  sufficient i l lustration . It i s  true that the court ' s  decision to re­
mand the case to the Secretary for a statement of reasons, and i ts  assumption 
that a district court would have had no choice but to do the same. is somewhat 
inconsistent with the approach taken by the Supreme Court two years l ater 
in Citizens to Preserve Overton Pa rle ,  Inc .  'Z/. Volpe .248 The Court remanded 
to the d istrict court to determine,  either by testimony or affidavits ,  the "factors 
that were considered" by the Secretary of Transportation or h is  "construction 
of the evidence' '249 in deciding, without a h earing or formal administrative 
findings, that there was no ' ' feasible and prudent alternative" to bui lding a 
h ighway through a park.250 07Jerton Parle makes clear. however, that the 
absence of formal administrative fi ndings or reasons does not n ecessarily call 
for a remand to the agency.251 Applying the same approach in Hardin, the 
District of Columbia Circuit might have disclaimed j urisdiction on the ground 
that the district court was the appropriate forum in which to obtain an ex­
planation for the Secretary's refusal to suspend DDT. Yet it m ight equally 
have concluclecl that i f  the explanation for the Secretary's action was to be 
el icited by affidavit or test imony, rather than by a remand to the agency, d istrict 
court review would be superfluous, for a court of appeals is no l ess able than 
a district court to secure the production of such evidence. This  conclusion 
was impossible in  Overto n Park, not only because of the absence of a statute 
giving courts of appeals j ur isdiction to review orders of the Secretary of Trans­
portation, but also because the  question of whether the Secretary had made 
an independent j uclgment or merely rubber stamped a dec is ion of the local 
city council  was a disputed matter possibly requiring oral testimony and cross­
examination.  Normal ly, one assumes, an administrator 's own explanation of 
the grounds upon which he acted, "post hoc ' '  rationalization though it may be, 
would be accepted at face value and coul cl be adequate! y communicated by 
affidavit .  
Findings and reasons, however, are not the only prerequisite to meaning­
ful judicial review ; the court may also need some factual basis on which to 
evaluate them . This poses no serious problem for c ircuit court review i n  cases 
where an extensive administrat i,·e record exists in the form of written ma­
terials that can be packaged and filed in the reyiewing court as easily as a 
hearing transcript. The difficulties arise in  cases where the record , if there is 
247 .  Id .  at 1 64. 
248. 40 1 U . S .  402 ( 1 9 7 1 ) ;  see notes 1 70-73 and accompanying text  supra. 
249. Id. a t  420. 
250. I d. at 405 .  
25 1 .  I d .  at 409. 
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one. i s  less complete, or less tidy. or where the question of what information 
was before the administrator when he acted i s  disputed or uncertain. In such 
cases. a j udicial t rial may sometimes be necessary in order to reconstruct the 
administrative record. 
In evaluating the frequency with which a j udicial tr ial  may be necessary, a 
key consideration i s  the extent to which agency action can properly be sus­
tained or chal lenged on the basis of evidence. j udicial ly adduced, that was not 
before the agency when it acted . If such evidence is ruled out, and the tr ia l  
l imited to a reconstruction of the administrative record , district court review 
will obviously be needed much less often. I n  O c•erton Park,252 and later more 
expl icitly in  Camp v. P itts,2":' the Supreme Court indicated that in determining 
whether an order i s  arbitrary or capricious .  "the focal point for j udicial revi ew 
should  be the administrative record already in  existence, not some new record 
made initially in  the reviewing court . "254 This position i s  in keeping with the 
traditional understanding that "the reviewing function i s  one ordinarily 
l imited to consideration of the decision of the agency or court below and of 
the eYidence on wh ich i t  was based ."255 Yet i t  i s  hard to take these statements 
ent irely at face value .  In the class of situations with which we deal , the party 
tendering new evidence may have had no opportunity to be heard at the 
administrative level . To deny him that opportunity in  court might be a viola­
t ion of due process . 256 Even i f  not . it woul d  often reduce j udic ial review to  a 
rubber stamp, especially where the proffered evidence tended to expose the 
administrative record as a product of superficial and inadequate investigat ion .  
To uphold the administrator 's  action merely because i t  i s  supported by such a 
record would be to  reward him for wearing bl inders. In  O ve rton Park,257 
and again in Ca111p , 258 the Court acknowledged that new evidence may be ap­
propriate where the agency's factfincl ing procedures are inadequate, and this  
exception may ult imately be held to encompass situations where the agency 
has acted ex parte and without sufficient effort to i nform itself . 2 5!l 
Even if one assumes that the administrative record may on occasion be 
supplemented by new evidence, it does not follow that this  must be clone 
252. !d. a t  420. U pon remand in O <_ocrfoll  Park, t h e  distr ict  cour t  conducted a 25-clay 
trial  in which it received volum inous evidence. much of i t  not contained i n  the original  
admini strat ive record,  bear ing on the Secretary's  conclusion that no alternative route was 
feasible.  C i t i:.:ens to Preserve Over ton Park, Inc. v .  Volpe, 335 F. Supp.  873 ( \N.D.  Tenn.  
1 973 ) .  The court ind icated. however, that i ts  decis ion would be based exclusively on the 
adm ini strat ive record that was before the Secretarv a t  the t ime he acted .  ld. at 882. 
253.  4 1 1 U.S .  1 38 ( 1 973 ) .  
-
254. !d. at 1 42.  
255.  U ni ted S tates v. Carlo B ianchi  & Co. ,  3 73 U.S.  709,  7 1 4- 1 5  ( 1 963 ) .  
256. Sec Londoner v.  Denver, 2 1 0  U.S.  373 ( 1 908 ) . See a lso note 2 1 5  and accompany-
ing text and note 43 supra. 
257. 40 1 U . S .  at 4 1 5 .  
258.  4 1 1 U . S .  a t  1 4 1 -42. 
2.19.  I n  a va r iety of situations, federal courts re\· iew ing i nformal admini strative 
act ion have admitted ne\\' evidence augmenting the  administrative r ecord. Sec,  e.g. ,  
B rown v .  United States,  396 F.2d 989, 99 1 -94 ( Ct .  C l .  1 968 ) ( Davis, ] . ) . 
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through a j udicial trial .  A lt ernatively, t h e  reviewing court could,  as i n  Hardin, 
remand to the agency for a fresh determination i n  l ight of  the  additional in­
formation brought to the cour t ' s  attention .  This approach has the advantage 
of enabling the  agency to evaluate the  new evidence for itself and woul d  re­
duce the r isk of a j ud icial substitution of j udgment . If frequently employed, 
however, the remand tec h n i qu e  could  force the agencies to adopt burdensome 
factfinding procedures that Congress d id  not see fit to i mpose and that 
could s eriously impair the  efficiency of the  administrati v e  process . \Ve do not 
attempt to resolve these questions of appropriate procedure.  Our purpose 
i s  merely to note that o n  certain procedural assumptions courts of appeals 
will  often be able to perform the  reviewing function effect ively despite deficien­
cies in the record. 
Our analysis  y ields  no easy general i zations concern i ng the frequency with 
which a trial  in the district court may be necessary . Until  we know much more 
than we do, it  woul d  be premature to recommend wholesale,  or even retail ,  
departures from t h e  exist ing statutory preference for dist rict court review. But 
j ust as we do not say that all i nformal rulemaking should be reviewed in 
appellate courts ,  neither clo we say that al l informal adj u di cation should be 
reviewed in district courts .  Further study may reYeal categories of informal 
action in which the need for j u dicial trial .  ancl the acl clecl burden upon the 
courts of appeals, are sufficiently small to warrant a statutory assignment 
of j u risdiction to the appellate courts .  
One c lass  of informal action that immediately comes to mind as a cate­
gory, or source of categories ,  for court of appeals review is t h e  occasion2.l  in­
formal orders of agencies that mainly adjudicate formally and have statutory 
review provisions plac i n g  t h eir  " orders" in the courts of appeals .  I nformal 
action by such an agency is often ancil lary to a pending or prospective formal 
proceeding, and district  court review. aside from its other i nefficiencies, could 
have the acldecl disadvantage of dividing a s ingle proceedi ng between two 
courts .260 Not all informal action by formal adj udicatory agencies has this 
anci l lary character-for example, the order complained of  in M cdical Cmn­
Inittee may have been altogether remote from the area of formal agency ad­
j ud icat ion . Furthermore,  even when an informal order does fall within the 
general subj ect matter arena in which the agency formall]' adjudicates, it  may 
be unrelated to any ongoing or imminent formal proceeding. As we have 
saicl . 26 1  the mere fact t h at the  district court, in reviewing an informal order, 
may have to decide a legal i ssue that would ordinarily come to the court of 
appeals review of a formal order does not seem a particularly troublesome 
form of bifurcation,  since the  district court's decis ion can in any event be 
260. Sec L. ] .'\ FFE. supra note 4, at 422. 
26 1 .  Sec notes 223-27 and accompanying text supra. 
r 
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appe:1lecl . These considerati ons  suggest as one possible statutory approach . 
that the standard court of appeal s review provi s ions be construed or revised 
to coYer informal orders anci l lary to a pending or i m m inent formal proceed­
ing . . \ l ternatively.  the statutory "orders ' '  reviewabl e  in the appel late courts 
111ight . contrary t o  J/ rtrof'olitan T: diso11 , be defi ned to include informal as 
wel l as formal orders.  The latter option seems preferable, not only b ecause 
it avoids the j ur i sd ict ioml ambigu i t i es that lurk in the not i on of anci l lar iness .  
but  a lso bec:1use it makes good sen se for i n fo rmal  orders to he rev i ewed hy 
appel late j udges who presumab l y  have acqu i red a subj ect matter expertise i n  
the regulatory area i n  questi o n .  
F o r  most agenc i es . the  c l a s s  of  orders t hat w o u l d  c o m e  di rectly to t h e  
appel late courts  u n cl er th is  approach a r e  n o t  numerous a n d  typi ca l ly involve 
important enough i nt erests to  he appea l ed in any event . Those i nstances,  prob­
ably rare. in which the  record i s  i n adequate could be hand l ed by r eference to  
a m:tster, to the agency i t self, o r ,  statute perm i tt i ng . to a di strict court .  There 
are. to be sure, some except ions .  The i n formal . h igh ly discretionary orders of 
district directors of imm igrat ion i n  cleportat ion-relatecl matters fal l i ng outside 
the framework of the  formal d eportation  proceeding t ypical ly im·olve questions 
of spec ific fact affect i ng on ly  t h e  i m m ediat e  part i es ancl are rarely appealed . 
For t h i s  and other reasons w e  ha,·e already discussed ?'� w e  do not share the  
vie11· of  Professors Davis�r;8 and J affe�84 that these  orders shou l d  b e  added t o  
the exclus ive j ur isd iction o f  the  courts o f  appea l s . 
\Vhatever i t s  u lt imate form . a category -by-cat egory approach t o  the ques­
tion of appropriat e  forum seems t o  us preferable to the acl hoc approach of 
the D i strict of Columbia C i rcuit i n  Hardin and M cdiral Comll l ittce. Under the  
latter . j urisdict ion wou l d  apparentl y  depend o n  a determinat ion i n  each case as  
to  wh eth er factual q uest ion s demanding aclcl it iona l eviden ce were ra ised .  No 
doubt such a test wou l d  shorten the road to u l t imate appellate resolution, 
but only at the cost of uncerta inty an d j ur i sdict ional lit igation :�"5 no o n e  
suggests t h a t  a s imi lar  approach be aclopt ecl in c i v i l  act ions  generally, t hough 
to do so would avoi d  delay i n  appeai cases \Vhere the facts do not have to be 
tried. 
262. Sci' notes 1 09-27 �nd accompanying text s1 1pra. 
263. I\: . D.-1\'I� .  Sll{!ra note 43 . § 23.03. at 798-99 ( 1 970 S upp. ) .  
264. L J c\ FFE,  ,\1/f'ra note 4, at 422. 
265. The uncert�in ty probl em a ri se s  only on the assumption that dist rict court and 
appe l l a t e  cour t j u r is d i ct ion �re mutual lY  exclus i,·e, 5() th at a d i s t r i c t  court  \l·ou lcl be 
iorc c r l  t o  d i sc l a i m  j ur i sd i c t i on i n  cases ;10t requ i r ing a trial and therefore �menab l c  to 
i mm ediate appel late rc1·ie11 . 'Cncertil inty and j ucl ic i::ll contl ict  11·ou l d  cl i s�ppear, o n  the 
othn hand .  i f  the di;;tr ict  court s .  ioo, adopted the p ragma tic  pol icy of �ccc·p t ing j ur i s d i ction 
1 11 all  ins ta J J Ces 1.1 hc re rer()uting th e part ies  a ppears to sen·e no prac t ica l purpose i n  t h e  
P�lrt icubr Clse.  Th(� resul t-a d e  fact o  sys t em of C(nicw-rent  j u r i scl i c t i on-\l·oul d  b e  con­
trary tn the congressiunal i n tent.  h 011 eve r .  that c i rcui t  c o u r t  j u r i sd i c tion be exclus ive 11·ith 
1:espen tu "orders" 11· i thin its doma i n and m i gh t  a l so provi d e  fert i l e  opportunities for 
lorum- s ! Iopp in g-. 
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I I .  SPECIALIZED CouRTS AND Ex cLUSIVE VENUE 
In F rance and other cont inental countries,  admin i st rat ive actions are 
reviewed by separate tr ibunals or courts.266 In the B ri t i sh Comn1onwealth, 
the idea of separate administrative courts or divisions i s  spreading .267 I n  this 
country Congress has on i solated occasions created narrow special ized courts 
to review specific kinds of administrative action and has  local ized review of 
other administrative act ions in a single court of appeals .  
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals .  as i t  1 s  now known . was 
created i n  1 909 to hear chal lenges to tariff determinat ions ;2ns in 1 929 it was 
given nonexclusive j ur isdict ion to review Patent Office determinations on 
patent appl ications and between competing applicants i n  interference proceed­
ings.2f;9 The Commerce Court, aboli shed three years after i t s  c reat ion  in 1 9 10 ,  
was given exclusive ju ri sdiction to review I CC rai lroad ord ers .27 ° Congress 
vested exclusive j urisdiction to determine the val idity of price regulations 
during the Second vVorld vVar in the Emergency Court of Appeals,271 and 
made a somewhat comparab le  provi s ion for substantial const itut ional questions 
under the 1 970 price control legislation .272 The  Court of  Cla ims has  j ur isdic­
tion, exclusive in cases involving over $ 10,000, of  contract ancl certain other 
claims against the L nited States.2"3 The Tax Court has nonexclusive j uris­
diction to determine challenges to tax assessments 274 T h e  Court of 1vi i l i tary 
Appeals bas review power, exclusive except for l imited co l lateral attack over 
266. The French Consei l d 'Etat  and the inferior T ribunaux Adminis tra t i fs have ex­
clusive j urisdict ion over "acts of the administration" ; other matters  are  l i t i gated in the 
ordinary civi l  courts .  Simi lar systems are found, for example, in B el gium, I ta ly, and \Vest 
Germany. See ycncrulf)' LN. BRow ;..; & ]. CARX ER, FRE N C H  A l l :\[ I N I STRATI \' E  LAw ( 2d 
eel. 1973 ) .  
267. Ne\v Zealand created an Administrative Divis ion wi th in  i t s  Supreme ( trial ) 
court i n  the J uc!ica ture A mendment A ct ,  N .A.  Stats.  1 968, No. 1 8 .  S cc also ( N .Z . )  
P UBLIC A N D  .'\ D:\! l l\ I STRATI\' E L A W  REFOR:\1 COM M ., 5TH A N D  6TH REPORTS ( 1972, 1 973 ) .  
A commit tee appointed by the Austral ian Attorney General has r ecommended the c re­
ation of a single administrative t ribunal to review adm inistrative dec isions closely and a 
federal administ rat ive court to exercise over it a more l imited supervisory power . CoM :\!0 :\ ­
W L\LTH .\ rnt i :\ ISTRATI\'E REnEw CO:\I MITTEE, REPORT, Austr .  Par i .  Paper  :'\ o .  1 44 ( 19 7 1 ) .  
Rej ected by the Franks Committee in  Great B r i tain in  1 957, Co�D! ITTEE O ="  T R! B u l\ :\LS 
A x D  E :\ Q L: I RIES ,  REPOI!T, C:\I D  . .'\o. 2 1 8, at 25-29 ( 1 95 7 ) .  the idea of an administrat ive 
court or el i \- i s ion is under restudy there.  See id. 4059 ( 1 969 ) .  In Canada, administrative 
revie\\' responsib i l i t ies, previously scattered among provincial cour t s ,  \\·ere r ecently con­
sol idated in a single two-tier Federal Court \\ i th  relatively few other  s ignifi cant duties. 
Federal Cuurt .·\ct  1 970, 19 El i z .  2 c .  1 ( Can. ) .  
268. Act  of Aug. 5 .  1 909, ch.  36, § 29, 36 Stat .  105 .  In i t ial r evie\v ing power i s  now 
vested in the Customs Court, wi th a fur ther right of  appeal to t h e  Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals. See 28 U.S .C .  §§ 1 582, Li4 1  ( 1 970 ) .  
269. Act of .:Vfarch 2, 1 929. ch .  488, 45 Stat .  1 47 5 .  Se,· 28 U.S .  C .  § 1 542 ( 1 970 ) .  
270. Ac t  of J une 1 8, 1 9 1 0, 36 Stat .  539, repea led by Act o f  Oct .  22, 1 9 1 3, 38 Stat.  
208, 2 1 9. 
27 1 .  Act  of Jan.  30, 1 942, ch . 26, § 204, 56 Stat .  3 1 .  
272. Economic Stabi l i zation Act  o f  1 970 .  as u u 1 , · ;uicd. § §  2 1 l ( b ) .  ( c ) .  1 2  -C. S .C . .\. 
§ 1 904 note ( Supp. I I I .  1 9 73 ) ,  as u m c n dcd, Act  of Aug 24. 1 974 .  Pub . L. No. 93-387, 
§§ 2 1 l ( b ) ,  ( c ) , 88 Stat. 750 ( n o ted in 12 U .S .C .A .  ( Supp. 1 974) ) .  
273. 28 U .S .C .  § 1 49 1  ( 1970 ) : sec a lso id . § 1 346 ( a )  ( 2 ) . 
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court-martial convict ions.215 Exclusive j urisdiction over FCC l icense denials 
and over EPA regulations sett ing air-quality standards or n ew source per­
formance standards ( among other examples ) is in the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circu it .276 
A. A dvantages 
Examination of the history of spec ia l ized courts  suggests three principal 
advantages over the prevailing American pract ice of review in the ordinary 
courts .  It  can produce j udges more fami l iar with administrat ive i ssues i n  
general a n d  with individual administrat ive programs in  part icular, thus im­
prO\· ing the quality of decision. By  minimizing actual ancl potent ial intercourt 
conHicts, i t  can reduce or el iminate cl isuniformity and uncertainty i n  the  law 
administered by the se,·eral agencies and the attendant forum shopping. And i t  
can rel i eve  the burden on the ordinary courts ,  thus  improving the conditions 
for dec isionmaking in both administrat ive ancl nonadministrative cases. These 
advantages would  not be without corresponding costs, as we shal l  see below. 
First . however. we shal l examine the three hypothesized advantages. 
1 .  Relief for the Regular Courts. Relieving the caseloacl of the  regular 
courts was apparently  one explicit reason for the creation of the Court of 
Customs Appeals i n  1 909. The S econd Circuit was ' ' swamped ' '  with a mult i­
tude of chal lenges to tariff determinations.  causing delay in  the resolut ion of 
tariff cases and ' · a  serious obstruction to the disposition of . . .  traditional 
l itigation . ' '�'' Later the same court was gi\'en patent j urisdiction in order to 
rel ie,·e the  burden on the D . C. Circui t . � 1 8  
It i s  now generally accepted that the regular federal courts, and especially 
the courts of appeals, are critically overloadecJ.:!'!' To solve this problem by 
aclcl ing judges or ci rcuits would .  i t  is sai c l .  merely create ne\\' problems. Al­
ready the danger of intracircuit con A icts. the unwieldiness of enlarged en bane 
proceedings, and the lack of col legiality characteristic of ex i st ing courts of L 3  
or 1 5  j udges have led t o  recommendations for doubling the number o f  c ircuits .  
Yet there are dangers in the mult ipl ication of c ircuits too.::s" 
The seriousness of the overload problem i s  large!;.' beyond the scope of 
the present paper. but we add a caveat . I t  i s  fashionable to assume that recent 
upward trends in docket entries wi l l  continue, but predictions ought to be  
based upon more sophisticated subj ect-by-subj ect analysis . �8 1 As an example, 
27 5 .  10 U . S .  C. § 867 ( 1 970 ) . For the confusing scope of habeas corpus sec D.  C e RRa: , 
.mpm note 6. at 1 64-2 1 1 .  
276. 47 U .S .C.  § 402 ( b )  ( 1 970 ) ; 42 U . S .C .  § 1 857h-5 ( b )  ( Supp. III .  1 973 ) .  
277.  F. Fru:o;:n:rnsR & ] .  LI N DI S ,  T H E  B u s i N E S S  OF T H E S c PREC. l E  Coc_· RT 1 49-5 1 
( 1 928 ) 
278. ::\athansun, The A dm inistrati·ve Court Proposal, in 2 .'\ JJ:.I L'\IST!{,\T!\'E Co xFER-
F:XCE UF T H E  C :.: n ED ST.I T b ,  1\ i·:co:.r: . r E :-.:n.nro x s  11 X D  REPORTS 1 98, 2 1 1  ( 1 970-72 ) .  
279. Src. I ' .!J . . H .  FR! U\ DLY, supra note 1 0 .  
280. S e c  n o t e  86  supra .  
28 1 .  Sc,• Casper & Posner, The Su/Jremc Cou rt's Cascload, 3 ] .  LEGAL Sn: D L ES 3 3 9  
( 1974 ) 
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one must take care in basing proj ections upon the fact that direct appeals to 
the Ninth Circuit from EPA determinations rose suddenly to  the staggering 
sum of 2 1 9  i n  the first half of fiscal 1 97 4.282 The EPA has b een going through 
a crash period of adopting regulations and approving implementation plans 
under a brand-new statutory scl1eme 1vith tight rulemaking deadlines ; and 
review of its actions must be sought within 30 clays. Such chal lenges can be 
expected to trail off almost as suddenly as they appeared. 
In any event ,  to the extent that present or proj ected caseloacls impair 
or threaten to impair the qual ity of adj udication. any significant rel ief must 
be regarded as a substantial gain .  Creation of a separate court or courts to 
handle administrative cases \Yould directly further this obj ective, essentially 
by permitting the appointment of more judges without b loating the circuit 
courts or multiplying the circuits .  A 10 percent reduction in cases, for example, 
would be tantamount to appointing 1 0  new circuit judges.283 
Care must be taken, however. to avoid 0\·erburdening a new court of 
administrative appeals .  I f al l  administrative cases were transferred to such a 
court ,  its docket would immediately approach that of our busiest c ircuit-the 
bel eaguered Fifth ( 3 .294 cases in fiscal 1 974) -in which 1 5  j udges have had 
to cut corners in order to keep abreast . One way to avoid this would be to 
give a new court j ur isdiction over only as many categories of cases as it could 
handle with a manageable complement of. say . nine j udges . Such a scheme 
woul d  require monitoring of workloads and cont inuing j ur i sdictional adjust­
ments, c reating both an administrative burden and the danger of sudden 
changes in the law as a c lass of cases is shunted into or out of the new court's 
j ur i sdiction. It  might therefore be  preferable .  from this point of view, to create 
more than one new court, though changing workloads could present similar 
problems. 
A principal d ifficulty with the overload argument is  that it provides no 
j ustification for singl ing out administrative cases for t ransfer to special ized 
courts. 284 The same obj ect ive could be achieved by separate courts for criminal 
or diversity cases or for those arising under the Federal Employers Liability 
Act ( FELA ) .  I f  such alternatins prove politically infeasible or undesirable in 
282. 1 974 SDII-A .. N N UAL A . O .  REPORT, supra note 1 ,  at 1 3. 
283. See t ext accompanyi ng notes 38, 58 supra.  Th i s estimate  assumes that  adminis­
trative cases are of average ct i fficu l ty . The T n m o  CIRCUIT TnrE STUDY, supra note 37, 
rather surpris ingly sho\\'S admin is trative cases to average a smal l e r  i nvestment of  j udge 
t ime than other cases, but J udge Leventhal has test ified to a subj ect ive conclusion that 
the opposite  i s  true in  spades in the D . C. Ci rcu i t . Sec S talc 1 1 1ent  of Judge Lc< 'Ci l lhal, 
S l tpra note 2. at 9. Obviously, administ ra tive cases are highly variable  in diffi cul ty. 
284. A reason for s ingl ing out a class of admin i strative cases for separate treat­
m ent m ight  exist if  that class in i t se l f  imposed an extraordinary burden on the courts .  as 
a pparently was true oi customs cases before 1 909, see no tes 277-78 and accompanying text 
snpra. There are fears that a recent surge in social  secur ity cases before the SSA may 
correspO!ldingly glut the d is tr ic t  courts  in the near future. Sec notes 64-94 and accompany­
ing text supra. But it i s  no more accurate to  a t t ribute the general  problems of the ci rcuit 
cou r t s  to  ;tdministrat ive C;tSes than to fecleral question cases not im·olving the fecleral 
go\·crnrncnt, which cl early outnumber them. Sec 1 974 A .O.  REPORT, su pra note 1 ,  tab le  B7. 
1 
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substance. then, of course, an admin istrative court or courts should  be consid­
ered to the extent that rel ief is needed for the circu i t  courts. 28'i 
2. Certainty in the Law. vVhenever concurrent j urisdiction over a class 
of controversies is vested i n  more than one t ribunal , the danger arises that 
confl icting decisions, unless resoh·ecl by h igher authority, wil l  produce sub­
stant ive inequality, uncertainty. and, if  l iberal venue provisions are available. 
unseemly forum shopping. These considerations have figured prominently in 
the creat ion of specialized tribunals here and abroad. The establishment of the  
Court of  Customs and Patent Appeals was preceded by "costly conflicts in  
decisions ' '  under the tariff laws .28r; The Commerce Court was set u p  i n  re­
sponse to a Presidential message that stressed, among other things, the "great 
uncertainty' '  result ing from "contrariety of decision" in various courts review­
ing ICC decisions.287 The Clean Air  Act gives t he District of Columbia Circuit 
exclusive j urisd iction to review certain EPA regulations because t hey "are 
nat ional in  scope and requi re even consistent national appl ication ."288 The 
same considerations, among others. have long prompted suggestions for special­
ized courts  of exclusive j ur i sdiction over tax and patent matters .280 And i n  
the env ironmental field, E PA attorneys w e  i ntervi ewed acknowledged that a 
specialized court would relieve them of their present uncertainty, engendered 
by conflict i ng circuit court decisions.  as to basic procedures they must follow 
in passing upon state implementat ion plans .  
From the standpoint of uniformity and certainty, i t  makes no d ifference 
whether one or  more new courts are created, so long as subj ect matter l ines 
do not overlap. But on some types of issues, overlap i s  almost inevitable. For 
example, different courts reviewing different agencies might reach divergent 
results as to common procedural or constitutional quest ions, or even as t o  
such substantive matters a s  raternaking, l icens ing, or antitrust policy. I n  any 
case, i t  is important for un i formity that the circui t  courts be deprived of 
jurisdiction to decide the relevant questions regardless of the posture in which 
they ar ise .  whether directly in  agency revie\v or by appeal from a district 
court . If a new court, for example. i s  to h ear pre-enforcement chall enges to 
regulat ions, i t  must also hear-either originally, by cert ification, or on appeal 
285. V/e have not d iscussed the possibi l i ty that a special court or courts might 
rel ieve the burden of  administrative cases on the district courts. B ecause the distr ict  
courts do not to any significant degree function as  col l egial bodies ,  there i s  l ess ob­
j ection to rel ieving their caseloacls by the appointment of  addit ional j udges. See H. 
Fr. r E :'\ DLY,  supra note 1 0, at  28-3 1 .  But there presumably must be some l imit ,  i f  only so 
that adm inistrative tasks can be managed \Vith some effi c iency : and when that l im i t  i s  
approached the  same considerations may be \\·c ighed as in  connection \\· i th the  c i rcuit  
courts .  
286.  See F. FR,\ ::\'Kfl:RTER & ] .  LANDIS ,  supra note 277. 1 48-52. 
287. M essage of Presiden t Taft. <J IIotcd in H . R. R EP. �\o. 923. 6 1 st Cong. , 2d Sess. 
( 1 9 1 0 ) . rcpri11 ted in 2 B. Sc H W ,\RTZ.  T H E Eco :-;o:--uc REGI.L\TIO:\ O F  B c s r :\ESS  A :\ D  
h D1'STRY 1 0 3 1 -32 ( 1 973 ) .  
288. S .  REP. No. 9 1 - 1 1 96, 9 l st Cong., 2d Sess.  4 1  ( 1 970 ) .  See also �lu l lan. supra 
note 223. 
289. Sc,· H. F R IE N DLY , supra note 10, at 1 5 3 -7 1 .  
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from the district court-any chal lenges to validity that are permitted to be 
raised in defense of a civil or  criminal enforcement proceeding. Certification 
from a regular trial court was provi ded for i n  connection with r ecent wage and 
price controls , 290 but i t  had the unfortunate effect of requi ri ng l it igation of the 
same case i n  t wo forums at the same time and does not seem highly desirabl e. 
Original enforcement j ur isdict ion \vould make it advisab le  to  create a new 
trial court as well as an appel late one for more efficient ascertainment of the 
facts and, at l east in criminal cases, woul d  require the new court to sit in the 
vicin ity of the offense. New judges would  have to be appointed or to sit i n  
every state. S ince the transfer o f  jurisdiction over matters n o w  heard i n  the 
district courts would further expand the juri sdiction of the new court, with 
consequent impact upon the caseload, appeal from the district courts to the 
new court would therefore seem far preferable. 
Again,  however, the question arises whether it is appropriate to single out 
administrative cases if the el imination of intercircuit conflicts is the goal .  A 
solution to the problem of disuniformity or uncertainty ought to focus upon 
those categories of cases in which that problem is or is expected to be especially 
serious . The l ikelihood of conflict depends, among other things, on the novelty 
and the complexity of the i ssues and the presence of issues on which social 
attitudes may influence dec isions. The significance of conflict depends largely 
on the importance of the cases and the need for prompt , not merely eventual , 
resolution.  There are old and relatively settled administrative statutes as well 
as new and unsettled ones , simple and trivial statutes as well as complex and 
crucial ones. Some affect strongly held social policies or requi re rapi d  resolu­
tion and some do not. The same i s  true of nonadministrative cases.  There i s  
one difference : Dispersed review of  the  decisions of a single agency inj ects dis­
uniformity i nto a system that, unl ike criminal or acc ident cases, is presumably 
uniform at the trial l evel . Nevertheless, if greater certainty is our goal , i t  
m ight be better to attack the problem wherever it is most acute rather than 
obliquely by s ingl ing out administrative cases . 
Moreover, before drast ic alterat ions are m2.cle i n  the present j urisdictional 
system in  the name of removing disunifcrmity, a serious effort should be 
made to determine the extent of the problem. In Canada, for example, a com­
mentator observing that one reason for creat ion of a new federal court was the 
"obvious" danger of conflicting provincial decisions noted that it was "difficult 
to point to this having occurred in  practice."291 
290. Economic Stab i l i za t ion A c t  of 1 970, 1 2  U . S .C.A. § 1 904 ( Supp. 1 974) , as 
U Ji lCJl dcd, A c t  of Aug. 24, 1 974, Pub. L. ?\o. 93-387, § 2 1 1 , 88 S ta t .  750 ( noted in 1 2  
U . S . C.A. ( Supp.  1974 ) ) .  
29 1 .  Mullan,  supra note 223, at 23-24. Sec the doubts raised by J udge Fr iencl lv  as to 
the lack of  proof that,  outside of the tax field, there are serious problems of um�solvecl 
conflicts or that the Supreme Cou r t  i s  overburdening i tse l f  tel reso l ve con fl i cts.  Friendlv. 
A verting the Flo od /;y Lessening the Flow, 59 CoRNELL L .  EH. 634, 654-55 ( 1974) ;  
Testimony of ] uclge Henry Friendly Beiore Comm ission on Revision o f  the Peel era!  
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3 .  Better Understanding . Perhaps the dominant rationale for creation of 
specialized administrative courts has been the  notion that review of h ighly 
technical administrat ive decisions requires a better grasp of the subj ect matter 
than can be expected from the generali st j udge. Frankfurter and Landis ra­
tionalized the Court of Customs Appeals on the ground t hat customs decisions 
confronted judges with problems ' 'outside their usual province of experi­
ence. ' '292 P resident Taft, in urging establ i shment of the Commerce Court , 
maintained that the issues on revie\v of ICC decisions were "often technical, "  
requiring "knowledge of the  business. "283 P atent cases, Judge Friendly argues, 
present issues "beyond the abi lity of the usual j udge to understand without 
the expenditure of an inordinate amount of educational effort . . .  and, i n  
many cases, even with i t . "294 Brit ish admirers of t h e  French administrative 
courts headed by the Conseil d 'Etat applaud the dec ision to entrust jurisdic­
tion to experts who understand what they are reviewing rather t han to ordinary 
judges who are often "strangers to the administrative process and unsympa­
thetic to its needs" and whom the authors scornful ly characterize as "the rea­
sonable man on the Clapham omnibus. "295 
It  is obvious that concentrated experience 111 handl ing a particular cate­
gory of cases faci litates understanding. A court whose sole function is to re­
view FPC decisions would quickly become fami l iar with pipeline  rate 
regulation even i f  its judges had no previous background in  the subj ect . 
Further,  if it were thought desirable. such j udges cou ld  be chosen on the basis 
of their prior training and experience. The decider will invest more time and 
effort in learning the administrati \ e held if he can expect the knowledge gained 
to prove useful later on .  He can decide more speedily because he need not 
obtain a general education in the field case-by-case .  The l it igants, too, wi l l  
find it more efficient to present cases before judges who need not  be  given 
a cram course in  the background technology. A nd it goes w ithout saying that 
the judge who knows what he is doing is l ess l ikely to make accidental errors 
through misunderstanding of the technology or of the body of the law being 
applied. The sensible cl ient, one supposes, would prefer to  hire a tax lawyer 
in a tax case, and a patent lawyer in  a patent case ; the same philosophy shoul d  
292. F .  FRANKFURTER & ] .  LA..'i DIS ,  supra note 277, a t  1 48-52 .  
293. See B .  ScH WARTZ, supra note 287 ,  1 03 1 -32.  
294. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 10,  a t  Li6-57. 
29i L N. BROWN & ] . GARN ER, supra note 266, at 10, 1 56-6 1 .  Sec also the recom­
mendation of the Law Commission ( U . K . )  that proposal s  for an administrat ive  cour t  or 
divi sion be taken o ff  the she lf  because of the view "held by some" that ' 'a lack of exper­
t ise" sometimes renders ordinary j udges "unable to get  near enough to the admin i strat ive 
decis ion" to review i t  to best  advantage, c�rND.  No. 4059, at 7 ( 1 969) ; the statement of 
the  sponsor of K e\\ Zealand's  legis lat ion providing for an  admin i strative d iv is ion that 
the j udges of that division " \\ i l l  have a t horough kno\\· l edge o f  admin i strat ive law and 
of the background and the  economic and social pol ic ies  \vh ich  the particular Acts con­
cerned \\·ere desig·ned to implement ."  D. BE:\J AF IELD & H.  \V H ITC\IORE, P n r :\' C J PLES OF 
.-\ L'STRALIA K  A D�IIXISTRATI\'E L A \\. 362 ( 4th eel. 1 9 7 1 ) ; and the argument of the Aus­
tral ian At torney General 's  committee for a federal  adminis trat ive  court because a 
"developing expertise" wou ld be "very desi rable ."  R EPOFT OF CoM C>ION WL\LTH Aml !NIS­
TR,\TI\.E REnEw Co?v DIITTEE, AusTL. PARL.  P A PER No.  1 44, a t  72-73 ( 1 971 ) .  
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perhaps apply to judges. As  Judge Friendly asks, why shou ld  "lack o f  u nder­
standing' '  be "deemed a precious asset" ?:!DG 
The logical extension of th is  reasoning 1s to create separate courts for 
each narrow subject ,  administrat ive or otherwise-the narrower the better .  
To state this proposition , however .  i s  to raise a reel flag.  Our system has 
largely been premised on  the not ion that such extreme special ization not only 
carries certain dangers ,297 but i s  unnecessary because increased special ization 
brings diminishing returns .  Not every kind of case is so complicated that only 
one who does nothing else can understand i t  wel l  enough to  perform the ratl1er 
l imited function of j udic ia l  review. I n  any event, any effort to  create more or 
l ess special ized tribunals for aclmin i strati·ve or for any other cases ought to be 
based upon a detailed analysis of  the kinds of cases in  which there is a signifi­
cant need . The challenge to automotive emission standards i n  International 
Han1cster Co . 7.'. R u cl;; e lshaus,2!18 for example ,  presented a much more com­
pell ing argument for an expert tr ibunal than does the ordinary social security 
or workmen 's  compensation case. And once again. as i l lust rated by patent 
and antitrust l i t igation, the problem i s  not peculiar to administrat ive cases . 
In sum, the three principal al leged advantages of a separate administrative 
court point  in  somewhat different direct ions .  The unburdening of  the c ircuit  
courts i s  neutral as to which cases should 1Je transferred and what sort of 
courts set up, so long as the regular courts are rel ieved of a s ignificant b urden 
ancl the new courts not overloaded . The el imination of d isharmony argues for 
transfer of cases in the most di sharmon ious categories ,  and preferably to  a 
single court . The creation of better understanding may cal l  for relat ively 
narrowly defined j urisdiction over cases i m·olving a high degree of technical or 
other difficulty . 
B .  D z:sa.dzmntages 
1 .  Loss of the Genera list P crsp ec ti7. · c .  The more t irne one devotes to a 
particular subj ect , the l ess t ime one has to l earn about others. Analogy has 
been one of the geniuses of the common law : it surely has its place in adminis­
trative revi ew. To put b l inders on j udges and confine them to narrow compart­
ments not only creates the r isk of significant disuniformit ies but also enhances 
the danger that issues may be resolved on the basis of ignorance as to past 
experience in  related fields .  I t  seems l ikely, for example,  t hat we have a 
better la>v of aclminist rati\-e procedure because the same courts rev iew a num­
ber of different agencies .  and a better procedure in both courts ancl agencies be­
cause of the comparisons perceived by courts that rev iew them both. Excessive 
296. H .  FRIEX DLY, supra note 10, at 1 57. 
297. See notes 299-324 and accompanying text i11jra. 
298. 478 F.2cl 6 1 5  ( D .C. Cir. 1973 ) .  
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compartmental i zation can also frustrate substantive programs in which there is 
a need for coordination. 299 
Another aspect of the general ist perspective is the possible advantage of 
the outsider's unprej udiced vision. The cognoscenti have indispensabl e  infor­
lllation on technical matters. but they may also share preconceptions that the  
fresh mind unclouded with intimate knowledge would wish to reexamine. A 
special ized court made up of experts in the art of marine navigation would  
surely have been l ess l ikely than was the general ist Learned Hand to  find  
the whole  industry remiss in fai l ing to  adopt the  radio . �00 Similarly, the  skep­
tical outsider may have something of value to add in administrative cases j ust 
because he has not been steeped in the t raditional wisdom with all i ts  im­
perfections. 
2 .  Tl1 e  L oss of lJi<•crsc Vie7.L'S and the Concentration of Pml'er. That 
different courts decide the same issue in different ways i s  commonly lamented : 
uniformity i s  a value much prized. As Judges F riendly and Oakes have pointed 
out . however .  correct decision may often be promoted by filtering an issue 
through a variety of j udges with a variety of  points of view.�01 
\Vhat the fi rst court decides wrongly may be better understood by the  
second or  third. \Vhen the  Supreme Court waits for  addit ional lower court 
decisions before tackl ing a difficult new problem, i t  i s  often in  ant icipation that 
a few more heads may contribute to ultimate understanding of the issues. 
Col legial decision by the fi rst court is a safeguard against error, but i t  i s  
hardly fai l safe. Indeed. t h e  dynamic of t h e  decis ionmaking process itself­
deference to one's col leagues. the persuasive powers of a single member, the 
assignment of primary responsibil ity to the writ ing j udge and the l imitations 
of the parties presenting a particular case-dilutes somewhat the element of 
collegiality and increases the possibility that a f resh look by another body may 
afford additional insights. l\Toreover, as will be considered more closely be­
lO\vY'2 an ent ire court or its maj ority may come to embrace a particular point 
of view that may not be representative. Thus, whi le conflicting decisions 
resulting from multiple venue can be  damaging if  not promptly resolved, they 
haYe important uses in the short run. Perhaps it would be wiser to  make 
certain that con flicts can be resolved rather than to try to prevent them-if that 
can be clone \vithout undue burden to the system . 
Dispersion of jurisdiction among several cour t s  not only assures that 
299. I n  I l l i nois, for exam pl e . one argument for consol idat ing pol l ut ion-cont rol agencies 
\\·as that  i t  \\·oul cl be unfortu nate to c l ear up  an air-pol lut ion prob lem only to create 
water pol lution.  Scr Ogilvie,  S pec i a l ?vl essage on the Envi ronm ent 2 ( Apri l  23 ,  1 970 ) .  
300. T h e  T.J . Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 ( 2d Cir .  1 932 ) .  
30 1 .  H .  FRIE:\' DLY, supra note 1 0, at 1 86 ;  Oakes. D c;:c/opmcnts in Environ nlt' ! lla/ f_at.l'. 
in 3 E:--::n rw :-< .  L. REP. 5000 1 ,  500 I I  ( 1973)  ( opposing estab l i sh men t of a specialized en­
vironmental  cou r t : " [ t ] here is  a healthy cross-fert i l izat ion \\ h ich occurs from having 
d i fferent courts ru le  o n  given envi ronmental q uestions and then l iving \vi t h  those dec i sions 
ior a t ime " ) .  
302. Sec n o tes 306- 1 2  and accom panying text infra. 
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a number of j udges may contribute thei r j ud gm ent t o  the solut ion o f  difficult 
problems ; i t  also vastly reduces the potential  of a single wrong decision to  
harm an adm inist rative p rogram or those subj ect to it .  T h e  m o re important 
the  administrative program ,  the  greater the dangers of giving sole pov.:er 
over it  to a s ingle court. Commenting on the death of the Commerce Court, 
Frankfurter and Landis observed that the courts are increasingly "arbiters 
of the economic and socia l  l ife . . .  at t imes of the  whole country, " and that 
"the issues reach . . .  beyond the experience and insight of a singl e court,  
however wel l equipped . "303 "Less than ever . " they concl uded,  "is it l ikely 
that Congress wi l l  entrust these issues to five men,  even t hough i nvested with 
the authority of bench and wool sack and subj ect to  the correcti v e  scruti ny of 
the Supreme Court. "30� 
3. The Q uality of the Judges. The doubt that seems to m erit  t h e  most 
careful attention in conn ection with the creation of any t ribunal  of l i mited 
subj ect matter concerns the quality of the j udges . If one c ou l d  b e  confident 
that the j udges of a new administrat ive court would b e  as  able and disin­
terested as the average j udge of the c ircuit  courts, one could v iew the pros­
pect with more equan i mi ty. But  it  i s  not at a l l  c lear t h ey would be .  
One question is  whether the nature of  the j ob wi l l  b e  such as to  attract 
persons of the same cal iber as  those who now sit  on t h e  federal  bench. To 
some. perhaps. it i s  the ,·ery variety of the present c i rc u i t  j udgeship t hat 
makes it both prest igious and intel lectually satisfying. To spend one's l ife  
deciding social sec ur i ty cases,  for an extreme example,  might s eem l ess  ex­
citing than being a federal c i rcuit  j udge and to make one less  o f  a figure in t h e  
leaal communitv.305 I f ,  o n  the other h a n d .  a l l  the interestine- administrative b - � 
business were taken from the c ircuit courts and given to a p restigious new 
tribunal, it wou l d  be the  former whose seats might become l ess  desirable .  as 
their caseload would consist i n  larger proport ion t han today of such grist  as 
automobile accidents and frivolous prisoner petitions .  At  worst both regul a r  
and special  courts could b e  damaged, i f  a subs lant ia l  body of interest i ng b u s i ­
ness were taken from t h e  former a n d  d i st ribu� ecl in narrow categories among 
a number of the latter.  KnO\dedgeabl e  s econd-raters might r eplace more intel­
ligent general ists, and it  is  to be doubted that such a development would make 
for sounder decisions. 
A second aspect of the problem of j udge quality, promi nently voiced 
during the debates on the creat ion and abolit ion of the i l l -fated Commerce 
Court . is  that judges may be not so much incompetent a s  biasecl_ :JOn This  
probl em in  turn has two aspects .  Fi rst , there i s  the danger t hat pressures 
303. F. Fl\.H .K F L' RTER & ]. L.��Dis,  supra note 277, at 1 73-74. 
304. !d. at 1 74. 
305. Cf. Friendly,  supra note 29 1 ,  at 649 ( the increasing c r i m i na !  diet  may make 
distric t  j udgeships  less  attract ive ) . 
306. Su F. FR.-\ N .K F LiRTER & ] .  L A N D I :" .  supra note 277, at 1 53 -74. 
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may be brought to bear upon the appointment process. "vVe merely remind the 
Senate, " said opponents of the Commerce Court .  · ' of the tremendous influences 
that wil l  inevitably surround the selection of such a tribunal . "307 Professor 
Joseph Sax has explained persuasively why these pressures are greater the 
narrower the juri sdiction of the t ribunal : 
[ Ordinary ] j udges . . .  wi l l  spend only a tiny fraction of their t ime 
and energy dealing with environmental d isputes .  For th is  reason the 
process of j udicial select ion is not s ignificantly affected by anyone's 
est imate of a given j udge's attitudes about those issues. This i s  a 
most important fact , one which can hardly be  applied to any institu­
tion that deals regularly with environmental matters. A President or 
a Covernor who i s  choosing an environmental council cannot avoid 
consideration of the attitude that important interest groups-whether 
the oi l  industry or conservat ion organizat ions-wil l  adopt toward 
that choice.308 
The second danger is that bias may develop after service on a separate 
court . One possibi l ity is that , as they come to know more and more about 
the subj ect-or from the outset i f  chosen because of prior knowledge-the 
j udges may increasingly subst itute their judgment for that of the agency in 
which Congress has vested discret ion. I n  contrast . the uninitiated general 
j udge may be inhibited by knowledge of his own inadequate information from 
interfering too much with agency discretion .30n How much interference is too 
much depends.  of course, on the point of view. An agency is l ikely to  favor 
considerabl e deference to its experts, and those i t  regulates may find or be­
l ieve that the inexpert j udge lets the agency get away with murder. On the 
other hand, pr ivate attorneys we interview·ed also favored review in  the 
ordinary courts, but for the opposite reason : They feared that special ist j uclges 
might be too deferential to agencies with which they regularly deal and whose 
attorneys they have come to know personally a 1 0  The architects of the Com­
merce Court ,  cognizant of these dangers, provided for assignment of regular 
circuit j udges on a revolving basis to prevent " the possibil ity of the  court 
becoming packed with l ife members.  dealing with a special subj ect , where their 
307.  !d. a t  1 57. 
308. J .  SAX,  DEFENDING THE  EKVIRONc-.IENT : A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN A CTION 1 09 
( 1 970 ) .  
309. The comments of a number of federal agencies reflect  a belief that an en­
vironmental court could become a "super-agency" 11·here the j udges 11·ould not 
hes i tate to subst itute their vi e\\'s for those of  the admini strator . . .  
PRES I DF.l\T.  :\CTI:-.i'G T H ROUGH THE ATTORNEY GEKER.-\L, REPORT O N  T H E  FL\ S !BILITY OF 
EsTA !l l . lS H J. \ G AN EK\'IRONl\IEl\TAL CoL'RT SY STBI V I -24 ( 1 973 ) [hereina fter c ited as 
REPOin OF T H E  PRESIDEXT] . SeC' a lso Hines & Nathanson ,  Prcli l l l inar_\' A n alysis nf 
En, ·iro nll lcntal Court  P roposal Suggested in the Federal H-'atcr Pollu tion Con trol A c t  
A m c nd111cnts o f  1 972, i n  id. a t  C-13 .  
3 1 0 . S e c .  C. _(J . ,  argument of S enator Hardy against the  Commerce Court, in F .  
!-1< .\ '\ 1-:FTI<TFR & J .  L A  l\" n r s ,  s u  pro note 277, a t  1 6 1 : "when you get your court set 
aside for the trial of one class of cases only. \\· i th  represen tati ves of the Uni ted States . 
far rem01·ed from the people, up011  one side,  and the representatives of the great ra i l ­
roads . on the other, after a whi le your i m part ial  j udge begins to see things in  a l i tt le 
d i fferent l ight from what he did before. "  
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. 1 1 0ns. or a majority of them, are fixed one vvay possibly l eaning toward the 
op
t! 
-ests of the railroads. "m This concession, natural ly,  la id the legi slation 
int e t " . . . . . t o the cnttc1sm that tt cltcl not even provide expert j nclges.312 ct1 op 
[Ivaluating the danger that j udges of a special ized court may be  mcom-
en t or biased is largely an exercise in  conj ecture .  The  l essons of experi­
pet e nre helpful but not conclusive. l\ot only· is the success of special ized 
enc 1 1 -ds a mixed bag : observers also d iffer in  their assessment of success .  uilJtl , .  . . . . . . . 
" 1 1 jnt ot personnel problems 1s touncl m recent Bnttsh appra1sals of the 
I\ �:nch Conseil d 'Etat .�1 3 Judge Friendly reports a " lack of  any serious 
F I  . _ 1· �1 n "  of the Court of Claims or of the Court of Customs and Patent ' t t l  ·' crt  
Jeab· :J H  and close observers have applauded the work of the wartime 
Ap�ergency Court of Appeals. :1 1 5  The Tax Court i s  t hought by many prac­EI� 1ers to be pro-( ;overnment .il t l i The Commerce Court was aboli shed largelv 
ti t t (l l . . . . . -l ,e t t was be!Jevecl to be pro-ra1lroacl, but later commentators, pomtmg 1 · ' l  t " )Cl ' that the railroads had fared even better with the c i rcui t  courts than with ottt Co1nmerce Court. have questioned that j uclgment . 3 17  Of the federal aclmin­�he _ _  1 1 j\·e agencies themselves. one encounters criticism on grounds both of 
15t 1  :t . 11 1anship ancl of part isanship that one does not often hear about the ;l t j cr, 1· t courts . 3 1 8  As Professor Nat hanson remarked i n  evaluatin2' a recent · -ctt � c ! l  
109! for a separate court of administrative review, " [ t ]  h e  charge that nrol · · h 1 1 1 · 1 b 1 · 1 · t ];1torv comm1ss10ns over t e years tenc to )e c ommatec y t 1e me ustnes 
regtt �-egt;bte, whether justified or not. i s  too common to be  ignored entirely thC\ · 1 · · · · " 3 HI 
. �stabl ts  1mg new mstltutwns. · · 111 A. n additional consideration suggested by the h istory of the Commerce 
.1 is that a sr)ecial izecl court, whether or not actuallv parti san , is pecul iarly · - t i l - -
c o  · cjlt ible to being thought parti san .3�u I f  a single court frustrates a popular 
st�2L1in istrative program . it is natural for those disappointed to blame j udic ial a� · �� : the finger cannot so easily be pointed where responsibi l ity is shared by 
bt a··e!l circuit courts 82 1 Confidence in the integrity and intel l igence of deci-
ele' 1 1 · bl 1 · · bl  111a ;:ers ma\· ma -ce untavora e c ec1stons more accer)ta · e . . . t 1 -sJO The spectrum of experience permits distinctions : varying models of 
· i :tl ized tribunals pose personnel problems 1 11 differ e n t  degrees. The status spCL 
__...-/:)'�2 B .  ScH WARTZ, supra note 287, a t  1 060. � ] 2. Sec id. at 1096. � J ] 3 .  See LI\'. BROWN & ] .  GARNER, supra n o t e  266. 
1 1 � Sec H .  FRIENDLY, supra note �l\ at 1 54.  . . , 3 1 � . Sec Hyman & Nathanson, !udmal Rcc•zcy• of ,Pn cc C on tro l :  Tlz c B o t ti!' of tlz c 1 ]?<'.<J li lat zons. 42 ILL. L. REv. J84, 630 ( 1 94/ ) ; N athanson,  supra note 278, at 1 98, 
,]J·· 'l ' 
� 1, 1 J .  H F 2 1 �  " 1 6. Sec . RIEKDLY, supra note 1 0 ,  at 1 66 .  ·; 17. See  F . . FRA N K FURTER & ] .  L A N DIS ,  supro n o t e  277, a t  1 64. � 1 8. For rmlcler examples ,  sec the matenals  col l ec ted 1 11 \V . GELL HORN & C.  BYsE. ·; ,, r �TIL\TIH LAw : CASES A N D  Co�DIENTS 1 - 53 ( 6t h  eel. 1 974) ; G.  RoBi x s o .:;- & E . 
. -� P'1 J I 1w:;, THE .-\ n m x r STRATIVE PRocE s s  83 1 -33 ( 1 974 ) .  
( r 1· 1 , i '· j 9. l\athanson. supra note 278, at 198 .  2 1 4 . 
·;111 Sec note 3 1 7  and accompanyi ng text supro .  ·�] ] .  Sec f .  FRA N K F l'RTER & ] .  LA .': DIS ,  supra rwte 277,  a t  1 64 . . � 
1975 ]  JUDICIAL REVIE W OF A GENCY ACTION 73 
of the tribunal is surely relevant to the wil l ingness of top people to serve. 
c ;reater prest ige and j ob security make i t  more attractive to  be an article I I I  
judge than t o  b e  a board member, and tenure during good behavior i s  strong 
ar111or against improper influence.322 To equal or approach the personnel l evel 
of the courts of appeals .  any new courts should enj oy article I I I  status. 
But tenure alone may not be enough. The more narrowly j urisdiction is 
defined . the greater the danger of making the job repetitive and unattractive 
or of low prestige. the greater the pressure of spec ial i nterests upon the ap­
pointive process. and the greater the danger of  excessive or  insufficient defer­
ence through overfamil iarity \vith personal it ies or programs. The Commerce 
Court was an especially unpropit ious inst i tut ion in this regard. It dealt with 
a single agency then regulating a single potent industry-in contrast to  the 
more successful Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and Emergency Court 
of Appeals. both of which were concerned with the economy as a whole,32� 
to the Conseil d 'Etat with its general administrative j urisdict ion, and to  the 
District of Columbia Circuit . which combines exc lusive j urisdict ion over cer­
tain administrat ive functions vvith a healthy d iet of general federal jur isd iction. 
The one redeeming feature of the Commerce Court was that the j ob was 
important enough to be attract ive. But th is  very i mportance \vas another 
substant ial factor in  the court 's downfal l .  The intense pol it ical controversy 
surrounding the i ssues on review assured maximum pressure on the appointive 
process and enhanced the l ikelihood that the court woul d  be considered 
part i san.324 Courts of narrow special ized ju ri sdiction may have a better chance 
of surviving if they deal with relatively obscure. noncontroversial matters 
such as government contracts ,  customs and patents. On the other hand, i f  
the j ob is  quiet  enough not to invite pol it ical intrusion . i t  may lack sufficient 
sex appeal to attract the best judges. Are we certain that the lack of outcry 
over the Court of Claims and the Court of  Customs and Patent Appeals i s  
attributable to  good performance rather than to public indifference ? Timing, 
of course. is important : The Emergency Court of Appeals and the Commerce 
Court had the good fortune to go largely out of business before the i ssues 
became stale and the glamor faded. Tales of administrative agencies proceed­
ing from zeal to indolence over time furnish a useful admonit ion .  
4. Jurisdictional Lit iga tion . The jurisdict ional l ines separating adminis­
trat ive from general courts should be drawn as precisely as possible i n  order 
to minimize l it igation over the proper forum. There is one type of such l i t i ­
gat ion that  would be reduced by providing a single forum for each subj ect 
category : the present l it igat ion oYer proper venue among courts of concurrent 
jur isd ict ion.  But the determinants of proper ';enue under existing la\v have 
322 Sec T H E  FEDERALIST. Nos.  78,  79 (A.  Hamilton ) .  
323. Sec '\'athanson, supra note 278. a t  2 1 4. 
32-1. Sa F. FR.-\ :O: h:FURTER & ] .  LANDIS ,  supra note 277. at 1 62-64 : H .  FRI E ".' flLY,  
supra n " t e  1 0 . at 1. )3- 54 : Nathanson, s u p ra note 278,  at 209- 1 0, 2 1 4. 
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been rather carefully picked out by years of decisions :325 a new crop of un­
certainties might be created by a carelessly drawn statute creating new dis­
tinctions based upon subj ect matter rather than geography. To give a court 
jurisd iction over "environmental" cases, for example, would invite wasteful 
jurisdictional litigation,326 much as has the French provision giving the Consei l  
d 'Etat j uriscliction over matters "affecting the administration. ":>27 It  would 
appear best to emulate existing statutes that define review jurisdiction simply 
in terms of the agency whose order is being reviewed, taking pains to clarify 
such ambiguities as whether or not "orders" includes regulations,328 whether 
prel iminary steps in the administrative process are to be reviewable, and 
what is to be clone if issues within the experience of the new court arise in 
enforcement or other proceedings somewhere else.329 
5 . Litigation C om.•cnience. In cases of small money value, centralized 
j urisdiction in a single court may deprive I itigants of significant economies 
afforded by a district court or even by a circuit court forum.:��o This possibil­
ity suggests either defining the jurisdiction of an administrative court so as to 
exclude categories rich in small cases or prm·icling for the court to sit on 
circuit, as some current and past specialized courts have done.331 This latter 
expedient \Vould be constitutionally necessary ii the new court 's  jurisdiction 
extended to the trial of criminal casesY32 The travel burden might make the 
j ob l ess attractive. 
325 .  Sec gen erally D. CuRinE, s11pra note 6, at  657-62. Congress does not he lp 11 hcn 
i t  provides for review in  the "appropriate" ci rcu i t  court ,  since there i s  no general venue 
statute for those courts .  E.g., section 307 (b ) ,  C lean Air Act, 42 U . S .C.  § 1 857h- 5 ( b )  I 1 )  
( 1 970) . 
326. Sec REPORT OF THE PRES IDENT, supra note 309, at V I I - 1 ( 1 973 ) .  
327. On the one hand, some acts of the government, such as operation of a ferry,  
have been held within the j urisdict ion of the regular civil courts because they \\·ere the 
sort  of activity that could be conducted on the same terms by private enterpr ise.  On  the  
other .  acts  oi pr ivate parties have been held to be within the j ur i sdict ion of the admin­
i s t rat ive courts when they concerned what was considered to be a pub l ic service.  More­
over, the  civi l  courts may determine ' 'flagrant irrq,'Lllar i ty" in governmental act ion ; 
damage actions for government i nfringement of personal l iberty ; compensation for 
takings ; certain tax cases ; and accidents involving government employees. Final ly ,  in a 
cr iminal  ( but not in a civ i l )  case a regular court  may pass upon a defense quest ioning 
the  val idity of an admini strative action. B rown and Garner, on whose work this foot­
note i s  based. point to one case in  which after eleven years of j ur isd ic tional l i t iga tion 
the  parties started al l  over in  the proper forum ; but they conclude that the  ser iousness 
of j uri sdictional confl icts should not be exaggerated because "the rules \l·h ich define the 
respective competences are now [after a hundred years]  reasonably wel l sett led . ' '  L. T\ .  
I3 R O W N  & J .  GARKER , supra note 266 at 80. This  \I'Ol.dd obviously no t  be true of a ne\\. 
administrative court. 
328. Sec notes 1 40-60 and accompanying text supra. 
329. The possible complex i t ies of such a provision are suggested by the deta i l s  of 
J udge Friendly's proposal for a patent court ,  to which among other th ings cases would 
be removed irom state or federal courts 11·henever the val idity of a patent was called 
into quest ion by \l·ay of defense. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 1 0, at 1 60.  
330.  For a detai led discussion of l i t igat ion coiwenience as between distr ict  court 
and circuit  court .  sec notes 28-36 and accompanying text  supra.  
33 1 .  The Tax Court, the Court  of Claims and the  Emergency Court  of Appea l s .  Sec 
H. F R I E K DLY.  supra note 1 0, at  1 69 ;  1\'athanson, supra note 278, at  2 12. 
332. U . S .  Co N ST. art .  I I I ,  § 2. See Hines & Nathanson, s upra note 309, at  C - 1 6 .  
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C. Models 
If the problems of c ircuit court overload. cl i suniformity and lack of exper­
tise are found to be serious,  and if the overload problem cannot be cured by 
surgery on such other port ions of the case body as diversity and post-convic­
tion cases, consideration wil l  surely be given to alterat ion of the scheme for 
reviewing administrative deci sions. A number of model review schemes could 
be concocted and tested against the considerat ions laid out in  the preceding 
sect ions of this Article, including el imination of all direct c ircuit court review 
and the creat ion of a large number of highly speciali zed courts .  'vVe l imit our­
selves to a few of the more prominent models .  
1 .  £.--..:elusive Jurisdiction in  D esi[Jna tC'd Courts of  A ppeals. I f  our sole ob­
ject were to minimize disuniformity and improve the quality of adj udication, 
rather than to relieve the c ircuit courts of part of their mounting caseload, we 
might well opt against the creation of a new court but in  favor of giving the 
existing circuit courts exclusiYe j ur i sdiction to review action of designated 
agencies, as the District of Columbia Circuit now has for certain types of FCC 
and E PA act ions. SEC cases, for example, might  be parceled out to the 
Second Circuit ; FPC cases to the Fifth ; CAB cases to  the Third, and so on. 
The judges would presumably acquire an expertise in  the subj ect matter and 
yet stil l bring to bear the perspective of the general ist .  Conflicts would be 
minimized or el iminated . The total appellate caseload would not be increased 
and, to the extent that the same issue neecl not be reli tigated circuit after 
circuit .  might be sl ightly reduced . Pol i t ical pressures upon both the appoint­
ment and deci sion processes would presumably be minimized .333 
The fact is ,  however, we are very much interested in  docket rel ief and 
therefore turn our attention to the desirabi l ity of increasing j udicial capacity 
rather than merely redistributing the load. 
2.  Excl11sive Jurisdiction in A d m in istra t i1:e A ppeals Co1 1rts. A court of 
administrative appeals could take a variety of forms .  Its j urisdiction could 
be l imited to a single agency or homogeneous class of agenci es, or could em­
brace a vvicler and more heterogeneous range. Its members could be appointed 
from sitt ing appellate j udges or from non-j udges . The latter could be selected 
either for their preexisting expertise in one or more of the subj ect areas of 
adj udication or on the basis of more general qualifications similar to those 
ordinarily used in picking appel late j udges . I f  sitting j udges were to be desig­
nated, their appointment to the new court could  be permanent or for a fixed 
term, after which they would return to their home bench . The new court could  
be  divided into permanent panels based on subject matter or  shifting panels 
l ike the present courts of appeals .  A l l  panels could sit in  \Vashington, or some 
333. For reservations as to the completeness of this protection. sec notes 334-35 aml 
accompany ing- text infra. 
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could  s it  elsewhere, ach ieving a measure of regional i zat ion.  Conflicts among 
the panels would presumably be  resolved en bane ; and panels special i zed by 
subj ect matter could refer issues of general admin i st rative l aw to  the  ful l  
court .  Many other variat ions could be imagined. 
( a )  Subject 1Vfatter JurZ:sdiction. The most important variable i s  subj ect 
matter j urisdiction. I n  general, we th ink it h ighly desirable that the j ur isdic­
tion of any court of administrative appeals he qui te  broadly drawn i n  order to 
reduce the pressures of  special interests on appointment and decision, to avoid 
the loss of perspective that can come from overcompartmentalization, and tc 
assure that the j ob i s  varied enough to be  interest ing. \Ve concede that spec ial 
circumstances or urgent need may in exceptional i nstances just i fy s ingle­
subj ect courts .  Our best j udges te l l  us that only techni cal experts can under­
stand patent cases well  enough to do them j ustice, :l:l4 and a persuasive case ha� 
been made for a Court of Tax Appeals 835 But the  acceptabi l ity of a special 
court in such fields as patents and taxation may depend h eavily on the  lad 
of high polit ica l  controversy or  of a narrowly defined i nterest group con 
stituency. Even i f  the need were comparable,  we should be l ess sanguint  
as to the success of a court l imited, for example. to  labor or to  environmenta 
cases .  
The suggestion of an environmental court was raised by the 1 974 amend· 
ments to  the \;\later Pollution Control Act and opposed by the Attorney Gen· 
eral in  a bulky 1 974 report .336 S everal of the report ' s  obj ections can easily b( 
met. Threshold l i tigation over what constitutes an  "environmental" cas( 
would  present l ess of a problem if j ur i sdiction w ere  l imited to cases arisin� 
under named statutes or under statutes administered by the E P A .  Giving t ht 
new court appellate j urisdiction only would eliminate the  need for circuit r idin� 
i n  cr iminal cases and reduce generally the inconvenience of a central ized torum 
The obj ection that there are too few cases to keep such a court busy appears t< 
have been cured by t ime,337 though prediction of future workloads is hazard 
ous . :{:JS But the hard problems of the specialized court, stressed by the Attorne; 
General, remain : the possibl e  loss of bro2.d perspectives for resolving genera 
issues, the lost benefit of diverse views, the danger of overreview by exper 
judges, the concentration of power-all exacerbated by the danger of partisat 
appointments in a pol it ically sensitive field .  " I t  wou ld  be difficult ,  if not im 
possible," wrote Professors H ines ancl Nat hanson, "to create a special cour 
to handle  environmental matters which would not be  regarded as parti san  b: 
334.  Sec, e.g. ,  H .  FRIE N DLY, supra note 1 0, at  1 53 -6 1 ,  and authorit ies cited thereir 
33S. See, e.g. ,  id. a t  1 6 1 - 7 1 ,  and authorit ies c ited therein .  
336. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 309. 
337. A computer pr intout furnished by the Administrat ive Office to the Commiss io  
on Revision of  the Federal Court  Appel late System shcn\·s that  direct  appeals to  th  
c i rcui t  courts  from the EPA in  fiscal 1 974 numbered 454 : that  does not  exhaust  th 
environrnenta 1 cases. 
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a substantial  segment of the part ies affected by i t s  decis ions ."339 In the absence 
of the strongest showing of need, we shoul d  be very reluctant to p l ac e  so 
much povver over such i mportant matters i n  t h e  hands of a s i ngle court not 
insulated from appointive pressures by substantial non-environmental business.  
Further ,  the Attorney General expressed serious reservati o n s  as to  t h e  
need for an environmental court ,  report ing that the affected agencies had ex­
pressed confidence in the abi l i ty  of the ordinary courts to handle  even the 
toughest environmental cases. The posi t i on of the EPA here i s  especial ly 
instructive : 
\\'e believe that the courts  have shown that  t h e i r  abi l i ty to c ope with 
the em· i ronmental issues invoh·ecl i s  adequate. and i s  certai n ly  not in­
ferior to  their abi l ity to cope \Vith the tech n ical issues i nvoh·ecl i n  non­
envi ronmental cases . . 
The parties \vi ! !  both do thei r best to explain the issues to the 
court  i n  layman 's  language. I n  our  experience there are few i ssues 
that cannot be explained adequate!:· in t h i s  way . . . .  
The kinds of  environmental i ssues t hat typical ly arise do not 
d irectl y  invoh·e obscure ! l l atters of scient ific t heory or techniques .  
I nsteacl . t hey are quest ion s of ev idence, of  the form ' ' \Vhat do the 
facts shovY the effect of a given factor ( concentrat i o n  of  a pollutant,  
use of a control method.  use of a pest i c i d e )  to  be on a variable ( hu ­
man health . pollution emi ssions,  t h e  sun-iva! of certain species  o f  
w i l d l i fe ) ? ' '  Such quest ions  <tre relatively easy compared w i t h  those 
that often arise in patent cases concerni n g  whether a given i m·ention 
d i ffers from a previous one to  the extent necessary to make i t  patent-
able . :{.Jo 
\Vh i l e  the Deputy A ssi stant Attorney General for the Land and Natural Re­
sources Division has more recently i n d i cated a desi re to reevaluate the r eport 's  
conclusion i n  the l i ght of further experience i n dicating considerable technical 
cl ifficulty, :H I  we beli e,·e seyeral decisions of  the circuit courts u nder the Clean 
A i r  Act.  technical as the i ssues are, eloquently substantiate t h e  Attorney 
General 's  position that the sacr ifice of expert ise  is not so serious as to  j ust ify 
the r isks  of a narrow speciali zed envi ronmental court .3-12 
The 1 97 1  A s h  Council report . agreeing that separate courts to revi ew each 
federal agency woul d  be unclesi rable,3 1 3  proposed the establ i shment of a single 
339. H ines & f\athanson , supra note 309, at C-20. 
340. R EPORT OF T H E  PRESIDE XT, supra note 309, at  B- 55,  B -56. 
34 1 .  Sec·  :\ clcl ress by \Valter K ieche l .  J r .  before A B A  Comm.  on Envi ronmental  
La11·. _-\ p r i l  27. 1 974. 
342. S,·,·. e.g .. Internat ional Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.Zd 6 1 5  ( D .C.  Cir. 
1973 ) : Port l and Cement :\ss'n v. Ruckel s lnus, 486 F.Zd 375 ( D .C.  Cir 1 973 ) ,  ccrt .  
di' J t i,·d . sui! n o n t .  Portland Cement Corp. Y .  Administrator, 4 1 7  U . S .  92 1 ( 1 974) : Texas v .  
E P ,\ . 499 F.2d 289 ( 5th Cir. 1 974) . This assessment i s  made against the backg round 
of the e xpe r i ence of one of the authors as Chai rman of a ful l - t ime state po l lut ion control 
board for t \\'0 and a half years .  Scr also H ines & l\athanson, supra note 309, at C- 1 3 .  
C- 1 4  ( describing sC\·eral district court op in ions under N E F' .-', a s  "monuments ."  along 
with "equal l y  impressiye" decisions in other technicai fields as antitrust and rai l road 
receiverships,  to the capacity of the fecler:1l j udic i<: l  system "to master a body of l earning 
and experi ence far removed from the classical  patlm ays of the law" ) . 
343. To so l im i t  the court's scope would seriously diminish its attractiveness to 
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Administrative Court t o  rev iew agency decisions i n  the fields o f  t ransportat ion, 
power, and securities now made by the ICC ,  CAB, Federal l\1arit ime Commis­
sion ( F l\f C ) , FPC and SEC .  I t  argued that a specialized court with a l imited 
j urisdiction would  yield better understanding of the issues and relief of the  
burdened circuit courts .3H 
The Administrat ive Conference, echoing a report by Professor Nathanson, 
was critical . There were too few such cases to give the courts of appeals signifi­
cant reli ef : only 1 76 in fiscal 1 969, less than 3 percent of their caseload . l\Iore­
over, the j urisdiction proposed was so narrow as to render the  new court 
unable to make the anticipated "contributions to uniformity in admin istrative 
law" and as to  create the risk that the court m ight "become or give the appear­
ance of becoming ident ified with the agency or industry point of v iew . "345 'vVe 
agree. The optimum administ rative court should enj oy the  safeguards of a 
broader jurisdiction, and we are not convinced that the Ash Counci l  proposal 
s ingles out those administrative decisions most deserving of review by a 
specialized court . 
( b )  A Suggested JYI ode!.  Jurisd iction of an administrative court shou ld  
be determined with an eye upon the  problems to  be corrected .  I t  should in­
clude the most technically difficult , the most novel and uncertain, and the 
most t ime-consuming cases in order to maximize the reduct ion of poor under­
standing, clisuniformity ancl overburden. Absent detailed study of each cate­
gory of cases, we can only make tentative suggest ions. Attacks upon regula­
t ions under such new and technical statutes as those governing air and water 
pol lution, noise, occupat ional health and consumer safety seem obvious candi­
dates on all three scores.  I ndividual cases as well as regulat ions from the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ( NRC ) ,  the F ecleral Aeronautics Adminis­
tration ( FAA ) ,  the F oocl and Drug Administration ( FDA ) , the  FPC, the 
F lVIC ,  the FCC, the SEC and the ICC are l ikely to be both important and com­
plicated, even though the  governing statutes have been much interpreted .  
NLRB cases loom large in number but not , we think, in technical complex­
ity,34G and, though forum shopping has sometimes proved of concern , there 1s 
the most qualified candidates for j udgeships, would encourage an overassoClatiOn 
\Yith the agency being reviewed, and might lead to a usurpation of the agency's 
policy responsibi l i ties. It woul d  a lso preclude development of integrated adminis­
trative procedures as  wel l as uniform application of procedural advances. 
PRESIDENT's C o u c.:CIL ON ExECUTIVE ORGA N IZATION, NEw REGULATORY FRAMEWOR K :  
R EPORT ON S ELECTED I N DEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 54 ( 1 9 7 1 ) .  
344. Jd. at 5 1 -56. 
345. Sec Full  Sta tem e n t  of Views of the  A dil l inistrat i'ih' Conferen ce on  the  Report  of 
Selec ted Independent  Regu latory A gencies of the Presiden t's A dvisory Coun cil on E.rew­
t i·c·e O rgani:::a tion, in 2 A DMINISTRATI\.E CoNFERE NCE OF T H E  UN ITED SLITES , R Eco:--r ­
MEi\DATIONS AXD REPORTS 27. 30-3 1 ( 197 1 ) ; Nathanson . su pra note 278. at 1 98.  
346.  T h e  General Counsel  of the NLRB repor ts t hat ' 'cases from this agency do not 
im·olve complex scienti fic or technical questions" :  and that of 298 c i rcuit  court  cases 
i n  fiscal 1 97.:+. 66 \\·ere decided without oral  argument and 72 \1 ithout opinion. Letter 
fwm Peter G. Nash. General Counsel to the N L R B .  to Antonin Scal ia .  Chairm;m of 
the Administrative Conference, Oct. 25, 1 974. at 2. 5.  Judge Leventhal testified before 
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substantial intercircuit uniformity toclay.34i Trade Commission cases range 
in theory from enormous antitrust matters of considerable technical complex­
i ty to relatively simple matters of deceptive advertis ing. The former should be 
reviewed by the same courts reviewing other antitrust cases to avoid disuni­
formity : the latter seem to present no cause for a special court.  Immigration, 
social security, longshoremen's act . employee d ismissaP48 and mining cases, 
we suspect, tend to be uncompl icated, the issues not novel, and the case for a 
local forum strong. Aclclitional categories of cases can be  analyzed in  the  same 
manner . 
Thus, as a preliminary sketch, one can visual ize a separate article I I I  
appellate court ,  o r  perhaps two such courts. with j urisdiction to hear appeals 
from individual decisions of the NRC,  FCC. FPC.  I CC,  CAB, F l'vi C  and SEC, 
and challenges to regulations adopted by these agencies,  and by the FDA, 
the FAA and the EPA, and under the  consumer-product safety and OSHA 
provisicr,.1s .  For t he  sake o f  consistent appl ication o f  t he  law, t he  administ ra­
tive court should also have appellate j urisdiction over district court cases-for 
example .  enforcement act ions-ari sing under the same statutes .  To create 
such a court would eliminate intercircuit conflicts and uncertainties in these 
important fields : it would faci l itat e  j udicial understanding of these complex 
problems : and it would remove a large and growing body of cases from the 
overburdened circuit  court s .349 Juri sdict ion would he broad enough that  no 
t h e  Commission o n  Revision of the Federal Cour t  A ppellate System o n  M a y  2 1 ,  1 974 
that even contested l\ L R B  cases are often " routine" and of "no s i gni ficant \\·eight" s ince 
they frecjuently turn on "whether there i s  substan t i a l  evidence o f  a r e fusal to bargain,  o r  
discr iminatory d i scharge. " 
347. Sa note 98 and accompanying t ext supra.  
348.  Our impres s ion i s  general ly supported by the view o f  t h e  General Counsel o f  the 
Civil  Service Com m i s s ion that,  "except for the areas of pay and class ification,  w h i ch 
sometimes p rove troub lesome to the courts,  most of the Commission's cases do not 
invoh·e h ighly technical or compl icated questions." Letter of Anthony L. Mondello to 
A ntonin Scal ia, Chairman of the Administrative Conference, Oct .  2 1 ,  1 974, a t  2 .  
3 4 9 .  Determ i ning t h e  caseload such j ur i sdict ion would i mpose i s  somewh a t  difficult 
not only because uf shi ft ing l i t igation patterns but also because of the way the stat ist ics  
a r e  reported. D irect appeals  from the listed agencies t o  t h e  c ircuit  courts  numbered 823 
in fi s cal  1 974 according to the 1 974 A . O .  REPORT, supra note 1 ,  table B3, and to the 
supplemental computer printout c i ted i n  note 337 supra : 
D i rect  A ppeal s  from Selected Agencies to 
Courts  of A ppea l s, 1 974 
AEC ( now N R C )  2 
CAB 37 




fDA 1 5  
f M C  7 
F P C  1 66 
O S HA 3 5  
S EC 1 5  
Professor '\ a thanson.  supra note 278,  a t  1 99 n.7, reports there \':ere 9 6  I C C  cases taken 
to t hree-j udge d i str ict  courts in tl scal  1 969 : the :\ . 0. R I' PO RTS .  su pra. note 1 .  do not l i s t  
these separate ly .  There  were also appea l s  irorn d i st r i c t c o u r t  c a s e s  invoh· i ng t h e  abtwe 
agencies.  i\ [ost of the others a rc b u r i ed under t h e  he;.tcl i ng "other . "  T h e  total caseloacl 
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single industry would  be l ikely t o  dominate, even over t ime,  the  select ion of 
judges. Finally, the breadt h and importance of the j urisdict ional spectrum we 
have out l ined is sufficient ,  we beli eve, to make the j ob h ighly attractive. 
Stripping the regular court s  of these important cases does d iminish their 
glamor but l eaves them such challenging matters as const itut ional attacks 
upon state action and the enforcement of c ivi l  rights laws. Such a court would 
meet many of  the obj ections made by the Attorney General against  an environ­
mental court and by the Administrative Conference against the Ash Council 
proposaJ .350 
The possible obj ection that a j urisdiction embracing such a grab bag of 
diverse special t ies would be incompatible with the stated goal of decision­
making by experts brings us to the fur ther question of how members of the  
new court should lJe selected .  I f  oversight  were confined to a s ingle agency or  
homogeneous group of  agencies .  i t  might be feasibl e to draw m embers from 
non-judges with preexisting expertise in the  subject area. I ndeed, the sole 
convincing rationale for so narrow a j urisdictional grant wou ld  be to  maximize 
the court " s  subj ect-matter expertise .  This aim arguably woul d  be  best pro­
moted by appointing persons with special knowledge of the  technology and 
economics of the regulated industry, since the t echn ical competence required 
to  come to grips with the scient ific  issues presented in  environmental or nu­
c lear-licensing cases is al together d ifferent from that required, say, for intel l i ­
gent evaluation of the economic regulat ion in  such a field as transportation.  
Given even a narrowly defined j urisdiction, however, we would recom­
mend against this method of appointment , since it  would maximize the danger 
both of political pressure in the  appointment process and of overintrusive su­
pervision by the judiciary. Moreover ,  such appointments woul d  minimize the  
l ikel ihood o f  obtaining either the perspective o f  the general ist or  two additional 
varieties of expertise that would be of value on a court of admini strative re­
view .  One i s  the art of j udicial review of admini strative action : i t  call s  for 
an understanding of the administrat ive process .  a feel ing for the  proper l imits 
of the j udicial role ,  a sophistication in the appl ication of  such standards as 
"substant ial evidence, " "arbitrary or capricious , "  and so on .  I t  is the kind 
on t h e  basis of  the abon figures m i ght approximate 1 000. about equal to t h a t  o f  the 
Seventh and E ighth Circuits .  Nine j udges can survive such caseloads only because they 
inc lude easy c ases that  can be  subj ected to summary procedures t h at \\ ould  sel dom be 
ava i l able to a special court \\·hose cases  are sel ected precisely because they arc the  most  
d i fficu l t .  Significant i ncreases, moreover. may be expected in t h e  near future i n  such 
categories as \\ ater pol l ution, noise. O SHA, and consumer product safety, where pro­
grams arc j us t  getting under \\·ay : and a probab l e  dropoff in l i t i gation over air pol l u ­
t ion  regulations should be p a r t l y  o ffset  by a s igni fi cant ga in in corresponding enforcement 
actions.  To add NLRB cases wou l d  increase the  load by 641 cases on the basis of 1 974 
figures so i t  \I"OU!d approach in bare numbers that oi the Second Ci rcuit, or about hal f 
that of the Pifth. 
3 )0. Com pare P rofessor Nathanson's opposit ion to the Ash Report ,, ·ith his c o n­
cession that to ' "concentrate j udicial  revie\\. of  a l l  the federal rcgul a tory agencies in  a 
separate divis ion of the federal courts of appea l s "  \\·oulcl be ' " fai r ly  debatab l e . "  .1\. :� thanson, 
snpra note 278. at  2 1 3 - 1 6 .  
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of skil l  one would expect to be acquired by the j udges of the District of 
Columbia Circuit by virtue of their heavy close of administrative appeals .  The 
final kind of expertise might be labeled ' 'procedural" ; appellate judges who 
regularly hear a gamut of civi l  and criminal cases, especially the latter, become 
experts in the requirements of clue process.351 The narrow specialization which 
i s  calculated to maximize the subj ect-matter expertise is by no means the best 
prescription for the other two talents. 
As the j urisdiction of the court i s  broadened to include diverse agencies 
and subject matter, the desirability and even the feasibility of staffing i t  w ith  
p reexisting subj ect-matter expertise become increasingly doubtful .  I f  the spe­
cial court vvere intended to be an " expert ' ' body in  the sense that its members 
come to the bench already qualified as experts by their pre-j udicial experience, 
no member could be considered an expert in more than a small part of the 
subj ect areas that comprised the court's business . For example,  if one m ember 
of the court were chosen for his experience in  the field of natural gas regula­
tion. another for his background in environmental matters, still another for 
his knowledge of securit ies law, there would be a great danger either that the 
specialists in  a particular sector of the court's j ur isdiction would come to 
dominate the panel in  cases arising in  that area or that the court woul d  
eventually decompose into sub-specializing panels i n  order to bring maximum 
subj ect matter expertise to bear upon each case. Furthermore, since fewer 
j udges would  be chosen from each field of expertise, constituent groups might 
have an even stronger incent ive to press for the appointment of a sympathetic 
m ember than i f  the j urisdiction of the court were narrower . 
If .  on the other hand.  members of a special court with broad j ur isdiction 
were chosen from non-experts and expected to acquire their knowledge simply 
t h rough frequent ancl continuing on-the-bench exposure to the several areas 
of l i t igation , the argument \VOtdcl be a different one :  Because of the diversity 
of cases coming before them, the judges could not he truly expert in any. 
But to insist upon judges who are t rul ;.· t echnical experts may be to lose sight 
of the l imited function of judicial re\·iew. l\ fore l ikely.  al l t hat is  needed is 
the sort of  famil iarity that the District of Columbia Circuit has acquired in a 
number of administratin fields l1y virtue of its concentrated though varied 
ad m i n istratiYe diet .  As  J uclge Leventhal has argued. " judges are general ly  
' quick studies ' ' ' : revie\Ying cou rt s "clo no t  need enough knowledge or under­
standing to determine what the goyernment shoul d  do" but require_ only 
enough background understanding for  what is "primarily a general appraisal 
35 1 .  T h i s  sensi t ivity might be though t me rely anoth er name for  what we h ave 
been c a l l ing "the perspective of the genera l i s t , "  but the t 11·o are not identical .  T h e  la tter 
refers to the  breadth  oi background a nd sympathy a j udge brings to his  task by virtue of 
his experience of l i fe : the former i s  the more specific competence he acquires th rough 
practice in adj ucl icating claims of procedural unfairness .  
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o f  fairness, and i n  that they are expert . "352 Thus,  we do not t hink the lack of 
narrow expertise  i s  a serious obj ect ion to a court with broad administrative 
r eview j u risdiction . 
For s imilar reasons . we believe it would b e  h ighly d es i rable-especial ly 
if the j ur i sdict ion of the court were to embrace a b road range of agencies-for 
its members to be appointed f rom sitting circuit  court j udges.  A sitting j udge 
transferred to the court of administrative appeals would hopeful ly  bring t o  
his  new assignment a b readth o f  perspective not ordinarily t o  be  foun d  i n  t h e  
narrow special i st ,  along vv ith some degree o f  experience i n  evaluating a d m in­
i strative action and in enforcing procedural fairness.  And constituency p ressure 
for the appointment of benign j udges, though not el iminated al together,  would 
b e  abated somewhat by virtue of the l imited range of candidates el igible for 
appointment, and the frequent absence of any wel l -cleflned d i fferences in att i ­
tude among the candidates. 
If the members of the special court were selectee! from sitting appel late 
j udges. the question would arise whether appointment was to be permanent 
or  temporary and , i f  the latter,  whether for a fixed term or at the appointee's 
pleasure, the j u dge return ing in either case to the circuit  court from which 
he came. T h ree considerat ions favor temporary appointment.  First ,  there is  
the possibi l ity that too few j udges of the h ighest cal iber would b e  attracted 
to a l ifet ime position on a court they m ight view as less p restigious and l ess  
i nteresting than the c i rcuit courts .  Second, there i s  the contrary possi b i l i ty 
t hat curtailing their j u risdiction woul d  make the circuit courts less  attractive 
and create a strong demand among the j udges for a tour of duty on the special  
court . Third .  i t  may be desirable to supply the new court ,  t h rough regular 
turnoYer, with a continuous infusion of new b l ood and fresh attitudes, to avoid 
stal eness, r igidity and loss of interest. Stronger considerat ions ,  however . 
argue for permanence of appointmen t .  F irst, and most important , it would 
defeat a cardinal p urpose of the  special court i f  i ts  members were relieved of 
their cluty j ust as they began to acquire a t rue mastery of the j ob .  Second, a 
revolving-door court would be less l ikely to ach ieve h igh prestige and drawing 
power than one with m embership as stable as that of other appellate courts .  
Finally.  a clouble-eclgecl consideration : A n  increase i n  t h e  frequency o f  ap­
pointment would multiply the  opportunities for pol itical inHuence but at the 
same time would tend to  make the special  cour t more b roadly representat ive 
of the appellate bench as a whol e ,  thus neutral iz ing any bias  present i n  the 
i n it ial select ion process. On balance, we believe the weight ier argument favors 
permanence. but we do not regard the choice as crit ical .  
D. Concl11sion 
Creation of even the most acceptable court of acl m i n i st r;tt ive appeals 
would he a radical departur e  from our establ ished system of j ud i c ial re\· i e w .  
-- ·- - -· --- - -
352. StalcJJ icnt of Judge Lcuentlwl, su pra note 2, at 1 1 - 1 2 .  
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\Ve should be hesitant to incur the risks that always attend new institutions 
in the absence of a strong showing that the present system has serious flaws 
that cannot be cured by less drastic measures.353 The j udges themselves say 
the courts of appeals are heavi ly overloaded, and we have no basis  for dis­
agreement . I t  might be wiser, however. to  deal with this  problem by l imit ing 
j ur isdiction over diversity cases .  which are peripheral to the function of 
federal courts ; by providing for increased finality i n  criminal cases, because 
of the infinitesimal returns produced by the enormous investment of j udicial 
time in  s i ft ing prisoner petitions.:l54 or even by the creation of additional C1r­
cuits . '155 In  any event. the overload problem is no reason for singling out 
administrat ive cases. The same relief would be afforded by the creation of 
special ized courts for diversity or criminal cases. As for intercircuit conflicts, 
forum shopping ancl uncertainty, we think i t  must first be shown that these 
problems are serious enough to warrant major surgery, and that they are 
especially acute in  the administrative area, before a j urisdict ional change de­
signed specifically to meet them would be appropriate. \Ve t hink i t  food for 
thought that, in all the agencies we contacted, only one intercircuit conflict 
was put forward as having seriously impeded agency operations. :35( i F inally, 
while an administrative court would no doubt be marginally more competent 
in deciding difficult administrative cases than the regular c ircuit cour t s .  the 
latter have performed impressively in environmental cases, which are among 
the most difficult ; and the affected agencies generally have expressed sat is­
faction \vi th the  ability of the appellate courts to understand and cope with 
353 .  Perhaps the path of w i sdom l i es in the view that by and large our system 
of revie11· by general const i tut ional  courts has \vorkecl reasonably  \Ye l l ,  and that 
it i s  only in  specific areas where one can ant ic ipate a p roblem or shortfal l i n  
performance, that changes should be charted. 
!d. at  14. 
· 
354.  Sec H. FRIEKDLY, supra note 1 0, at 1 39-52 ; Friendly, Is lnno ceHce lrreleva H t '!  
Collateral A t tach 0 1 1  S ta te Crimi11al Judgmen ts, 38  U. C m .  L .  Rn. 1 42 ( 1970 ) .  
355 .  See note 86 supra. 
356. For the one serious E PA conflict ,  see text fol lowing note 289 supra . The A EC, 
now the J'\EC, reports no interc ircuit conflicts, and no adverse  e ffects from potentia l  
conflicts ,  during the past  five year s ; the  f'AA ,  Consumer P roduct Safety Commission. 
S EC, Comptroller Genera l  and Federal Eeserve report they have had no prob l em s. The 
CAB reports a s ingle conflict in  five years on w hich cert iorari  was not sought because 
the Sol ic i tor General thought the i ssue "sui gener is"  and the sums at stake i nsuffic ient .  
The N LRB has suffered nine confl icts s ince July ,  1 972. In  three the Board chose not to 
seck cert iorari ,  a11 a i t ing ' 'better vehicles" to present the i ssues ; in five of the remaining 
s ix the Supreme Court  resolved the  confl ict .  
A s  for the related forum-shopping i s sue, none of the  agencies responding to  our 
inqui ry reported a s ignificant probl em. The N L RB,  as to 11·hose dec i s ions such forum 
shopping has been suspected in  the past, reports that the problem of dupl i cate r eview i s  
solved b y  transfer under 2 8  U.S .  C .  § 2 1 12 ( 1 970 ) ( giving the agency power t o  fi l e  the 
record and thus to determine which of  several poss ib le  appea ls  courts w i l l  hear a pending 
appea l ) ,  and that forum shopping has no "real i mpact" upon operations. See letters to 
Antonin Scal ia .  Chairman o f  Admini strative Conference, from General Counsel Offices 
of  the  [\ EC, Oct .  7, 1 974 : Dcp't  o f  T ransportation,  Oct.  3 1 ,  1 974 ; Consumer  Products 
Safety Commiss ion ( CP S C ) ,  Nov. 1 8, 1 974 ; SEC, Oct. 30, 1 9 74 : Dep't o f  Treasury. Oct. 
8 ,  1 974 : Federal Reserve Board, Oct .  10, 1 974 : CA B ,  Oct .  18, 1 974 : and L\ LRB,  Oct. 25 ,  
1974. Sec  also H ines & .\Tathanson. supra note 309, at C- 1 6, C- 17  ( the performance o f  
the iccl eral courts in  envi ronmental cases general l y  ' ' reveals l i tt l e  grounds f o r  comp laint  
about inconsi stency" ) .  
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technical issues.'l57 I n  sum, we  are doubtful that there i s  any compell ing reason 
to s ingle out administrative cases for review in a separate court .  The prob­
l ems of overload and uncertainty, i f  found to require act ion,  m ight be better 
approached di rectly .  
This conclusion i s  buttressed by the stubborn drawbacks of even a general 
administrative court-the inherent loss of diversity of view, j urisdictional un­
certainties that may surv ive the best efforts at drafting, and the  n eed for con­
tinual readj ustment of juri sd iction to accommodate shifts in caseload or in 
novelty. Not least . there i s  the danger long ago perceived by Frankfurter ancl 
Landis .  of concentrating great power 1 11 a small number of individuals. If 
this proved unacceptable in  the narrow field of railroad regulation, it is even 
more questionable where the very heart of our national regulator_:-· programs 
is at stake. There is security in the dispersion of power, and that ought not 
be l ightly discarded . 
·-- - - ---- -··· -- - ------
3 � 7 .  I n  addit ion to the communications inc luded in the REPORT OF T H E  PHE�IDE:\T,  
.\"ltpra. nnte 309,  s r r  the responses of the  AEC. Comptrol ler Genera l .  Consumer Product 
Safety Commission.  FA .'-\ . 1-ederal Reserve Board, I CC, NHTSA ( h igh\\·ay safety ) and 
S EC to our quest ionnaire. Letters to Antonin Scal ia ,  Chai rman of the ,-\dmin istrat ive 
Conference, from Office of General  Counsel of A EC,  Oct.  7, 1974 ; C P S C. �ov. 1 8, 1 974 ; 
Dep't of T reasury, Oct .  2 1 ,  1 974 ; Dep't  of T ransportat ion ,  Oct .  30.  1 97 4 ; Federal Reserve 
Board, Oct .  10. 1974 ; I CC. Nov. 5 ,  1 974 : and S EC, Oct.  10, 1 974. O f  the agencies  we 
questioned, only the General Services Admin is tration ( G SA ) and the m i l i t ary have 
expressed any d issat is faction on  this  score. The former's concern \\·as w i th government 
procurement cases : "11any j udges . . .  experience d i fficulty i n  d i s tingu ish ing bet\\·een 
the general concepts and the spec ia l i zed ones." Letter to Anton i n  Sca l ia ,  Chai rman of 
:\ clministrat ive Conference, from GSA, Dec. 24, 1 974. The Army argues that ' 'most 
d i s t r ict  j udges are not qua l i fi ed to decide" the "complex technical  and sc ient ific ques­
t ions" in patent and certain contract cases. The Navy, pr inc ipa l l y  concemecl w i th 
const i tut ional problems such as rt:servists '  \v igs and counsel at summary courts-ma rtial . 
says that  '\1 h i l e  the courts have displ ayed sutTicient understanding to deal  with purely 
sc ient ific quest ions . . .  , they have been s ingu lar ly i nept in  understanding the com­
p lex i ty of the day-to-day probl ems of the m i l i tary society [and]  repeatedly interfere 
i n  m i l i tary mat ters  wherein they have l i t t l e  or no competence. " Letter to Antonin Scal ia ,  
Chairman of Admini strat ive Conference, from Dep't of Defense, Dec. 6,  1 974. VVhi l e  the 
necess i ty of l iving \l· i th  revie\\- in the regular  courts  for at  least  the  short  t en�! m ight 
dampen any pub l i c  expressions oi d iscontent, we th ink the agencies '  responses nnt without 
s ignificance. 
The c reation of an administrative court. however. 11·ould fac i l i ta t e  the provision of 
t echnical staff help, if that be thought desirable .  to t he j udges. To equ ip  every circuit  
court. not to mention every distr ict  court ,  with expe1 t s  in the entire gamut of relevant 
kno\\· lcdgc \mul e\ be proh ib i t ive and h igh ly  ineffic ien t .  A pool of such talent to be 
assignee\ to various courts as  needed \\·auld preclude the establ ishment nf  a confident ial  
s taff relat ionship bet\\·een j udge and expert such as might develop on a s ingl e admin is­
trat ive court . La\\·yers  for  the part ies  are  l ikely to oppose such technica l  assistance in  
fear tha t  the unseen expert. whose v iews cannot be chal lenged because they are  kept 
confident ia l ,  w i l l  ar:tua l ly  make the dec i s ion.  :\n a l ternative might  he a technica l ly  qual ified  
master 11· ho \\·oul cl wr i te  a report open to party cr i t ic ism,  or a court-employed expert 
11 ·ho 1\·ou l d give his views in open court .  Either of these 11 ou l rl depr i \-e the j udges of 
the s ignificant values of confidential advice. 
The I l l inois Pol lut ion Cont rol Board was equipped with techn ica l ly  qua l ified ass is­
tants-sani tary engineerS-\\·ho worked under the  c lose supervis ion of the Chairman. They 
1\·orkecl not on \\·hole cases but on sel ected technical i ssues referred to them bv the 
Chairman and served very l argely as translators of technical language. They a lso 1:a ised 
questions for the Board to put to the parties .  B oard control of matters  oi policy was of 
course aided by the bet that the Board heard only pol lut ion cases. But on balance \l" e 
bel i c\·e t ha t  a sma l l  sta ff of technical aclv i  sors could  function e ffect iYcl  v i n  connection 
1\· i th  a broad ly rlcfinccl court of aclmin is tra t i \-e appea ls  ;\ Jlcl cou l d  be l�cpt hv s t rong­
l l l indecl j udg-es from unduly in !luencing deci s ions.  I n  any even t .  11·e th ink  the ou t look for 
such ach- isors d i s t inc t ly  better on such a court than in t h e  c i rcu i t cou r t s .  
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Finally, there remains the possibi l ity,  or l egitimate apprehension, of 1m­
proper in fluence on the appointive process. Vl/e have argued that the broad 
jurisdiction envisioned for such a court would reduce the vulnerabi lity of the 
court to political influence on the appointment process, but we must sound 
a note of  caution. A broad and d iverse j ur i sdiction is  no guarantee that reg­
ulated firms and industries or other interested groups wi l l  not press for the 
appointment of  friendly judges. I t  i s  not the narrowness of  the court's j uris­
dict ion.  but its exclusivity, that supplies the motive for such pressure .  A court 
that heard al l CAB business. even if i t  heard much else besides, would be  wel l  
worth the air l ines ·  capturing. One might reasonably hope that, with many 
influences heing brought to bear, none woul d  be effect ive ; and that no single 
interest group could persuasively demand a ' ' seat" on the court when so many 
others had as good a claim But one should not bank too heav ily on this 
hope. Cutting across the various fields of regulation, there i s , after a l l ,  a 
fairly constant opposition between what m ight be called the "consumer" in­
terest and the " indust rial ' '  or "uti l ity " interest . A potential appointee whose 
background commenclecl him to the natural gas or electric power industry is 
apt to be acceptable to rai l road. airl ine and shipping interests as well  and, by 
the same token . unacceptable to consumer and environmental ist groups in  
genera l .  No doubt th i s  greatly oversimplifies the matter . There are  many areas 
of confl ict between industries ( between competing t ransportation modes or 
energy sources . between carriers ancl shippers. between wholesale and retail 
gas suppl iers. and so on ) and of potential conflict between consumers and 
enYi ronmental ists .  \Vhen these qualifications have had their full clue. however. 
breadth of  j ur i sdiction would st i l l  be at best an unreliable safeguard against 
interest-group pressure. :'''" In short. we do not favor the establ i shment of an 
admin istrative court . 
I I I .  PRo POSALS FOR A N ATIO !'< AL CouRT OF A PPEALS 
An impressive a rray of prominent j udges, attorneys and scholars have 
recen t lY  endorsed proposals for a National Division of the Court of Appeals 
i ntenclecl to resolve i nterci rcu it conflicts, settle i mportant questions of federa I 
l avv , and rel ieve the dockets of the Supreme Court and o f  the circuit courts. 35n 
358. There i s  a related danger. Tradit ion has come to dictate the geographical d i s­
t r ibut ion of j udgeships wi th in  exist ing circui t s  and has been said to have a ffected both 
geograph ical and ethnic composi t ion of the Supreme Court from t ime to t i m e. Divis ion 
of j ur isd ic t ion  on sub j ect matter l ines  cou l d  encourage a cor responding trad i t ion o f  
a l l ocating scats on an admini strative court a l o n g  l i nes either of  spec ial  i n t erest  or  of  
subj ect  matter competence. \Ve s hould v iew any such devel opment as h ighly  a l arming : 
Courts are not the place for voting accord ing to interest-group representat ion, both 
because too few in terests can b e  represented and because the  theory o f  j ud ic ia l  ( a s 
opposed t o  l eg is la t ive ) revie\\. is that more neutral values shal l p rcva i l .  
3 5 9 .  Scr. C . (/ . ,  A B A  E E I'OHT O F  T H E  S PECIAL co �!'IUTTEE O N  CooRD l :\ ATIO:\ O F  J t• n r l'I M. 
bi PHO\ D l E XTS ( Feb .. 1 974 ) : Carri ngton. supra note 3 1 ; Gri swold, The Supreme Cour t's 
Cosrlnari : Ci< · il R ir1h ts and O ther  Problc ll ls, 1 973 U. ILL. L F .  6 1 5 ; Rosenberg, Planned 
Fft.ril > ility to Mat Chanpin.r; Needs of the Fedaal A ppella te System.  59 CoR N ELL L. REv.  
,; 76 ( 1 974 ) : Sta tc ! l f c n ts of .Tudgc Hufstedler and of 1\fr. Cris<c·old !Jefore the Com mission 
0 1 1  Rcz · ision of t/zc Federal C1> 1 1 r t  A ppellate Sys tem.  Apri l  1 .  1 974.  
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Detai ls are both variable and hazy. Some. l ike Dean Griswold , favor l i fet ime 
appointments to the new division for stabi l ity and cont inuity of decision ; 
others, l ike Professor Carrington, prefer brief assignments  of regular circuit 
judges, perhaps by the Chief J ustice .  to avoid specializat ion or to  rel i eve 
pressures on the appoint ing process. Some, l ike J uclge Hufst edler . would  have 
the new court review decis ions of the regional c ircuit courts : others,  including 
Dean G riswold ,  would give i t  j urisdiction now vested in  the regional courts 
in order to avoid a fourth j udicial t ier .  The plans of the A B A  and of the 
Advisory Counci l  of Appellate J ustice would make d ec isions of the new court 
fina l  only after they had lain before the Supreme Court for a specified t ime 
without adverse action . 
The most difficult probl em . which i s  not adequately resolved by any of 
the proposals, would be establ i shing the criteria for determining which cases 
should go to the National Division . The ABA committee recommended that 
the Supreme Court should determine th is  question within guidel ines spec ified 
by Congress, suggest ing possible 1\ ational Division j ur isdiction over col­
lateral attacks on criminal convictions, tax cases. rev iew of federal admin­
istrat ive decisions ancl cases from state courts of last resort . J u clge Hufstedler .  
agreeing that Congress should l is t  categories for the Supreme Court to  choose 
from , includes tax and patent cases, d irect and collateral r ev iew of state cr im­
inal  convictions, review of the N LRB, SEC.  FCC, FPC. FAA and I CC .  non­
const itutional intercircuit conflicts ,  and such federal statutorv matters as 
Congress may designate. Dean Griswold is  less specific .  argu ing that the new 
court should have j ur i sdict ion not of all cases ·w i th in a subj ect category, l est 
i t  become overly special ized, but of cases "where a prompt decision, having 
nat ionwide validity. i s  clesirable . · ·:wo This ,  he says . would  exclude nearly all 
crim inal and diversity cases ;mel "other types of cases turning largely on 
their facts. or without any general or national significance. ' ' :lHl 
The vari ety of these proposals makes it difficult to evaluate their impact 
upon the system of j udicial  review of administrat ive  act ion .  In genera l ,  we 
endorse Judge Friendly's c rit ic ism of the National Divis ion p roposals .'�G2 He 
sees no proof that the Supreme Court is too busy , l eaves important conflicts 
too long unresolved , or wastes t ime resolving unimportant ones. He doubts 
that the c ircuit courts woulcl be s ignificantly relieved by creating an addi­
t ional court to review thei r decisions. He fears that the new scheme would im­
pose additional burdens on the Court because its inaction would result in 
the e�tabl ishment of nat ional law . . He points out  that there  are too many ad­
minist rative appeals to  be lodged in a single court and that centralization 
. .  - . .  · - ··----�- - - ·----
360. Gri swold,  supra note 359,  at 632. 
36 1 .  !d. at  629. 
362. Sec Friendly, supra note 291 ; Stalt' I I I C J I I of l ud.iJc Frien dly F3 c for<' tl 1c C'o l l l l l l is­
sion on R c clision of the Federa l Court  A ppe llate S_\'SICJJ I ,  1 974. 
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would tmpose a substantial financial burden on the small l itigant 1 11 many 
administrative cases. 
I f  the National Court were to replace rather than to revtew the circuit 
courts. its impact would be similar to that of a general court of administ rative 
appeals  to the extent that its workload consisted of  administrative cases. 
Commingling some nonadministrative cases would help retain a general ist 
perspective but would impair the ability of the new court to develop a con­
sistent administrative law. The problem of central ized power over important 
areas of the l aw would remain, as would a serious r isk of j ur i sdictional l i t i ­
gat ion unless l ines were drawn very carefully indeed . To give the new court 
jurisdiction over "all cases needing prompt national decision . "  for example ,  
would create hideous j ur i sdictional disputes. 
If ,  on the other hand. the Nat ional Court vvere to review decis ions of the 
courts of appeals .  conflicts could be resolved without losing the value of diverse 
views where that i s  significant .  But the rel ief such a scheme would afford the 
ordinary courts would be much reclucecl, for al l  cases reaching the nevv court 
would al ready have been l it igated through the ci rcuit courts .  Professor Car­
rington anticipates that once an issue has Leen settled by the new court. suits 
raising the same question would no longer be filed. as they now are. in other 
circ:uits 86e� Quantifying the saving is ob\· iously difficult .  And the additional 
price of this scheme is to subj ect the parties to the costs and delays of st i l l  
another level of appel late review. \Ve view this a s  the  less desi rable al ter­
native _ :�64 
--------- - ---·- · -- -- - ·--·----- --- -
363. Carrington, supra note 3 1 , at 616 .  
364. A s  th is  A r tic le  went to the  printer ,  the Commission on I�e1· i s ion of the Federal  
Cour t  .<\ppel l ate System unvei led a proposal for the creation of a permanent National 
Court of Appeals to decide cases referred by t he Supreme Court  or t ransferred by a court  
of appeals .  S e c  Remarks of Senator Roman L.  H ruska at the  National Conierence 0 1 1  
Appel late  j us t ice, Jan.  26.  1 975,  rcprill lcd i 1 1  121  Cong . Rec.  S 1 077-80 ( da i ly  eel. J an .  28. 
1 975 ) .  The Supreme Court  could refer any case w ithin its appel late j ur i sdict ion and would 
be expected to promulgate rules to govern i t s  d i scret ion in so doing. The courts  of appeal s 
r:ould transfer anv case i n  which there 11·as an actual intercircuit  con A ic t  or i n  w h ich  "a 
persuasive showi1�g" was made that "an immediate author i tat ive determination" of a dis­
pos i t ive, recurring quest ion of federa l  law was " in  the national i nteres t . "  The ?\ational 
Court could refuse to accept cases transferred from the regional courts .  and its decisions 
on the merits 11·oul d  be revie11·able on cert iorari .  
'vVe have not yet had an oppor tun ity to g in th is  important new proposal  the careful 
cons ideration it deserves. 'vVe do, ho1vever, percei v e  some d i fficult ies .  The proposal deals  
d i rect ly w ith one of the probl ems discussed in  th i s  section : the lack.  as Senator Hruska put 
i t ,  of ' ·confidence that the Supreme Court i n  the decades ahead can be expected adequately 
to sat isfy the needs for stab i l ity and harmony in the national law as t he demands cont inue 
to i ncrease . . . !d. at S 1 078. It appears largely to avoid the  probl em of  a four th  t i e r .  as i n  
nearly a l l  cases t h e  new court 11·ould supplant e i ther Supreme Court or court of appea l s .  
But we do not  share the Comm ission's v i ew t h a t  ' " there 11·ould be no  occas ion for  l i t igation 
over jur isdict ion." Presumably this conclusion i s  based upon the fact that the decis ion to 
send a case to the National Court 11·ould be discret io nary and ( 11·e " ould it:T\·cnt ly  hope ) 
not i tse lf  subj ect  to review. B u t  cf. 28 U . S . C. § 1 40- H a )  ( 1 970 ) .  author iz ing intcrcl i s tr ic t  
t ransfers ior l i t igation convenience ; some such decisions ha1·e been rc,· ie11·ecl by mandamus 
under 28 U. S .C. § 1 65 1 ( 1 970 ) ,  sec ,  ('._(f . ,  H o ffm an v. B l ask i , 363 U . S .  335 ( 1 960 ) .  We do 
not think the discret ionary nature of t he dec i s i on prec l udes l i t igating about i t .  \Vh i l c  l i t t l e  
add i t ional e ffort m i gh t  be  requi red o f  e i ther the  part ies or the j udges in  Supreme Court  
cases  i 1 1  11·h ich j ur i sdict ional papers a lready must be prepared. the Cormn i ss ion's proposal  
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The question remains what to do about overload problems m the 
courts of appeals. It  may be that the creation of an administrative court is the 
least of evi ls .  \Ve hope not. It  would be  a pity to create an inferior system 
of judicial r eview because no better way can be found to restore to the fed­
eral courts the time required to do their j ob .365 
would impose a new certiorari-l ike practice upon the courts of appea l s .  Moreover.  the 
parameters governing t ha t  practice. except in cases of actual conflict ,  are at this stage 
vague enough to give r ise  to real problems. A broad view of w hen "an immediate authori­
tative determination" would be ' 'in the public  interest" migh t  str ip  the regional courts of 
al l  but routine cases, el iminate the benefits of diverse j udicial vie11·s-a problem adverted 
to but not r esolved by Senator Hruska-and either s wamp the N at ional Court or neces­
sitate wholesale and time-consuming retransfers. Surely no such interpretation i s  intended, 
but we must confess an inabi l i ty to perceive even a subj ective criterion short of this that 
lends meaningful content to the proposed test for transferabi l i ty. At the other extreme, 
regional courts j ealous of their interesting cases m ight frustrate the purpose of this 
scheme by excessive hosti l ity to transfers. A t  this problem stage, therefore, we have 
doubts as to the administrabi l ity of the proposal. Perhaps when the Commission fl eshes 
out the bare bones of its ideas. i t  can satisfy those reservations. Perhaps further r e fl ec­
tion w i l l  convince us that the difficulties noted above are not as serious as 11·e now believe 
them to be. Our tentative view, however, is that the problem of unsettled national la11' 
would have to be considerab l e  indeed to j ustify the adoption of the Comm ission's plan.  
365. s{'{' H ines & Nathanson. Sl lf'ra note 309. at C-7. C-20. 
